field inquiry in New Jersey

2026"A field inquiry is essentially a voluntary encounter between the police and a member of the public in which the police ask questions and do not compel an individual to answer." State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 271 (2017).

2026"A field inquiry is essentially a voluntary encounter between the police and a member of the public in which the police ask questions and do not compel an individual to answer. " Ibid.

2024"A field inquiry is essentially a voluntary encounter between the police and a member of the public in which the police ask questions and do not compel an individual to answer." State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 271 (2017) (citing State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 (2001)).

2022See, e.g., State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 484 (2001) (“[T]he questioning of [a] defendant as part of a field inquiry is not sustainable if the officers approached him and his companions solely because of their race and age.”); State v. Segars, 172 N.J. 481, 493 (2002) (“[I]f race is the sole motivation underlying the use of a M[obile] D[ata] T[erminal] [in checking the status of a driver’s license], it is illegal . . . .”).

2026"A field inquiry 'is a limited form of police investigation that, except for impermissible reasons such as race, may be conducted "without grounds for suspicion."'" State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510 (2003) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)).

2026A-2976-24 8 The Supreme Court has further defined a field inquiry as "the least intrusive" form of police encounter, "occur[ring] when a police officer approaches an individual and asks 'if [the person] is willing to answer some questions.'" State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510 (2003)).

2026"A field inquiry 'is a limited form of police investigation that, except for impermissible reasons such as race, may be conducted "without grounds for suspicion."'" State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510 (2003) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002)).

2019One such encounter is a field inquiry, "a voluntary encounter between the police and a member of the public in which the police ask questions and do not compel an individual to answer." Ibid.

2026A-2976-24 8 The Supreme Court has further defined a field inquiry as "the least intrusive" form of police encounter, "occur[ring] when a police officer approaches an individual and asks 'if [the person] is willing to answer some questions.'" State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510 (2003)).

2025Our Supreme Court has defined a field inquiry as "the least intrusive" form of police encounter, occurring when "a police officer approaches an individual and asks 'if [the person] is willing to answer some questions.'" State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510 (2003)).

2022"Because a field inquiry is voluntary and does not effect a seizure in constitutional terms, no particular suspicion of criminal activity is necessary on the part of an officer conducting such an inquiry." Id. at 272 (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007)). 2 The court also found that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he had rolled his window down.

2020When subjected to a field inquiry, a person "need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way." State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 (2001) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 , 497–98 (1983)).

2026The Rule provides that “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 16 skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” To satisfy the Rule, the proponent of expert evidence must establish three things: (1) the subject matter of the testimony must be “beyond the ken of the average juror”; (2) the field of inquiry “must be at a state of the art such that an expert’s testimony could be suffici

2025N.J.R.E. 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto A-1825-22 23 in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The party seeking admission of expert testimony must demonstrate: (1) the subject matter of the testimony must be "beyond the ken of the average juror"; (2) the field of inquiry "must be at a state of the art such that an expert'

2025The proponent of expert testimony must establish that “(1) the subject matter of the testimony [is] ‘beyond the ken of the average juror’; (2) the field of inquiry ‘[is] at a state of the art such that an expert’s testimony could be sufficiently reliable’; and 78 (3) ‘the witness [has] sufficient expertise to offer the’ testimony.” J.L.G., 234 N.J. at 280 (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 208 (1984)).

2021A-4207-19T4 39 To fulfill their gatekeeping responsibility, judges begin by applying N.J.R.E. 702, which states that, "[i]f scientific . . . knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." To satisfy this requirement, the proponent of expert evidence must establish three things: (1) the subject matter of the testimony must be "beyond the ken of the average juror"; (2) the field of inquiry "must

2026Unlike a field inquiry, an investigatory stop, also known as a Terry2 stop, "is characterized by a detention in which the person approached by a police officer would not reasonably feel free to leave, even though the encounter falls short of a formal arrest." State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. 167 , 177 (App. Div. 2011); see also State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356-57 (2002); Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.

2020The Law Division subsequently granted defendant's motion to suppress. 2 Before doing so, however, the court, relying on State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 (2002), explained that the police were initially entitled to conduct a field inquiry 2 The other occupants of the vehicle were also indicted but all charges were dismissed at the time of defendant's plea and they have not participated in this appeal.

2022The court determined Storch then directed defendant to sit on the curb and, at that point, the field inquiry became an investigative detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

2019The crucial distinction is that while a field inquiry does not constitute a seizure for the purposes of the federal and state constitutions, and thus requires no A-1442-17T4 7 particularized suspicion of criminal activity, an investigative detention must be supported by an officer's "reasonable and particularized suspicion . . . that an individual has just engaged in, or was about to engage in, criminal activity." State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 356 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).

2022A field inquiry consists of questions that "[are] not harassing, overbearing, or accusatory in nature," State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 510 (2003)). "[T]he individual approached 'need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.'" State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 24 (2010) (quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 (2001)).

2020During such a field inquiry, "the individual approached 'need not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.'" State v. Privott, 203 N.J. 16, 24 (2010) (quoting State v. Maryland, 167 N.J. 471, 483 (2001)).

2022"Because a field inquiry is voluntary and does not effect a seizure in constitutional terms, no particular suspicion of criminal activity is necessary on the part of an officer conducting such an inquiry." Id. at 272 (citing State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 246 (2007)). 2 The court also found that defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he had rolled his window down.

2020"Because a field inquiry is voluntary and does not effect A-2500-18T1 12 a seizure in constitutional terms, no particular suspicion of criminal activity is necessary on the part of an officer conducting such an inquiry." Id. at 272 (citing Elders, 192 N.J. at 246 ).

2021Seeing "no reason to depart from the general rule that a request for identification does not, in and of itself, transform a field inquiry into a Terry stop," the Sirianni court expressed its continued adherence "to the general standard of reasonableness, measured against the totality of the A-4752-17 36 circumstances including, in the mix, the seriousness of the criminal activity and the degree of police intrusion involved." Ibid.

2019LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 9.2 at 53 (1978)). "[A]uthoritative questions that presuppose criminal activity or are otherwise indicative of criminal suspicion, thus making the suspect aware he is the focus of a particularized investigation, may be considered as part of the totality of circumstances in determining whether a field inquiry has escalated into an investigatory stop." State v. Sirianni, 347 N.J.

2022Super. 247 , 252–53 (App. Div. 2001) (finding that an officer who approached the driver of a stopped vehicle and asked why he was in the area performed only a field inquiry); State v. Egan, 325 N.J.

2021See Rosario, 229 N.J. at 273 - 74 (noting officer's immediate request for the defendant's identification "[a]lthough not determinative," reinforced the encounter was an investigative detention and not a field inquiry) (citing State v. Egan, 325 N.J.

2019"In contrast to a field inquiry, an investigative detention . . . occurs during a police encounter when 'an objectively reasonable person' would feel 'that his or her right to move has been restricted.'" Id. at 272 (quoting Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 126 ); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (plurality opinion) (holding that a person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when, "in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave").

2017A field inquiry can be transformed into an investigative stop when "a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 , 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877 , 64 L.

2018The police may initiate a field inquiry "by approaching an individual on the street, or in another public 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 7 A-3305-16T3 place, and 'by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions[.]'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 497 (1986)).

2002In general terms, a police officer properly initiates a field inquiry by approaching an individual on the street, or in another public place, and “ ‘by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions!!]’ ” State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 497 , 517 A.2d 859 (1986) (citations omitted).

2020A field inquiry does not violate Fourth Amendment 1 protections "so long as the officer does not deny the individual the right to move." State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 447 (1973); see also State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 273-74 (2017) (citing State v. Egan, 325 N.J.

2017"A field inquiry is not considered a seizure 'in the constitutional sense so long as the officer does not deny the individual the right to move.'" State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 126 (2002) (quoting State v. Sheffield, 62 N.J. 441, 447 , cert. denied, 414 U.S. 876 , 94 S. Ct. 83 , 38 L.

2025Ibid. "[A] field [inquiry] is not a Fourth Amendment event 'so long as the officer does not deny the individual the right to move.'" State v. Egan, 325 N.J.

2020Of course, whether a police/citizen encounter is only a field inquiry or something more "is always fact-sensitive and similar facts, when mixed and matched with other circumstances, will produce varying legal conclusions." Stampone, 341 N.J.

2020See State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 291-92 (2014) (stating that a field inquiry involves questioning that is not "harassing, overbearing, or accusatory in nature," and the person is free to refuse and terminate the encounter, but an investigative stop is one where a reasonable person would not feel free to leave).

2015Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980))); see also State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 291 (2014) (a field inquiry's questioning should not be "'harassing, overbearing, or accusatory in nature'"). 7 A-4295-12T4 Defendant argues that an officer smelling marijuana must be in a lawful vantage point.

2019Ibid. "[A]bsent any impermissible reason for questioning defendant[s], the officers [are] permitted to make a field inquiry 'without grounds for suspicion.'" Maryland, 167 N.J. at 483 (quoting State v. Contreras, 326 N.J.

2002J.G., 320 N.J.Super. 21, 31 , 726 A. 2d 948 (App.Div.1999) (finding that asking questions such as whether you "do not have anything you shouldn't" converts an inquiry into a Terry stop); Costa, supra, 327 N.J.Super. at 31 , 742 A. 2d 599 (finding that questions such as "what are you doing" and "[a]re you doing something that you're not suppose to be doing out here" convert a benign field inquiry into a Terry stop); Contreras, supra, 326 N.J.Super. at 540 , 742 A. 2d 154 (concluding that asking the defendants whether they had contraband on them converted a field inquiry into an investigative de

2018However, as support for that proposition, the panel relied on State v. Torres , which was a criminal case that applied the Frye standard in determining the admissibility of expert witness testimony. 183 N.J. 554 , 568, 874 A.2d 1084 (2005) (stating that "the field of inquiry must be generally accepted such that an expert's testimony would be sufficiently reliable" for expert testimony to be admissible); see also State v. J.R. , 227 N.J. 393 , 410, 152 A.3d 180 (2017) (relying on Torres for proposition that appellate court need not be as deferential on admissibility of expert scientific evidenc

2018However, as support for that proposition, the panel relied on State v. Torres , which was a criminal case that applied the Frye standard in determining the admissibility of expert witness testimony. 183 N.J. 554 , 568, 874 A.2d 1084 (2005) (stating that "the field of inquiry must be generally accepted such that an expert's testimony would be sufficiently reliable" for expert testimony to be admissible); see also State v. J.R. , 227 N.J. 393 , 410, 152 A.3d 180 (2017) (relying on Torres for proposition that appellate court need not be as deferential on admissibility of expert scientific evidenc

2024In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. at 349 (quoting State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 223 (1984)).

2019In re Accutane Litigation, 234 N.J. 340, 387 (2018). 9 We are unpersuaded by the Connecticut Supreme Court's reasoning that the other evidence was also sufficient to establish the field test was reliable.

2022State v. Adubato, 420 N.J.

2022See, e.g., Adubato, 420 N.J.

2002J.G., 320 N.J.Super. 21, 31 , 726 A. 2d 948 (App.Div.1999) (finding that asking questions such as whether you "do not have anything you shouldn't" converts an inquiry into a Terry stop); Costa, supra, 327 N.J.Super. at 31 , 742 A. 2d 599 (finding that questions such as "what are you doing" and "[a]re you doing something that you're not suppose to be doing out here" convert a benign field inquiry into a Terry stop); Contreras, supra, 326 N.J.Super. at 540 , 742 A. 2d 154 (concluding that asking the defendants whether they had contraband on them converted a field inquiry into an investigative de

2002J.G., 320 N.J.Super. 21, 31 , 726 A. 2d 948 (App.Div.1999) (finding that asking questions such as whether you "do not have anything you shouldn't" converts an inquiry into a Terry stop); Costa, supra, 327 N.J.Super. at 31 , 742 A. 2d 599 (finding that questions such as "what are you doing" and "[a]re you doing something that you're not suppose to be doing out here" convert a benign field inquiry into a Terry stop); Contreras, supra, 326 N.J.Super. at 540 , 742 A. 2d 154 (concluding that asking the defendants whether they had contraband on them converted a field inquiry into an investigative de

2019"A field inquiry is permissible so long as the questions '[are] not harassing, overbearing, or accusatory in nature.'" State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 20 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nishina, 1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2 U.S. Const. amend.

2018The police may initiate a field inquiry "by approaching an individual on the street, or in another public 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 7 A-3305-16T3 place, and 'by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions[.]'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 497 (1986)).

2025During the relevant period, New Jersey courts relied on the standard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

2019The court declined to decide "[w]hether a field test alone would be sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the substance tested was crack cocaine." 9 Id. at 10 . (continued) horizontal gaze nystagmus test did not yet pass muster under Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.

2020State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 164-66 (1994) (citing U. S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980)).

2018For that reason, an officer's conclusory statements that he merely intended to conduct a field inquiry or that a citizen was free to leave are "not probative." Ibid.