field test in Massachusetts

2018See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 812, 830-831 (2009) (three experienced officers' testimony that substance either appeared to be or was identified by a field test as cocaine, defendant's identification of substance as "crack" cocaine during two controlled purchases, and canine sniff contributed to finding that reliance on drug certificates in violation of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 [2009], was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Marte, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 140, 143 (2013) (defendant's 14 statement that "you never have to worry about my pa

2017See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly , 454 Mass. 808 , 812, 830-831, 913 N.E.2d 356 (2009) (three experienced officers' testimony that substance either appeared to be or was identified by a field test as cocaine, defendant's identification of substance as "crack" cocaine during two controlled purchases, and canine sniff contributed to finding that reliance on drug certificates in violation of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 [2009], was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Marte , 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136 , 140, 143, 993 N.E.2d 1201 (

2018See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 812, 830-831 (2009) (three experienced officers' testimony that substance either appeared to be or was identified by a field test as cocaine, defendant's identification of substance as "crack" cocaine during two controlled purchases, and canine sniff contributed to finding that reliance on drug certificates in violation of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 [2009], was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Marte, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 140, 143 (2013) (defendant's 14 statement that "you never have to worry about my pa

2017See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly , 454 Mass. 808 , 812, 830-831, 913 N.E.2d 356 (2009) (three experienced officers' testimony that substance either appeared to be or was identified by a field test as cocaine, defendant's identification of substance as "crack" cocaine during two controlled purchases, and canine sniff contributed to finding that reliance on drug certificates in violation of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 [2009], was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Marte , 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136 , 140, 143, 993 N.E.2d 1201 (

2012Commonwealth v. Fluellen, supra at 527 (where certificates “formed a tainted ‘core’ of evidence from which the rest of the Commonwealth’s case radiated” admission not harmless beyond reasonable doubt).

2010See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 592 (2010) (admission of the certificates was not harmless where officers did not perform a field test and the only evidence identifying the substance as cocaine was the drug certificates); Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 Mass. 517, 527 (2010) (admission of the drug certificates was not harmless even though the defense argued that the defendant was merely a cocaine user and not a dealer because even though the jury could have inferred the nature of the substance from the evidence presented, “the certificates made that inference inescapable”); Commonw

2018See King, supra at 360 ("[E]vidence [that] leads to the conclusion that the defendant took part in what appeared to be a drug transaction . . . does not go to whether the substance was, in fact, cocaine").

2017See King , supra at 360, 960 N.E.2d 894 ("[E]vidence [that] leads to the conclusion that the defendant took part in what appeared to be a drug transaction ... does not go to whether the substance was, in fact, cocaine").

2010In Vasquez, supra at 364 , in determining that the error in the admission of the certificate was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court noted the absence of any field testing, in contrast to Connolly . 3 Compare Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 Mass. 517,527 (2010) (noting absence of field testing in determin ing that admission of laboratory certificates not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 592 (2010) (noting lack of field testing in determination that admission of certificate not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2010See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 592 (2010) (admission of the certificates was not harmless where officers did not perform a field test and the only evidence identifying the substance as cocaine was the drug certificates); Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 Mass. 517, 527 (2010) (admission of the drug certificates was not harmless even though the defense argued that the defendant was merely a cocaine user and not a dealer because even though the jury could have inferred the nature of the substance from the evidence presented, “the certificates made that inference inescapable”); Commonw

2018Fernandez, supra at 148 .

2017I field test everything." In both Fernandez , supra at 149 n.17, 934 N.E.2d 810 , and Commonwealth v. Vasquez , 456 Mass. 350 , 364 n.15, 923 N.E.2d 524 (2010), the Supreme Judicial Court cited the National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States, A Path Forward, 134-135 (2009), for the proposition that forensic drug testing usually involves "presumptive identification" by a field test, followed by definitive identification using gas chromatography-mass spectrometry.

2018See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 812, 830-831 (2009) (three experienced officers' testimony that substance either appeared to be or was identified by a field test as cocaine, defendant's identification of substance as "crack" cocaine during two controlled purchases, and canine sniff contributed to finding that reliance on drug certificates in violation of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 [2009], was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Marte, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136, 140, 143 (2013) (defendant's 14 statement that "you never have to worry about my pa

2017See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Connolly , 454 Mass. 808 , 812, 830-831, 913 N.E.2d 356 (2009) (three experienced officers' testimony that substance either appeared to be or was identified by a field test as cocaine, defendant's identification of substance as "crack" cocaine during two controlled purchases, and canine sniff contributed to finding that reliance on drug certificates in violation of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts , 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 [2009], was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); Commonwealth v. Marte , 84 Mass. App. Ct. 136 , 140, 143, 993 N.E.2d 1201 (

2012Relying on the factors established by this court for assessing whether an error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Commonwealth v. Tyree, supra at 701 , 3 the Commonwealth asserts that the certificate was cumulative of its other evidence, i.e., Morrissey’s testimony which the Commonwealth characterizes as “expert,” the field test he conducted, and the defendant’s behavior.

2010Id. at 360 , quoting Commonwealth v. Tyree, 455 Mass. 676, 701 (2010).

2012Commonwealth v. King, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 189, 192 (2010).

2012In a memorandum and order issued pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals Court, relying on its decision in Commonwealth v. King, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 189 (2010), affirmed his convictions, holding that a field test and other circumstances rendered the admission of the certificate harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

2015Both a field test, 1 For a detailed description of the investigation of the William A. Hinton State Laboratory, the indictment of Annie Dookhan, and Dookhan's guilty pleas, see Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 337-342 (2014). 2 conducted by the police, and a subsequent test at the Hinton drug lab indicated that the substance was cocaine.

2013See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nelson, 460 Mass. 564, 577 (2011) (admission of certificate of drug analysis identifying marijuana not harmless beyond reasonable doubt where neither investigating officer nor drug distribution expert identified substance based on training and experience); Billings, supra (error in drug certificate admission not harmless where officer conducting field test did not have requisite experience, and where result of field test regarding composition of substance was left unidentified in officer’s trial testimony).

2011Judgment affirmed. 1 An indictment charging a violation of the controlled substances laws within a school zone was nol prossed. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), requires that a suspect “be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed,” prior to custodial interrogation. 3 Although Detective Terrence Donnelly performed the field test, the Commonwealth stated at trial that Sergeant Glen Decker had a personal recollection of the te

2010See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 592 (2010) (admission of the certificates was not harmless where officers did not perform a field test and the only evidence identifying the substance as cocaine was the drug certificates); Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 Mass. 517, 527 (2010) (admission of the drug certificates was not harmless even though the defense argued that the defendant was merely a cocaine user and not a dealer because even though the jury could have inferred the nature of the substance from the evidence presented, “the certificates made that inference inescapable”); Commonw

2010See Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 Mass. 808, 831 (2009) (admission of drug certificate harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where officer engaged in controlled purchase of cocaine and conducted a field test that was positive, confirming the nature of the substance). 2 See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 864, 874 (2010) (positive field tests critical to determination that admission of drug certificates harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

1995Commonwealth v. Varney, 391 Mass. 34, 38-39 (1984) (no warrant required to conduct field test on lawfully obtained substance believed to be narcotic because no legitimate expectation of privacy in chemical composition of substance lawfully obtained by police).

1984As we read the Walter case, it stresses the fact that the films were “materials arguably protected by the First Amendment,” id. at 655 (opinion of Stevens, J.), and notes that the warrant requirement was fashioned “against the background of knowledge that [an] unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression,” id. at 655 n.6 (opinion of Stevens, J.), quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965), and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).

1984As we read the Walter case, it stresses the fact that the films were “materials arguably protected by the First Amendment,” id. at 655 (opinion of Stevens, J.), and notes that the warrant requirement was fashioned “against the background of knowledge that [an] unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression,” id. at 655 n.6 (opinion of Stevens, J.), quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965), and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).

1984As we read the Walter case, it stresses the fact that the films were “materials arguably protected by the First Amendment,” id. at 655 (opinion of Stevens, J.), and notes that the warrant requirement was fashioned “against the background of knowledge that [an] unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling liberty of expression,” id. at 655 n.6 (opinion of Stevens, J.), quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 484 (1965), and Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).

1971Compare Loma Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc. 61 Cal. 2d 582 (California Supreme Court denied that Federal legislation had so preempted the field as to bar all State or local action affecting flight operations).

1939See Bemis v. Temple, 162 Mass. 342, 344 .