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30 California opinions name it 3 courts 1903–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jacobsengreen2 sentences2020We address these arguments in turn. 12 As previously noted, Jacobsen also separately discussed the government’s field test—concluding the testing of the white substance did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ( Jacobsen, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 122-123.) Because the same cannot be said for the agent’s actions in opening and viewing Wilson’s digital images (i.e., these actions do constitute a search), this part of the Jacobsen decision does not directly apply here. 2020We address these arguments in turn. 12 As previously noted, Jacobsen also separately discussed the government’s field test—concluding the testing of the white substance did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ( Jacobsen, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 122-123.) Because the same cannot be said for the agent’s actions in opening and viewing Wilson’s digital images (i.e., these actions do constitute a search), this part of the Jacobsen decision does not directly apply here. | 2 | 5 |
State Ex Rel. Jggreen2 sentences2014J.G. (1999) 320 N.J. 2014J.G., supra, 726 A.2d at p. 953 .) But here, Deputy Ochoa did not accuse defendant of any crime; he asked defendant whether he was on probation or parole, and merely asking 17 whether a person is on probation or parole does not in and of itself constitute an “unsupported outright accusation of criminal activity” to convert the inquiry into a detention. | 1 | 1 |
Amelco Electric v. City of Thousand Oaksgreen2 sentences2006(Amelco Electric v. City of Thousand Oaks (2002) 27 Cal.4th 228, 239 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 , 38 P.3d 1120 ]; Miller v. McKinnon (1942) 20 Cal.2d 83, 88 [ 124 P.2d 34 ].) North Bay argues that this rule is not applicable here because, once again, “[t]he protection of the public is not at issue in the context of this private project.” In Miller v. McKinnon, supra, 20 Cal.2d at page 88 , the Supreme Court stated, “ ‘Certain general principles have become well established with respect to municipal contracts, and a brief statement of these principles will serve to narrow the field of our inquiry he 2006(Amelco Electric v. City of Thousand Oaks (2002) 27 Cal.4th 228, 239 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 , 38 P.3d 1120 ]; Miller v. McKinnon (1942) 20 Cal.2d 83, 88 [ 124 P.2d 34 ].) North Bay argues that this rule is not applicable here because, once again, “[t]he protection of the public is not at issue in the context of this private project.” In Miller v. McKinnon, supra, 20 Cal.2d at page 88 , the Supreme Court stated, “ ‘Certain general principles have become well established with respect to municipal contracts, and a brief statement of these principles will serve to narrow the field of our inquiry he | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. McKinnongreen2 sentences2006(Amelco Electric v. City of Thousand Oaks (2002) 27 Cal.4th 228, 239 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 , 38 P.3d 1120 ]; Miller v. McKinnon (1942) 20 Cal.2d 83, 88 [ 124 P.2d 34 ].) North Bay argues that this rule is not applicable here because, once again, “[t]he protection of the public is not at issue in the context of this private project.” In Miller v. McKinnon, supra, 20 Cal.2d at page 88 , the Supreme Court stated, “ ‘Certain general principles have become well established with respect to municipal contracts, and a brief statement of these principles will serve to narrow the field of our inquiry he 2006(Amelco Electric v. City of Thousand Oaks (2002) 27 Cal.4th 228, 239 [ 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 900 , 38 P.3d 1120 ]; Miller v. McKinnon (1942) 20 Cal.2d 83, 88 [ 124 P.2d 34 ].) North Bay argues that this rule is not applicable here because, once again, “[t]he protection of the public is not at issue in the context of this private project.” In Miller v. McKinnon, supra, 20 Cal.2d at page 88 , the Supreme Court stated, “ ‘Certain general principles have become well established with respect to municipal contracts, and a brief statement of these principles will serve to narrow the field of our inquiry he | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ojedagreen2 sentences1995(See People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 591, 594-610 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ] (Leahy); People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30-32 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ] (Kelly).) A. HGN and Intoxication “Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may be horizontal, vertical, or rotatory. [Citation.] An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned from side to side (in other words jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN. [Citation.]” (People v. Ojeda (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 404, 406 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) The 1995(See People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 591, 594-610 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ] (Leahy); People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30-32 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ] (Kelly).) A. HGN and Intoxication “Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may be horizontal, vertical, or rotatory. [Citation.] An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned from side to side (in other words jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN. [Citation.]” (People v. Ojeda (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 404, 406 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) The | 1 | 1 |
City of Long Beach v. Mansellgreen2 sentences1995Therefore, leaving aside the issue of whether estoppel will lie against the District as a governmental entity (City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 496 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 ]), 8 the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme bars the City from invoking the equitable doctrine of estoppel to achieve dissolution of the District. 1995Therefore, leaving aside the issue of whether estoppel will lie against the District as a governmental entity (City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 496 [ 91 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 476 P.2d 423 ]), 8 the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme bars the City from invoking the equitable doctrine of estoppel to achieve dissolution of the District. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Kellyred2 sentences1995(See People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 591, 594-610 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ] (Leahy); People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30-32 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ] (Kelly).) A. HGN and Intoxication “Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may be horizontal, vertical, or rotatory. [Citation.] An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned from side to side (in other words jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN. [Citation.]” (People v. Ojeda (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 404, 406 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) The 1995(See People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 591, 594-610 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ] (Leahy); People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30-32 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ] (Kelly).) A. HGN and Intoxication “Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may be horizontal, vertical, or rotatory. [Citation.] An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned from side to side (in other words jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN. [Citation.]” (People v. Ojeda (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 404, 406 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) The | 1 | 1 |
People v. Leahygreen2 sentences1995(See People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 591, 594-610 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ] (Leahy); People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30-32 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ] (Kelly).) A. HGN and Intoxication “Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may be horizontal, vertical, or rotatory. [Citation.] An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned from side to side (in other words jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN. [Citation.]” (People v. Ojeda (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 404, 406 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) The 1995(See People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 591, 594-610 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663 , 882 P.2d 321 ] (Leahy); People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 30-32 [ 130 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 549 P.2d 1240 ] (Kelly).) A. HGN and Intoxication “Nystagmus is an involuntary rapid movement of the eyeball, which may be horizontal, vertical, or rotatory. [Citation.] An inability of the eyes to maintain visual fixation as they are turned from side to side (in other words jerking or bouncing) is known as horizontal gaze nystagmus, or HGN. [Citation.]” (People v. Ojeda (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 404, 406 [ 275 Cal.Rptr. 472 ].) The | 1 | 1 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1992The field of inquiry upon subjects properly involved in the endeavor to ascertain whether the juror is free from actual or implied bias is so broad that it will give each party ample opportunity to obtain information concerning the advisability of making peremptory challenges to the respective jurors." ( Id. at p. 755.) The court therefore held that a defendant "`cannot embark in a general exploration for the sole purpose of satisfying himself whether it will be safe to be tried by a juror against whom no legal objections can be urged.'" ( Id. at pp. 755-756, quoting People v. Hamilton (1882) 1992The field of inquiry upon subjects properly involved in the endeavor to ascertain whether the juror is free from actual or implied bias is so broad that it will give each party ample opportunity to obtain information concerning the advisability of making peremptory challenges to the respective jurors." ( Id. at p. 755.) The court therefore held that a defendant "`cannot embark in a general exploration for the sole purpose of satisfying himself whether it will be safe to be tried by a juror against whom no legal objections can be urged.'" ( Id. at pp. 755-756, quoting People v. Hamilton (1882) | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ivesgreen2 sentences1957(People v. Ives, 17 Cal.2d 459, 476 [ 110 P.2d 408 ]; People v. Harrison, 18 Cal.App. 288, 294 [ 123 P. 200 ]; see Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. 2, §§493-495, pp. 586-587.) It bears emphasis that the witness’s competency depends upon his ability to perceive, recollect, and communicate. 1957(People v. Ives, 17 Cal.2d 459, 476 [ 110 P.2d 408 ]; People v. Harrison, 18 Cal.App. 288, 294 [ 123 P. 200 ]; see Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. 2, §§493-495, pp. 586-587.) It bears emphasis that the witness’s competency depends upon his ability to perceive, recollect, and communicate. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisongreen2 sentences1957(People v. Ives, 17 Cal.2d 459, 476 [ 110 P.2d 408 ]; People v. Harrison, 18 Cal.App. 288, 294 [ 123 P. 200 ]; see Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. 2, §§493-495, pp. 586-587.) It bears emphasis that the witness’s competency depends upon his ability to perceive, recollect, and communicate. 1957(People v. Ives, 17 Cal.2d 459, 476 [ 110 P.2d 408 ]; People v. Harrison, 18 Cal.App. 288, 294 [ 123 P. 200 ]; see Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. 2, §§493-495, pp. 586-587.) It bears emphasis that the witness’s competency depends upon his ability to perceive, recollect, and communicate. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Tyreegreen2 sentences1957As was said in People v. Tyree, 21 Cal.App. 701, 706 [ 132 P. 784 ], “The statute does not undertake to prescribe or define *420 the amount or degree of mental unsoundness that must exist in order to disqualify the witness, but the reason for the existence of such a statute should be invoked, and we interpret that reason to require that the witness should have some apprehension of the obligation of an oath, and that he shall be capable of giving a fairly correct account of the things he has seen or heard, and this test should be made with special reference to the field of inquiry and character 1957As was said in People v. Tyree, 21 Cal.App. 701, 706 [ 132 P. 784 ], “The statute does not undertake to prescribe or define *420 the amount or degree of mental unsoundness that must exist in order to disqualify the witness, but the reason for the existence of such a statute should be invoked, and we interpret that reason to require that the witness should have some apprehension of the obligation of an oath, and that he shall be capable of giving a fairly correct account of the things he has seen or heard, and this test should be made with special reference to the field of inquiry and character | 1 | 1 |
East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Kieffergreen2 sentences1953Utility Dist. v. *744 Kieffer, 99 Cal.App. 240, 261 [ 278 P. 476 , 279 P. 178 ].) The state is complaining of seven rulings in some 240 pages of the cross- examination of three experts. 1953Utility Dist. v. *744 Kieffer, 99 Cal.App. 240, 261 [ 278 P. 476 , 279 P. 178 ].) The state is complaining of seven rulings in some 240 pages of the cross- examination of three experts. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Putnamgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Trumbogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Edwardsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Brittangreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Traskgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hines v. Davidowitz
green
2 sentences1974Comprehensive legislation by the Congress upon this subject may well be designed to preempt the field and to bar state action (id. p. 74 [ 85 L.Ed. at p. 591 ]). 1971Comprehensive legislation by the Congress upon this subject may well be designed to preempt the field and to bar state action (id. p. 74 [ 85 L.Ed. at p. 591 ]). | 2 | 1971–1974 |
United States v. Place
green
1 sentence2020(Jacobsen, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 123 .) As the Court explained: “Congress has decided—and there is no question about its power to do so—to treat the interest in ‘privately’ possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably ‘private’ fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest.” (Ibid.) The Court concluded that “the likelihood that official conduct of the kind disclosed by the record will actually compromise any legitimate interest in privacy seems much too remote to characterize the testing as a search subje | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Chapman v. California
red
1 sentence2014We need not decide whether the instruction was error because any error was harmless. “ ‘[A]n instructional error that improperly . . . omits an element of an offense . . . generally is not a structural defect in the trial mechanism that defies harmless error review and automatically requires reversal under the federal Constitution.’ [Citation.] Instead, an erroneous instruction that omits an element of an offense is subject to harmless error analysis under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 . [Citations.] In general, the Chapman test probes ‘whether it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Bogle
green
2 sentences2013(Id. at p. 179.) That conduct did not constitute either new evidence or an 4 In Collins, the court relied on the views in Bogle, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 770 to explain when a new field of inquiry has improperly been invaded by a jury. 2013(Id. at p. 179.) That conduct did not constitute either new evidence or an 4 In Collins, the court relied on the views in Bogle, supra, 41 Cal.App.4th 770 to explain when a new field of inquiry has improperly been invaded by a jury. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Higgins v. L.A. Gas & Electric Co.
green
1 sentence2010(Higgins, supra, 159 Cal. at p. 659 .) In the rifle case, the jury “merely subjected an exhibit to a more critical examination than had been made of it in court and by such examination reached a conclusion upon a contested fact by a more careful scrutiny . . . .” (Ibid.) In other words, under the rule established by Higgins , the jury’s experiment in the opium case invaded a new field of inquiry. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lee v. City Of Los Angeles
green
1 sentence2005(Id. at p. 777.) 2 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Lee, supra, 250 F.3d at page 683 , concluded that a detainee has “ ‘a constitutional right to be free from continued detention [but only] after it was or should have been known that the detainee was entitled to release.’ ” In the present case, the liberty interest at stake here—the alleged constitutional right to a speedy confirmation of the officers’ probable cause determination by use of laboratory testing—cannot be deemed a “fundamental” right that is “objectively, ‘deeply rooted in the Nation’s history and tradition.’ ” ( Washington, supra | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Pennington v. Hobson
green
1 sentence2005(Pennington, supra, 719 F.Supp. at p. 771 .) Thus, the court found that the arrestee did not have a constitutional right to a laboratory confirmation of the field test results because the police officers were not constitutionally required to obtain such information. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Salaman v. Bolt
green
1 sentence1995(Salaman, supra, 74 Cal.App.3d at p. 913 .) Field’s motion was denied, but after a successful appeal the attorney fees lien was impressed on Bolt’s judgment. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1995(State v. Superior Court (1986) 149 Ariz. 269 [ 718 P.2d 171, 181 , 60 A.L.R.4th 1103 ] (Blake); City of Fargo v. McLaughlin (N.D. 1994) 512 N.W.2d 700, 706 ; see also dis. opn. of Baxter, J., in Leahy, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 622-633.) 1. 1995(State v. Superior Court (1986) 149 Ariz. 269 [ 718 P.2d 171, 181 , 60 A.L.R.4th 1103 ] (Blake); City of Fargo v. McLaughlin (N.D. 1994) 512 N.W.2d 700, 706 ; see also dis. opn. of Baxter, J., in Leahy, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 622-633.) 1. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
City of Fargo v. McLaughlin
green
1 sentence1995(State v. Superior Court (1986) 149 Ariz. 269 [ 718 P.2d 171, 181 , 60 A.L.R.4th 1103 ] (Blake); City of Fargo v. McLaughlin (N.D. 1994) 512 N.W.2d 700, 706 ; see also dis. opn. of Baxter, J., in Leahy, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 622-633.) 1. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Hitch
green
2 sentences1980This was the basis of defendant’s motion pursuant to People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 527 P.2d 361 ]; it was denied. 1980This was the basis of defendant’s motion pursuant to People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641 [ 117 Cal.Rptr. 9 , 527 P.2d 361 ]; it was denied. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board
green
1 sentence1974Whether the Immigration and Nationality Act had this breadth and effect is, of course, a federal question.” (Italics added.) Proposed Congressional action was cited in Guss v. Utah Labor Board, supra, 353 U.S. 1 , as further indication of Congressional intent to preempt the field. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Coe v. Coe
green
2 sentences1966The direction of the court of appeal in reversing was to admit the excluded evidence and “to determine whether or not Alvera actually had her day in court in the Nevada proceeding.” Leila has sought by her claim of coercion, fraud and undue influence to bring her ease within the field of inquiry permitted by Heuer v. Heuer, supra, 33 Cal.2d 268 , Coe v. Coe, supra, 334 U.S. 378 [ 68 S.Ct. 1094, 1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1451 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1376 ], and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 [ 68 S.Ct. 1087,1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 ]. 1966The direction of the court of appeal in reversing was to admit the excluded evidence and “to determine whether or not Alvera actually had her day in court in the Nevada proceeding.” Leila has sought by her claim of coercion, fraud and undue influence to bring her ease within the field of inquiry permitted by Heuer v. Heuer, supra, 33 Cal.2d 268 , Coe v. Coe, supra, 334 U.S. 378 [ 68 S.Ct. 1094, 1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1451 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1376 ], and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 [ 68 S.Ct. 1087,1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 ]. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Heuer v. Heuer
green
1 sentence1966The direction of the court of appeal in reversing was to admit the excluded evidence and “to determine whether or not Alvera actually had her day in court in the Nevada proceeding.” Leila has sought by her claim of coercion, fraud and undue influence to bring her ease within the field of inquiry permitted by Heuer v. Heuer, supra, 33 Cal.2d 268 , Coe v. Coe, supra, 334 U.S. 378 [ 68 S.Ct. 1094, 1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1451 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1376 ], and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 [ 68 S.Ct. 1087,1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 ]. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Sherrer v. Sherrer
green
2 sentences1966The direction of the court of appeal in reversing was to admit the excluded evidence and “to determine whether or not Alvera actually had her day in court in the Nevada proceeding.” Leila has sought by her claim of coercion, fraud and undue influence to bring her ease within the field of inquiry permitted by Heuer v. Heuer, supra, 33 Cal.2d 268 , Coe v. Coe, supra, 334 U.S. 378 [ 68 S.Ct. 1094, 1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1451 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1376 ], and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 [ 68 S.Ct. 1087,1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 ]. 1966The direction of the court of appeal in reversing was to admit the excluded evidence and “to determine whether or not Alvera actually had her day in court in the Nevada proceeding.” Leila has sought by her claim of coercion, fraud and undue influence to bring her ease within the field of inquiry permitted by Heuer v. Heuer, supra, 33 Cal.2d 268 , Coe v. Coe, supra, 334 U.S. 378 [ 68 S.Ct. 1094, 1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1451 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1376 ], and Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 [ 68 S.Ct. 1087,1097 , 92 L.Ed. 1429 , 1 A.L.R.2d 1355 ]. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Drennan v. Star Paving Co.
green
2 sentences1964As applied to this field that doctrine is stated in Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409 [ 333 P.2d 757 ], a case arising between a general contractor and his own subcontractor. 1964As applied to this field that doctrine is stated in Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal.2d 409 [ 333 P.2d 757 ], a case arising between a general contractor and his own subcontractor. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Parrish v. Moss
green
1 sentence1955Of course, it is recognized that any bylaw of a board outlining teachers’ duties must stand the test of reasonableness.” Appellant seeks to apply the language of Parrish v. Moss, supra, to the instant case and asserts that the trial court should be reversed since the duties at the athletic contests were (1) in the nature of police work, (2) unprofessional, *375 (3) foreign to the field of instruction, and (4) imposed unreasonable hours, and therefore were not within the scope of the teaching duties required by the contract. | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| People v. MacDonald green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Williams v. Southern Pacific Co. green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| People v. Weber green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| People v. Ferdinand green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Municipality of Añasco v. Vélez neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Robinson v. Nevada Bank green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Russell v. Pacific Can Co. green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Merrill v. Forbes neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| People v. Car Soy neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Brobeck v. Superior Court of Cal., in & for S.F. neutral | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| Estate of Morey v. Wells green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Carro v. Cuevas Bustamante neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Mooney v. Olsen green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Miller v. Livingstone green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| In re the Estate of Carriger green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Ames v. Ames green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Estate of Welch green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| In Re Estate of Calef green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| In Re Estate of Silvany neutral | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Masterson v. Shelton green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Estate of Tibbetts green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.