field test in Indiana

2012As for Burkett’s claim that the State failed to present a sufficient foundation for the reliability of the field test, which is Doolin’s claim in the present case, the Burkett court concluded that the field test was admissible because “the results of this type of test have been admitted in other cases,” citing Houston v. State, 553 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ind.1990) and Bellamy v. State, 259 Ind. 254 , 286 N.E.2d 401 (1972).

2012As for Burkett’s claim that the State failed to present a sufficient foundation for the reliability of the field test, which is Doolin’s claim in the present case, the Burkett court concluded that the field test was admissible because “the results of this type of test have been admitted in other cases,” citing Houston v. State, 553 N.E.2d 117, 119 (Ind.1990) and Bellamy v. State, 259 Ind. 254 , 286 N.E.2d 401 (1972).

2015Id.

2007Id.

2013Id.

2013Id.

1979Inasmuch as the trial court eventually excluded State’s Exhibit No. 1 because of the break in the chain of custody, defendant contends that there is a failure of proof to connect her with any controlled substance, and that she is entitled to a reversal under the holding of Graham v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 525 , 255 N.E.2d 652 .

1979Inasmuch as the trial court eventually excluded State’s Exhibit No. 1 because of the break in the chain of custody, defendant contends that there is a failure of proof to connect her with any controlled substance, and that she is entitled to a reversal under the holding of Graham v. State (1970), 253 Ind. 525 , 255 N.E.2d 652 .

1966In Moore et al. v. Shields (1889), 121 Ind. 267 , 23 N. E. 89 , the Supreme Court laid down the rule in regard to the admission of evidence attempting to prove a conspiracy, “. . . the field of inquiry is broadened to allow the trial court a wide discretion in the admission of evidence showing the relation the parties to the conspiracy bear to each other, their interest in the success of the act to be accomplished or in the motive for its formation.” Taking these rules into consideration we cannot say that the trial court was in error in refusing to give these instructions because the jury cou

1966In Moore et al. v. Shields (1889), 121 Ind. 267 , 23 N. E. 89 , the Supreme Court laid down the rule in regard to the admission of evidence attempting to prove a conspiracy, “. . . the field of inquiry is broadened to allow the trial court a wide discretion in the admission of evidence showing the relation the parties to the conspiracy bear to each other, their interest in the success of the act to be accomplished or in the motive for its formation.” Taking these rules into consideration we cannot say that the trial court was in error in refusing to give these instructions because the jury cou

2025Discussion and Decision [17] We review the denial of a motion to suppress “deferentially, construing conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling.” Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Robinson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 362 , 365 3 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1 (a)(2), (e)(1). 4 While Officer James’s Arrest Report Narrative provides that a field test indicated the presence of heroin, the basis for the methamphetamine charges is not clear from the record before us. 5 I.C. § 35-48-4-1.1(a)(2), (e)(1). 6 I.C. § 35-48-4-6.1(a), (d)(1). 7 I.C. § 35-48-4-6(a), (d)(1).

2019Id. at 114 .

2015Filice, 886 N.E.2d at 34 . [30] As to Hester’s contention that no evidence was presented to explain how another defendant’s evidence was sent to the ISP lab in reference to Hester’s case, the State explained to the trial court that, although evidence from another Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A01-1411-CR-515 | September 8, 2015 Page 20 of 26 case was originally sent to the ISP lab in reference to Hester’s case, the actual evidence for Hester’s case was in the secure evidence room and did not leave until the mistake was discovered and resolved.

2006Id. at 111-12 , 104 S.Ct. 1652 .

2006Id. at 111-12 , 104 S.Ct. 1652 .

1983In a well written opinion, People v. Collins, (1978) 94 Misc.2d 704 , 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 , the defense expert, in testimony similar to Dr. Hollin's, stated that, "the relevant field of inquiry is acoustic phonetics, and stated that he would add experts in some other fields such as linguists and speech scientists (for obvious reasons, since human speech is after all, the subject of the test), psychologists (ostensibly to study the effects of stress on human speech), and engineers (to study the effects of distortion inherent in the electronic components associated with this test)." Id. at 708 , 40

1983In a well written opinion, People v. Collins, (1978) 94 Misc.2d 704 , 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 , the defense expert, in testimony similar to Dr. Hollin's, stated that, "the relevant field of inquiry is acoustic phonetics, and stated that he would add experts in some other fields such as linguists and speech scientists (for obvious reasons, since human speech is after all, the subject of the test), psychologists (ostensibly to study the effects of stress on human speech), and engineers (to study the effects of distortion inherent in the electronic components associated with this test)." Id. at 708 , 40

1981Therefore, at the time of Field’s motion to dismiss, it did not appear “to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts.” Sekerez v. Gehring, supra. See Noblesville City Plan Commission v. Gatewood (1963) 134 Ind.App. 609 , 189 N.E.2d 426 (in actions to enjoin violation of a zoning ordinance, complaint need only allege existence of ordinance and its violation by defendant).

1981Therefore, at the time of Field’s motion to dismiss, it did not appear “to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts.” Sekerez v. Gehring, supra. See Noblesville City Plan Commission v. Gatewood (1963) 134 Ind.App. 609 , 189 N.E.2d 426 (in actions to enjoin violation of a zoning ordinance, complaint need only allege existence of ordinance and its violation by defendant).

1981Therefore, at the time of Field’s motion to dismiss, it did not appear “to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts.” Sekerez v. Gehring, supra. See Noblesville City Plan Commission v. Gatewood (1963) 134 Ind.App. 609 , 189 N.E.2d 426 (in actions to enjoin violation of a zoning ordinance, complaint need only allege existence of ordinance and its violation by defendant).

1976Thus, if the field test can meet the test of conclusiveness that Mayes, supra, requires, we will be able to say that there was no error in allowing the jury to hear testimony as to the findings of that field test.

1976Thus, if the field test can meet the test of conclusiveness that Mayes, supra, requires, we will be able to say that there was no error in allowing the jury to hear testimony as to the findings of that field test.

1916This court held in City of Indianapolis v. Williams (1914), 58 Ind. App. 447 , 108 N. E. 387 , that where complaint was made of the exclusion of offered testimony, and the facts sought to be elicited from the witnesses were specifically found by the jury in answer to interrogatories, the error was harmless even though the excluded evidence was otherwise competent.

1916This court held in City of Indianapolis v. Williams (1914), 58 Ind. App. 447 , 108 N. E. 387 , that where complaint was made of the exclusion of offered testimony, and the facts sought to be elicited from the witnesses were specifically found by the jury in answer to interrogatories, the error was harmless even though the excluded evidence was otherwise competent.