field test in Georgia

2020See id. at 651 (1). 7 (Punctuation omitted.) Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27, 30 (3) ( 597 SE2d 392 ) (2004). 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Christy v. State, 315 Ga. App. 647, 650-651 (1) ( 727 SE2d 269 ) (2012). 8 officer’s belief that a suspect’s window tint violates OCGA § 40-8-73.1 is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, even if the officer later determines from a field test that the window tint did not in fact violate the statute.9 OCGA § 40-8-73.1 (b) provides: Except as provided in this Code section, it shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in this state: (1) Which ha

2020See id. at 651 (1). 7 (Punctuation omitted.) Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27, 30 (3) ( 597 SE2d 392 ) (2004). 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Christy v. State, 315 Ga. App. 647, 650-651 (1) ( 727 SE2d 269 ) (2012). 8 officer’s belief that a suspect’s window tint violates OCGA § 40-8-73.1 is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, even if the officer later determines from a field test that the window tint did not in fact violate the statute.9 OCGA § 40-8-73.1 (b) provides: Except as provided in this Code section, it shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in this state: (1) Which ha

2022The informant provided the substance he had purchased to Officer Woodall, who conducted a field test of the substance, which tested positive for cocaine. 2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 2 Waller was arrested in December 2017, and indicted on one count of the sale of cocaine.

2022The informant provided the substance he had purchased to Officer Woodall, who conducted a field test of the substance, which tested positive for cocaine. 2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 2 Waller was arrested in December 2017, and indicted on one count of the sale of cocaine.

2024See Thurmond v. State, 304 Ga. App. 587, 588, 590 (1) (b) ( 696 SE2d 516 ) (2010).

2024See Thurmond v. State, 304 Ga. App. 587, 588, 590 (1) (b) ( 696 SE2d 516 ) (2010).

2023Champion argues that, for the same reasons the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury’s verdict was contrary to the principles of justice and equity under OCGA § 5-5-20. “[N]o court except the trial court is vested by OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 with the authority to grant a new trial in a matter relating to the weight of the evidence.”14 The trial court here properly exercised its discretion as the “thirteenth juror.”15 Accordingly, this claim of error is without merit. 13 See Holmes v. State, 301 Ga. 143, 145-146 (1) ( 800 SE2d 353 ) (2017) (holding that a field test in

2023Champion argues that, for the same reasons the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury’s verdict was contrary to the principles of justice and equity under OCGA § 5-5-20. “[N]o court except the trial court is vested by OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 with the authority to grant a new trial in a matter relating to the weight of the evidence.”14 The trial court here properly exercised its discretion as the “thirteenth juror.”15 Accordingly, this claim of error is without merit. 13 See Holmes v. State, 301 Ga. 143, 145-146 (1) ( 800 SE2d 353 ) (2017) (holding that a field test in

2023Champion argues that, for the same reasons the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury’s verdict was contrary to the principles of justice and equity under OCGA § 5-5-20. “[N]o court except the trial court is vested by OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 with the authority to grant a new trial in a matter relating to the weight of the evidence.”14 The trial court here properly exercised its discretion as the “thirteenth juror.”15 Accordingly, this claim of error is without merit. 13 See Holmes v. State, 301 Ga. 143, 145-146 (1) ( 800 SE2d 353 ) (2017) (holding that a field test in

2023Champion argues that, for the same reasons the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury’s verdict was contrary to the principles of justice and equity under OCGA § 5-5-20. “[N]o court except the trial court is vested by OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 with the authority to grant a new trial in a matter relating to the weight of the evidence.”14 The trial court here properly exercised its discretion as the “thirteenth juror.”15 Accordingly, this claim of error is without merit. 13 See Holmes v. State, 301 Ga. 143, 145-146 (1) ( 800 SE2d 353 ) (2017) (holding that a field test in

2023Champion argues that, for the same reasons the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury’s verdict was contrary to the principles of justice and equity under OCGA § 5-5-20. “[N]o court except the trial court is vested by OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 with the authority to grant a new trial in a matter relating to the weight of the evidence.”14 The trial court here properly exercised its discretion as the “thirteenth juror.”15 Accordingly, this claim of error is without merit. 13 See Holmes v. State, 301 Ga. 143, 145-146 (1) ( 800 SE2d 353 ) (2017) (holding that a field test in

2023Champion argues that, for the same reasons the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, the jury’s verdict was contrary to the principles of justice and equity under OCGA § 5-5-20. “[N]o court except the trial court is vested by OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21 with the authority to grant a new trial in a matter relating to the weight of the evidence.”14 The trial court here properly exercised its discretion as the “thirteenth juror.”15 Accordingly, this claim of error is without merit. 13 See Holmes v. State, 301 Ga. 143, 145-146 (1) ( 800 SE2d 353 ) (2017) (holding that a field test in

2022The informant provided the substance he had purchased to Officer Woodall, who conducted a field test of the substance, which tested positive for cocaine. 2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 2 Waller was arrested in December 2017, and indicted on one count of the sale of cocaine.

2022The informant provided the substance he had purchased to Officer Woodall, who conducted a field test of the substance, which tested positive for cocaine. 2 See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Rankin v. State, 278 Ga. 704, 705 ( 606 SE2d 269 ) (2004). 2 Waller was arrested in December 2017, and indicted on one count of the sale of cocaine.

2022According to Waller, his conviction was in error as the State failed to establish a chain of custody of the drugs purchased by the informant. 5 Rankin, 278 Ga. at 705 (additional citations omitted). 6 Williams v. State, 174 Ga. App. 56, 58 (3) ( 329 SE2d 226 ) (1985). 7 Cooper v. State, 352 Ga. App. 783 , 787 (2) ( 835 SE2d 724 ) (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 In order to show the chain of custody adequate to preserve the identity of fungible evidence, the State has the burden of proving with reasonable certainty that the evidence is the same as that seized and that there has be

2022According to Waller, his conviction was in error as the State failed to establish a chain of custody of the drugs purchased by the informant. 5 Rankin, 278 Ga. at 705 (additional citations omitted). 6 Williams v. State, 174 Ga. App. 56, 58 (3) ( 329 SE2d 226 ) (1985). 7 Cooper v. State, 352 Ga. App. 783 , 787 (2) ( 835 SE2d 724 ) (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted). 4 In order to show the chain of custody adequate to preserve the identity of fungible evidence, the State has the burden of proving with reasonable certainty that the evidence is the same as that seized and that there has be

2021See generally Gadson v. State, 252 Ga. App. 347, 349 (4) ( 556 SE2d 449 ) (2001) (probable cause existed during the execution of a search warrant when the police found a substance which appeared to be cocaine and which a field test showed to be cocaine and defendant admitted to living at the address).

2021See generally Gadson v. State, 252 Ga. App. 347, 349 (4) ( 556 SE2d 449 ) (2001) (probable cause existed during the execution of a search warrant when the police found a substance which appeared to be cocaine and which a field test showed to be cocaine and defendant admitted to living at the address).

2020See id. at 651 (1). 7 (Punctuation omitted.) Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27, 30 (3) ( 597 SE2d 392 ) (2004). 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Christy v. State, 315 Ga. App. 647, 650-651 (1) ( 727 SE2d 269 ) (2012). 8 officer’s belief that a suspect’s window tint violates OCGA § 40-8-73.1 is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, even if the officer later determines from a field test that the window tint did not in fact violate the statute.9 OCGA § 40-8-73.1 (b) provides: Except as provided in this Code section, it shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in this state: (1) Which ha

2020See id. at 651 (1). 7 (Punctuation omitted.) Ciak v. State, 278 Ga. 27, 30 (3) ( 597 SE2d 392 ) (2004). 8 (Punctuation omitted.) Christy v. State, 315 Ga. App. 647, 650-651 (1) ( 727 SE2d 269 ) (2012). 8 officer’s belief that a suspect’s window tint violates OCGA § 40-8-73.1 is sufficient to justify an investigatory stop, even if the officer later determines from a field test that the window tint did not in fact violate the statute.9 OCGA § 40-8-73.1 (b) provides: Except as provided in this Code section, it shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in this state: (1) Which ha

2018See State v. Jones , 297 Ga. 156 , 158 (1), ( 773 S.E.2d 170 ) (2015).

2018See State v. Jones , 297 Ga. 156 , 158 (1), ( 773 S.E.2d 170 ) (2015).

2012Indeed, in prior cases involving 11 249 Ga. 519, 525-526 (1) ( 292 SE2d 389 ) (1982) (affirming the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the defendant’s statements made while under the influence of “truth serum”). 12 Id. at 525 (1). 13 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fortune, 304 Ga. App. at 298-299 (2). 5 such chemical field testing, we have expressly stated that we have found no case where the results of a chemical field test have been held inadmissible, and instead have indicated that the proper trial procedure is to admit the chemical field test results and then allow for a thorough

2012Indeed, in prior cases involving 11 249 Ga. 519, 525-526 (1) ( 292 SE2d 389 ) (1982) (affirming the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the defendant’s statements made while under the influence of “truth serum”). 12 Id. at 525 (1). 13 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fortune, 304 Ga. App. at 298-299 (2). 5 such chemical field testing, we have expressly stated that we have found no case where the results of a chemical field test have been held inadmissible, and instead have indicated that the proper trial procedure is to admit the chemical field test results and then allow for a thorough

2012Indeed, in prior cases involving 11 249 Ga. 519, 525-526 (1) ( 292 SE2d 389 ) (1982) (affirming the exclusion of expert testimony regarding the defendant’s statements made while under the influence of “truth serum”). 12 Id. at 525 (1). 13 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Fortune, 304 Ga. App. at 298-299 (2). 5 such chemical field testing, we have expressly stated that we have found no case where the results of a chemical field test have been held inadmissible, and instead have indicated that the proper trial procedure is to admit the chemical field test results and then allow for a thorough

2011See State v. Webb, 193 Ga. App. 2, 5 (2) ( 386 SE2d 891 ) (1989) (the plain view doctrine supports a warrantless search and seizure if the officers are lawfully in position to obtain the view, the discovery is inadvertent, and the object viewed is immediately seen to be incriminating); Griffin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 189, 190 ( 348 SE2d 577 ) (1986) (arrest and *122 search are predicated on probable cause where officer relies on his senses to “see” contraband in plain view).

2011See State v. Webb, 193 Ga. App. 2, 5 (2) ( 386 SE2d 891 ) (1989) (the plain view doctrine supports a warrantless search and seizure if the officers are lawfully in position to obtain the view, the discovery is inadvertent, and the object viewed is immediately seen to be incriminating); Griffin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 189, 190 ( 348 SE2d 577 ) (1986) (arrest and *122 search are predicated on probable cause where officer relies on his senses to “see” contraband in plain view).

2011See State v. Webb, 193 Ga. App. 2, 5 (2) ( 386 SE2d 891 ) (1989) (the plain view doctrine supports a warrantless search and seizure if the officers are lawfully in position to obtain the view, the discovery is inadvertent, and the object viewed is immediately seen to be incriminating); Griffin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 189, 190 ( 348 SE2d 577 ) (1986) (arrest and *122 search are predicated on probable cause where officer relies on his senses to “see” contraband in plain view).

2011See State v. Webb, 193 Ga. App. 2, 5 (2) ( 386 SE2d 891 ) (1989) (the plain view doctrine supports a warrantless search and seizure if the officers are lawfully in position to obtain the view, the discovery is inadvertent, and the object viewed is immediately seen to be incriminating); Griffin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 189, 190 ( 348 SE2d 577 ) (1986) (arrest and *122 search are predicated on probable cause where officer relies on his senses to “see” contraband in plain view).

2011She further testified that she prepared samples of the substance for testing, that the substance was tested in accordance with lab procedures, that the crime lab ran two different tests on the substance (one that she personally ran), that the results were peer reviewed, and that, in her opinion, the substance found in White’s pocket consisted of 10.36 grams of cocaine. 7 This evidence, coupled *390 with the testimony of the drug task force officer about the field test that indicated the presence of cocaine, was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find White guilty beyond a reasona

2011She further testified that she prepared samples of the substance for testing, that the substance was tested in accordance with lab procedures, that the crime lab ran two different tests on the substance (one that she personally ran), that the results were peer reviewed, and that, in her opinion, the substance found in White’s pocket consisted of 10.36 grams of cocaine. 7 This evidence, coupled *390 with the testimony of the drug task force officer about the field test that indicated the presence of cocaine, was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find White guilty beyond a reasona

2004State v. Wright, supra, 221 Ga. App. at 205 (fact that officer did not charge defendant with offenses on which stop based is immaterial). *31 Decided June 7, 2004.

1993Riley v. State, 175 Ga. App. 810 (1) ( 334 SE2d 863 ) (1985); Magher v. State, 199 Ga. App. 508, 509 (3) ( 405 SE2d 327 ) (1991). 3.

1993Riley v. State, 175 Ga. App. 810 (1) ( 334 SE2d 863 ) (1985); Magher v. State, 199 Ga. App. 508, 509 (3) ( 405 SE2d 327 ) (1991). 3.

1988Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560); Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758, 759 (2) ( 341 SE2d 288 ).

1988Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560); Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758, 759 (2) ( 341 SE2d 288 ).

1985Hunter v. State, 143 Ga. App. 541, 543 (5) ( 239 SE2d 212 ) (1977).

1985Hunter v. State, 143 Ga. App. 541, 543 (5) ( 239 SE2d 212 ) (1977).