field test in District of Columbia

2017A field test is not disposi-tive but nonetheless can " 'constitute evidence' of the identity of the seized substance." Digsby, 981 A.2d at 605 (citing Duvall v. United States, 975 A.2d 839, 845-46 (D.C. 2009)). .

2017While a field test "is not dispositive" and, "standing alone, cannot prove [the nature of the substance] beyond a reasonable doubt,” it "does constitute evidence of the identity of the seized substance" and can be considered in a determination of whether the government’s evidence "was overwhelming.” Digsby v. United States, 981 A.2d 598, 605-06 (D.C. 2009) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), 19 .

2009At trial the officer started to describe a field test of the green weed substance, but the judge cut him off, saying “we can dispense with this part of the testimony since we have the DEA-7.” Id.

2009In undertaking our analysis of whether the error in admitting the DEA-7 report was harmless, we acknowledged that the evidence made it “more likely than not” that Fields intended to carry contraband, reasoning that “[h]iding a green weed substance in a private area of the body is not commonplace and surely permits an inference that it might be ... contraband.” Id. at 867 .

2022We believe the typical reasonable observer in appellant’s position would understand that Officer Julien was asking him to open the hood so the police could look under it, and would understand appellant’s cooperative and unqualified response as his full consent to do so for that conclusion in the present case would not change if we were to apply the more deferential “clearly erroneous” test. 19 Ware v. United States, 672 A.2d 557, 565 (D.C. 1996) (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252 ). 16 purpose – not merely his partial or limited consent to release the latch.

2017But, of course, appellant had a ―constitutional right to put the government to its proof and not put on a defense . . . .‖ Thomas v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 16 (D.C. 2006).

2017A field test is not disposi-tive but nonetheless can " 'constitute evidence' of the identity of the seized substance." Digsby, 981 A.2d at 605 (citing Duvall v. United States, 975 A.2d 839, 845-46 (D.C. 2009)). .

2017LLC v. District of Columbia, 84 A.3d 522, 530 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 15 A.3d 699 , 711 n.2 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 57 In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 778 (D.C. 2000) (citations omitted). 35 strongly suggests a quantity of pills containing MDPV.

2017Reply Brief Argument: Lack of Foundation for Detective Thomas’s Testimony For the first time in his reply brief — citing the trial court‟s comment that Detective Thomas appeared to be “outside his area of expertise” when testifying that he was “95% confident that all of these pills are the same” — Smith asks this court to find plain error in the trial court‟s allowing that testimony to go to the 52 Bernard v. United States, 575 A.2d 1191, 1193-94 (D.C. 1990) (circumstantial evidence sufficient to prove identity of suspected unlawful drug). 53 In his motion for judgment of acquittal, counsel fo

2017LLC v. District of Columbia, 84 A.3d 522, 530 (D.C. 2014) (quoting Marshall v. United States, 15 A.3d 699 , 711 n.2 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 57 In re Shearin, 764 A.2d 774, 778 (D.C. 2000) (citations omitted). 35 strongly suggests a quantity of pills containing MDPV.

2012See Parker v. United States, 757 A.2d 1280, 1286-87 (D.C.2000) (“It is well established that a defendant cannot well complain of being prejudiced by a situation which [he] created.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)).

2010See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922, 929 (D.C.2007); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633-34 (D.C.1992).

2010See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 916 A.2d 922, 929 (D.C.2007); United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633-34 (D.C.1992).

2009Supplemental Brief for Appellee at 24 n. 22. [3] Appellant also contends that the trial court's ruling violated his Sixth Amendment rights. [4] See Giles v. District of Columbia, 548 A.2d 48, 50-51 (D.C. 1988) ("The obvious purpose of this provision is to give sufficient notice to the defendant to decide whether to call the chemist for cross-examination....").

2007The trial court noted that after defense counsel elicited Officer Baker’s acknowledgment that a field test had been conducted, so that it became clear that “one officer says [the field-test] was done and another officer says it was not,” the usual procedures and who might have done the field-test were irrelevant and immaterial inquiries. 4 “[A] decision on an issue of relevance is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion, to which we owe substantial deference; we will overturn it only on a showing of abuse of discretion.” Stewart v. United States, 881 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C.2005) (citations omi

2007The trial court noted that after defense counsel elicited Officer Baker’s acknowledgment that a field test had been conducted, so that it became clear that “one officer says [the field-test] was done and another officer says it was not,” the usual procedures and who might have done the field-test were irrelevant and immaterial inquiries. 4 “[A] decision on an issue of relevance is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion, to which we owe substantial deference; we will overturn it only on a showing of abuse of discretion.” Stewart v. United States, 881 A.2d 1100, 1110 (D.C.2005) (citations omi

2007“Relevant evidence is that which tends to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without that evidence.” Stewart, supra, 881 A.2d at 1110 (quoting Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C.1977)) (other citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2007“Relevant evidence is that which tends to make the existence or nonexistence of a fact more or less probable than would be the case without that evidence.” Stewart, supra, 881 A.2d at 1110 (quoting Punch v. United States, 377 A.2d 1353, 1358 (D.C.1977)) (other citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

1997In reviewing the determination that appellant was not seized or in custody when he dropped the drags, “we defer to the trial court’s finding of fact, but determine the question of law de novo.” Patton v. United States, 633 A.2d 800, 814 (1993) (citations omitted).

1994See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-45 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 617-19 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (grand jury “generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials”; its “sources of information are widely drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence considered”); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 , 76 S.Ct. 406, 408 , 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (indictment may rest entirely on hearsay); In re Sealed Case, 237 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 318 , 737 F.2d 94, 100 (1984) (prosecutor has broad di

1994See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-45 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 617-19 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (grand jury “generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials”; its “sources of information are widely drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence considered”); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 , 76 S.Ct. 406, 408 , 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (indictment may rest entirely on hearsay); In re Sealed Case, 237 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 318 , 737 F.2d 94, 100 (1984) (prosecutor has broad di

1994See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-45 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 617-19 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (grand jury “generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials”; its “sources of information are widely drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence considered”); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 , 76 S.Ct. 406, 408 , 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (indictment may rest entirely on hearsay); In re Sealed Case, 237 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 318 , 737 F.2d 94, 100 (1984) (prosecutor has broad di

1994See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-45 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 617-19 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974) (grand jury “generally is unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials”; its “sources of information are widely drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected by the character of the evidence considered”); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 , 76 S.Ct. 406, 408 , 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956) (indictment may rest entirely on hearsay); In re Sealed Case, 237 U.S.App.D.C. 312, 318 , 737 F.2d 94, 100 (1984) (prosecutor has broad di

1979D.C. 67, 71-72, 447 F.2d 1236, 1240-41 (1971), the court explained: The rule operates to prevent an accused from successfully gaining exclusion of inadmissible prosecution evidence and then extracting selected pieces of this evidence for his own advantage, without the Government’s being able to place them in their proper context.