employee violation in California

2002In this case, we consider whether a Catholic hospital exempt from the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq., 1 because it is “a religious corporation . . . not organized for private profit” (§ 12926, subd. (d)) and therefore not an “employer” within the meaning of the FEHA, may nonetheless be liable for terminating an employee in violation of public policy (see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ]).

2002In this case, we consider whether a Catholic hospital exempt from the Fair Employment and Housing Act (the FEHA), Government Code section 12900 et seq., 1 because it is “a religious corporation . . . not organized for private profit” (§ 12926, subd. (d)) and therefore not an “employer” within the meaning of the FEHA, may nonetheless be liable for terminating an employee in violation of public policy (see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ]).

2023“It is the firmly-established rule that a judgment on the merits favorable to an employee in an action by a third person for a tort of the employee is a bar to an action by the third person against the employer where the latter’s asserted liability for the tort rests upon respondeat superior 19 and not his independent tort.” (Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 461 ; accord, Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1347 .) “Because the vicarious liability of the employer is wholly dependent upon or derived from the liability of the employee, any substantive defense that i

2020“As a general rule, a new theory may not be presented for the first time on appeal unless it raises only a question of law and can be decided based on undisputed facts. [Citations.]” (Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 983 .) 5 They do cite one case for the proposition that a voluntary dismissal is not appealable, but that proposition is not particularly relevant. 9 We acknowledge “the firmly established rule that a judgment on the merits favorable to an employee in an action by a third person for a tort of the employee is a bar to an action by the third person against the em

2015(Id. at p. 177; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ].) It subsequently held such causes of action must be “tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ].) “It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Ca

2015(Id. at p. 177; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ].) It subsequently held such causes of action must be “tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ].) “It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Ca

1999The violation occurs, not in refusing to negotiate, but in discriminating against an employee or employees for exercising his or her rights of self-organization and designation of a representative for the purposes stated in the statute. *225 “We hold, therefore, that the plaintiffs state a cause of action for civil relief when they allege that they were discharged because they designated an attorney to represent them for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of employment.” (Montalvo v. Zamora, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 75 .) In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d 167

1996DISCUSSION (1) On appeal from a judgment or order of dismissal after the trial court has sustained a demurrer, this court must assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations of fact. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 635 [ 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 377 , 909 P.2d 981 ].) (2) Nevertheless, a trial court does not err in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend where the complaint discloses on its face that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. ( Basin Construction Corp. v. Department of Water & Power (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 819, 823 [ 245 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; 5

2007(See also Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880 [, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ] [recognizing common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against age discrimination].) Page v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal. App.4th 1206 [, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] held that an individual supervisor may be liable for retaliation against an employee in violation of FEHA.

2007(See also Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880 [, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ] [recognizing common law cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy against age discrimination].) Page v. Superior Court (1995) 31 Cal. App.4th 1206 [, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 529 ] held that an individual supervisor may be liable for retaliation against an employee in violation of FEHA.

2024(See Loder v. City of Glendale (1997) 14 Cal.4th 846, 861 (Loder) [“An employer ‘discriminates’ against an employee in violation of section 56.20, subdivision (b), if it improperly retaliates against or penalizes 4 an employee for refusing to authorize the employee’s health care provider to disclose confidential medical information to the employer or others (see Civ.

2014However, nothing in this section shall prohibit an employer from taking such action as is necessary in the absence of medical information due to an employee’s refusal to sign an authorization under this part.” “An employer ‘discriminates’ against an employee in violation of section 56.20, subdivision (b), if it improperly retaliates against or penalizes an employee for refusing to authorize the employee’s health care provider to disclose confidential medical information to the employer or others ...” (Loder v. City of Glendale (1997) 14 Cal.4th 846, 861 [ 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 927 P.2d 1200 ],

2015(Id. at p. 177; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ].) It subsequently held such causes of action must be “tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ].) “It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Ca

2015(Id. at p. 177; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ].) It subsequently held such causes of action must be “tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ].) “It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Ca

2013(Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1258 .) The nexus requirement is generally satisfied when an employer retaliates against the employee in violation of the policy. (3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency and Employment, § 250, pp. 325-326.) Redeker’s second cause of action is for wrongful termination in violation of Labor Code section 1102.5,1 which prohibits retaliation against employees who engage in whistleblowing and related activities.

1996DISCUSSION (1) On appeal from a judgment or order of dismissal after the trial court has sustained a demurrer, this court must assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations of fact. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 635 [ 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 377 , 909 P.2d 981 ].) (2) Nevertheless, a trial court does not err in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend where the complaint discloses on its face that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. ( Basin Construction Corp. v. Department of Water & Power (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 819, 823 [ 245 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; 5

2021(See also Stillwell v. The Salvation Army, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 363 [in wrongful termination action, parties conceded on appeal that a special verdict finding there was an at-will employment agreement was inconsistent with a special verdict finding the employer breached an implied agreement to terminate the employee only for cause]; Morris v. McCauley’s Quality Transmission Service, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 970 [verdict for the defendant on personal injury claim asserted on behalf of child was inconsistent with verdict awarding damages to the child’s mother for the child’s medical ex

2021(See also Stillwell v. The Salvation Army, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 363 [in wrongful termination action, parties conceded on appeal that a special verdict finding there was an at-will employment agreement was inconsistent with a special verdict finding the employer breached an implied agreement to terminate the employee only for cause]; Morris v. McCauley’s Quality Transmission Service, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 970 [verdict for the defendant on personal injury claim asserted on behalf of child was inconsistent with verdict awarding damages to the child’s mother for the child’s medical ex

2021(See also Stillwell v. The Salvation Army, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 363 [in wrongful termination action, parties conceded on appeal that a special verdict finding there was an at-will employment agreement was inconsistent with a special verdict finding the employer breached an implied agreement to terminate the employee only for cause]; Morris v. McCauley’s Quality Transmission Service, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 970 [verdict for the defendant on personal injury claim asserted on behalf of child was inconsistent with verdict awarding damages to the child’s mother for the child’s medical ex

2021(See also Stillwell v. The Salvation Army, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 363 [in wrongful termination action, parties conceded on appeal that a special verdict finding there was an at-will employment agreement was inconsistent with a special verdict finding the employer breached an implied agreement to terminate the employee only for cause]; Morris v. McCauley’s Quality Transmission Service, supra, 60 Cal.App.3d at p. 970 [verdict for the defendant on personal injury claim asserted on behalf of child was inconsistent with verdict awarding damages to the child’s mother for the child’s medical ex

2014An entity is ordinarily required to defend a civil action against an employee arising from the scope of employment. (§ 995; Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 168, 175 (Police Protective League).)7 By contrast, a public entity may, ordinarily, arbitrarily refuse an employee a defense in a criminal action.

2013An entity is ordinarily required to defend a civil action against an employee arising from the scope of employment. (§ 995; Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 168, 175 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 574 ] (Police Protective League).) 7 *670 By contrast, a public entity may, ordinarily, arbitrarily refuse an employee a defense in a criminal action.

2014An arbitration agreement’s provision that “the arbitrator shall only rely on governing law and not informal principles of ‘just cause . . .’ ” is not “unconscionably one-sided.” (Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1064, 1075, fn. 1 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 63 P.3d 979 ].) Sanchez’s employment was at will, and he was notified that he could be terminated without just cause.

2014Accordingly, the Arbitrator shall have no authority to require that CarMax have ‘just cause’ to discipline or to discharge an Associate or to change the terms and conditions of employment of an Associate, unless specifically required by federal, state or local law or as a remedy for a violation of applicable law by the Company with respect to the Associate.” The trial court concluded that this provision unfairly favored the employer, and Sanchez argues that it prevents an employee from asserting a common employee claim. 9 An arbitration agreement’s provision that “the arbitrator shall rely on

2004For example, while the employee has no claim for reimbursement of workers’ compensation benefits against the third party, the employer, and therefore its insurer, does.” (Employers Mutual, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 639 .) We acknowledge defendants’ point that, although the statute no longer speaks in terms of subrogation as an earlier version did (Stats. 1913, ch. 176, § 31, p. 295; see Insurance Co. v. Terminal Rys. (1919) 39 Cal.App. 388, 391 [ 178 P. 974 ]), the current statute and its predecessors have been characterized as codifying principles of equitable subrogation, rather than indemnity

2004For example, while the employee has no claim for reimbursement of workers’ compensation benefits against the third party, the employer, and therefore its insurer, does.” (Employers Mutual, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 639 .) We acknowledge defendants’ point that, although the statute no longer speaks in terms of subrogation as an earlier version did (Stats. 1913, ch. 176, § 31, p. 295; see Insurance Co. v. Terminal Rys. (1919) 39 Cal.App. 388, 391 [ 178 P. 974 ]), the current statute and its predecessors have been characterized as codifying principles of equitable subrogation, rather than indemnity

1996(Basin Construction Corp. v. Department of Water & Power (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 819, 823 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 178]; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 912, p. 349.) It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.

1996(Basin Construction Corp. v. Department of Water & Power (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 819, 823 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 178]; 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 912, p. 349.) It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.

2023“It is the firmly-established rule that a judgment on the merits favorable to an employee in an action by a third person for a tort of the employee is a bar to an action by the third person against the employer where the latter’s asserted liability for the tort rests upon respondeat superior 19 and not his independent tort.” (Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30 Cal.2d 453, 461 ; accord, Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1347 .) “Because the vicarious liability of the employer is wholly dependent upon or derived from the liability of the employee, any substantive defense that i

2021For example, in Shaw, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at pages 1344 to 1345, the Court of Appeal concluded in an employee’s wrongful termination action that the jury’s verdict for the employer on the employee’s breach of contract claim was inconsistent with the jury’s verdict for the employee on his claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, reasoning that the jury must have necessarily found the plaintiff was an at-will employee (by 35 rejecting the claim for breach of contract), but the finding of bad faith implied the jury believed the employee could only be dismissed fo

2004Appeals Bd., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at page 1437 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 explained: "When an employee suffers a cumulative injury over time, the employee may claim workers' compensation benefits against any one or more of successive employers or insurance carriers that employed or insured the employee during a maximum one-year injury period.

2004Appeals Bd., supra, 104 Cal.App.4th at page 1437 , 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 53 explained: "When an employee suffers a cumulative injury over time, the employee may claim workers' compensation benefits against any one or more of successive employers or insurance carriers that employed or insured the employee during a maximum one-year injury period.

1968(Cox v. Certified Grocers of Cal. Ltd., 224 Cal.App.2d 26, 31 [ 36 Cal.Rptr. 48 ]; see also Spruce v. Wellman, 98 Cal.App.2d 158, 162 [ 219 P.2d 472 ].) Here, the negligence of Valley must, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, be predicated upon the negligent acts of Wallis.

1968(Lynch v. Bencini (1941) 17 Cal.2d 521, 529-530 [ 110 P.2d 662 ]; Kooper v. King (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 621, 627-629 [ 15 Cal.Rptr. 848 ]; Adams Mfg. & Engineering Co. v. Coast Centerless Grinding Co. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 649, 655 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 761 ]; Mirabile v. Smith (1953) 119 Cal.App. 2d 685, 688-689 [ 260 P.2d 179 ].) “It is the firmly-established rule that a judgment on the merits favorable to an employee in an action by a third person for a tort of the employee is a bar to an action by the third person against the employer where the latter’s asserted liability for the tort rests upon re

1996DISCUSSION (1) On appeal from a judgment or order of dismissal after the trial court has sustained a demurrer, this court must assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations of fact. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 635 [ 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 377 , 909 P.2d 981 ].) (2) Nevertheless, a trial court does not err in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend where the complaint discloses on its face that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. ( Basin Construction Corp. v. Department of Water & Power (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 819, 823 [ 245 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; 5

1996DISCUSSION (1) On appeal from a judgment or order of dismissal after the trial court has sustained a demurrer, this court must assume the truth of all properly pleaded material allegations of fact. ( Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 635 [ 49 Cal. Rptr.2d 377 , 909 P.2d 981 ].) (2) Nevertheless, a trial court does not err in sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend where the complaint discloses on its face that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. ( Basin Construction Corp. v. Department of Water & Power (1988) 199 Cal. App.3d 819, 823 [ 245 Cal. Rptr. 178 ]; 5

2015(Id. at p. 177; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ].) It subsequently held such causes of action must be “tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ].) “It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Ca

2015(Id. at p. 177; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ].) It subsequently held such causes of action must be “tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ].) “It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Ca

2015(Id. at p. 177; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ].) It subsequently held such causes of action must be “tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ].) “It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Ca

2015(Id. at p. 177; Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 71 [ 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 , 960 P.2d 1046 ].) It subsequently held such causes of action must be “tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions.” (Gantt v. Sentry Insurance (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874 , 824 P.2d 680 ].) “It is settled that an employer’s discharge of an employee in violation of a fundamental public policy embodied in a constitutional or statutory provision gives rise to a tort action.” (Barton v. New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (1996) 43 Ca

2013(Guz v. Bechtel National Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 335 ; see also Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 889-890 ; Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 169-170 .) To support a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, the policy allegedly violated must be articulated, at the time of the discharge, in a constitutional or statutory provision.

2003(Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 335 [ 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352 , 8 P.3d 1089 ] (Guz); Stevenson v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 889-890 [ 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888 , 941 P.2d 1157 ] (Stevenson); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167, 169-170 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 ] (Tameny).) Several appellate courts, including Division Four of this court, have held that, because independent contractors are not employees, they lack standing to assert a claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy.

2007The “requirement of exhaustion of judicial remedies is to be distinguished from the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. [Citation.] Exhaustion of administrative remedies is ‘a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.’ [Citation.] Exhaustion of judicial remedies, on the other hand, is necessary to avoid giving binding ‘effect to the administrative agency’s decision, because that decision has achieved finality due to the aggrieved party’s failure to pursue the exclusive judicial remedy for reviewing administrative action.’ [Citation.]” (Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at

2001(See Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 70 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 316 , 5 P.3d 874 ].) While the court in Lucido found that integrity of the judicial system would not be undermined by allowing the same criminal charge to be litigated in both a probation revocation hearing and a criminal trial because the public had separate interests in the two proceedings, both the public and the parties have only one interest here: seeing that employees are not wrongfully discharged.

1999The violation occurs, not in refusing to negotiate, but in discriminating against an employee or employees for exercising his or her rights of self-organization and designation of a representative for the purposes stated in the statute. *225 “We hold, therefore, that the plaintiffs state a cause of action for civil relief when they allege that they were discharged because they designated an attorney to represent them for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of employment.” (Montalvo v. Zamora, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 75 .) In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d 167

1999The violation occurs, not in refusing to negotiate, but in discriminating against an employee or employees for exercising his or her rights of self-organization and designation of a representative for the purposes stated in the statute. *225 “We hold, therefore, that the plaintiffs state a cause of action for civil relief when they allege that they were discharged because they designated an attorney to represent them for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions of employment.” (Montalvo v. Zamora, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d at p. 75 .) In Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 27 Cal.3d 167