employee immunity in Maine

2022"Therefore, pursuant to section 626, a former employee may only claim what is owed according to the terms of the employment agreement; section 626 does not modify or supersede its terms." Richardson v. Winthrop, 2009 ME 109 , ,r 7, 982 A.2d 400 .

2022Considering the facts alleged in Bean's counterclaim and other documents central to Bean's claims, such as the employment agreement itself, see lvfoody, 2004 ME 20 , ,r 11, 843 A.2d 43 , Bean has stated a colorable claim for payment of unpaid wages under 26 M.R.S. § 626.

2022Considering the facts alleged in Bean's counterclaim and other documents central to Bean's claims, such as the employment agreement itself, see lvfoody, 2004 ME 20 , ,r 11, 843 A.2d 43 , Bean has stated a colorable claim for payment of unpaid wages under 26 M.R.S. § 626.

2021Likewise, in OfficeMax, the court found section 626 merely allows for the enforcement of an employer’s compensation plan by a former employee for all payments, including incentives and bonuses, but does not itself determine specific payments owed. 773 F.Supp.2d at 234 .

2009Id.

2009Thus, “section 8104-B(3) provides a governmental entity with discretionary function immunity despite section 8104-A.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83, ¶ 14 , 948 A.2d at 1229 (quoting Norton v. Hall, 2003 ME 118, ¶ 11 , 834 A.2d 928, 932 ) (emphasis omitted). [¶ 15] Discretionary function immunity is a creature of statute, “intended to provide absolute immunity for acts that are uniquely governmental.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83 , ¶ ¶ 16, 17, 948 A.2d at 1229 .

2009Thus, “section 8104-B(3) provides a governmental entity with discretionary function immunity despite section 8104-A.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83, ¶ 14 , 948 A.2d at 1229 (quoting Norton v. Hall, 2003 ME 118, ¶ 11 , 834 A.2d 928, 932 ) (emphasis omitted). [¶ 15] Discretionary function immunity is a creature of statute, “intended to provide absolute immunity for acts that are uniquely governmental.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83 , ¶ ¶ 16, 17, 948 A.2d at 1229 .

2009Thus, “section 8104-B(3) provides a governmental entity with discretionary function immunity despite section 8104-A.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83, ¶ 14 , 948 A.2d at 1229 (quoting Norton v. Hall, 2003 ME 118, ¶ 11 , 834 A.2d 928, 932 ) (emphasis omitted). [¶ 15] Discretionary function immunity is a creature of statute, “intended to provide absolute immunity for acts that are uniquely governmental.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83 , ¶ ¶ 16, 17, 948 A.2d at 1229 .

2009Thus, “section 8104-B(3) provides a governmental entity with discretionary function immunity despite section 8104-A.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83, ¶ 14 , 948 A.2d at 1229 (quoting Norton v. Hall, 2003 ME 118, ¶ 11 , 834 A.2d 928, 932 ) (emphasis omitted). [¶ 15] Discretionary function immunity is a creature of statute, “intended to provide absolute immunity for acts that are uniquely governmental.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83 , ¶ ¶ 16, 17, 948 A.2d at 1229 .

1982The purposes of section 68, as explicated in Weeks, supra at 1012-13 , are (i) to give the injured worker the benefit of the greater of any tort recovery and any workers’ compensation award, (ii) to relieve the carrier of the compensation burden that the third party’s fault has caused it to shoulder, and (iii) to prevent either a double recovery by the employee or an immunity for the third party tortfeasor.

1978Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 , 91 S.Ct. 1909 , 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971), an exemption within Garmon makes this a permissible state court action. [W]here the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act. 359 U.S. at 244 , 79 S.Ct. at 779 .

1978Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 , 91 S.Ct. 1909 , 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971), an exemption within Garmon makes this a permissible state court action. [W]here the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act. 359 U.S. at 244 , 79 S.Ct. at 779 .

1978Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 , 91 S.Ct. 1909 , 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971), an exemption within Garmon makes this a permissible state court action. [W]here the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act. 359 U.S. at 244 , 79 S.Ct. at 779 .

1978Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 , 91 S.Ct. 1909 , 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971), an exemption within Garmon makes this a permissible state court action. [W]here the regulated conduct touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to act. 359 U.S. at 244 , 79 S.Ct. at 779 .