field test in Pennsylvania

2020Id. at ,r 15.

2020Id. at 22 .

2018In his second claim, Bee argues that, pursuant to Pa.R.E. 702, the Commonwealth must show that the field test kit satisfied the standards set forth in Frye, supra, to establish the requisite probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

2014“This field of inquiry . . . must be limited to questions relevant to a witness’ credibility.” J.S., 860 A.2d at 1120 , supra (internal citations omitted).

2010In any event, this Court noted since “the means to make the handgun operable again, after a slight malfunction, were readily available to [the appellant], the weapon was ‘operable’ pursuant to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Layton and this Court’s analysis in Siiams.” Stevenson, 894 A.2d at 776 .

1992First, we emphasize that we adhere to the position expressed in Appeal of Attleberger, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 329, 583 A.2d 24 (1990), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 527 Pa. 625 , 592 A.2d 45 (1991) (licensee testified he was confused because he thought that once he took a preliminary field test he need not submit to further testing), and Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Wicks, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 322, 583 A.2d 21 (1990), that where no Miranda warnings are given and there is no overt manifestation of confusion, no O’Connell warning is re quired. 6 Whe

1992First, we emphasize that we adhere to the position expressed in Appeal of Attleberger, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 329, 583 A.2d 24 (1990), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 527 Pa. 625 , 592 A.2d 45 (1991) (licensee testified he was confused because he thought that once he took a preliminary field test he need not submit to further testing), and Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Wicks, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 322, 583 A.2d 21 (1990), that where no Miranda warnings are given and there is no overt manifestation of confusion, no O'Connell warning is required. [6] *9

1992First, we emphasize that we adhere to the position expressed in Appeal of Attleberger, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 329, 583 A.2d 24 (1990), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 527 Pa. 625 , 592 A.2d 45 (1991) (licensee testified he was confused because he thought that once he took a preliminary field test he need not submit to further testing), and Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Wicks, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 322, 583 A.2d 21 (1990), that where no Miranda warnings are given and there is no overt manifestation of confusion, no O’Connell warning is re quired. 6 Whe

1992First, we emphasize that we adhere to the position expressed in Appeal of Attleberger, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 329, 583 A.2d 24 (1990), petition for allowance of appeal granted, 527 Pa. 625 , 592 A.2d 45 (1991) (licensee testified he was confused because he thought that once he took a preliminary field test he need not submit to further testing), and Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Wicks, 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 322, 583 A.2d 21 (1990), that where no Miranda warnings are given and there is no overt manifestation of confusion, no O'Connell warning is required. [6] *9

1985Cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. Setsodi, 303 Pa.Super. 482 , 450 A.2d 29 (1982) (prima facie case of vehicular homicide made out where *194 defendant failed to perceive approaching motorcycle while turning left into driveway); Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 282 Pa.Super. 549 , 423 A.2d 381 (1980) (failure to yield right-of-way at stop sign); see also Commonwealth v. Koch, supra (same).

1985Cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. Setsodi, 303 Pa.Super. 482 , 450 A.2d 29 (1982) (prima facie case of vehicular homicide made out where *194 defendant failed to perceive approaching motorcycle while turning left into driveway); Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 282 Pa.Super. 549 , 423 A.2d 381 (1980) (failure to yield right-of-way at stop sign); see also Commonwealth v. Koch, supra (same).

1985Cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. Setsodi, 303 Pa.Super. 482 , 450 A.2d 29 (1982) (prima facie case of vehicular homicide made out where *194 defendant failed to perceive approaching motorcycle while turning left into driveway); Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 282 Pa.Super. 549 , 423 A.2d 381 (1980) (failure to yield right-of-way at stop sign); see also Commonwealth v. Koch, supra (same).

1985Cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. Setsodi, 303 Pa.Super. 482 , 450 A.2d 29 (1982) (prima facie case of vehicular homicide made out where *194 defendant failed to perceive approaching motorcycle while turning left into driveway); Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 282 Pa.Super. 549 , 423 A.2d 381 (1980) (failure to yield right-of-way at stop sign); see also Commonwealth v. Koch, supra (same).

1985In Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345 , 437 A.2d 385 (1981), the Supreme Court distinguished the Commonwealth’s burden of proof in a vehicular homicide case from its burden in an involuntary manslaughter prosecution.

1985In Commonwealth v. Houtz, 496 Pa. 345 , 437 A.2d 385 (1981), the Supreme Court distinguished the Commonwealth’s burden of proof in a vehicular homicide case from its burden in an involuntary manslaughter prosecution.

1979Finally, appellant himself concedes that Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) does not compel a contrary conclusion, because the field test results were not exculpatory.

1979Finally, appellant himself concedes that Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) does not compel a contrary conclusion, because the field test results were not exculpatory.

1978Cummings v. Nazareth Borough, 430 Pa. 255 , 242 A.2d 460 (1968) (reference to literature on safe depth of pool diving areas allowed to show that borough’s agents in charge of pool had never investigated what a safe depth would be); Evanuik v. University of Pittsburgh, 234 Pa.Super. 287 , 338 A.2d 636 (1975) (publication permitted to show expert is unfamiliar with literature in particular field, but only if other evidence shows literature is universally accepted by authorities in the field as a standard work).

1978Cummings v. Nazareth Borough, 430 Pa. 255 , 242 A.2d 460 (1968) (reference to literature on safe depth of pool diving areas allowed to show that borough’s agents in charge of pool had never investigated what a safe depth would be); Evanuik v. University of Pittsburgh, 234 Pa.Super. 287 , 338 A.2d 636 (1975) (publication permitted to show expert is unfamiliar with literature in particular field, but only if other evidence shows literature is universally accepted by authorities in the field as a standard work).

1978Cummings v. Nazareth Borough, 430 Pa. 255 , 242 A.2d 460 (1968) (reference to literature on safe depth of pool diving areas allowed to show that borough’s agents in charge of pool had never investigated what a safe depth would be); Evanuik v. University of Pittsburgh, 234 Pa.Super. 287 , 338 A.2d 636 (1975) (publication permitted to show expert is unfamiliar with literature in particular field, but only if other evidence shows literature is universally accepted by authorities in the field as a standard work).

1978Cummings v. Nazareth Borough, 430 Pa. 255 , 242 A.2d 460 (1968) (reference to literature on safe depth of pool diving areas allowed to show that borough’s agents in charge of pool had never investigated what a safe depth would be); Evanuik v. University of Pittsburgh, 234 Pa.Super. 287 , 338 A.2d 636 (1975) (publication permitted to show expert is unfamiliar with literature in particular field, but only if other evidence shows literature is universally accepted by authorities in the field as a standard work).

1973On June 1, 1971, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Smith, 443 Pa. 151, 156 , 277 A. 2d 807, 810 (1971) cited with approval Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), reh. denied, 400 U.S. 856 , which in turn had relied on Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), for the proposition that “[a] warrantless search of an automobile can be made *434 even though not ‘incident to arrest’, ‘provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.’ ” Twenty days later, however, the Supreme Court of the United States

1973On June 1, 1971, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Smith, 443 Pa. 151, 156 , 277 A. 2d 807, 810 (1971) cited with approval Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), reh. denied, 400 U.S. 856 , which in turn had relied on Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), for the proposition that “[a] warrantless search of an automobile can be made *434 even though not ‘incident to arrest’, ‘provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.’ ” Twenty days later, however, the Supreme Court of the United States

1973On June 1, 1971, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Smith, 443 Pa. 151, 156 , 277 A. 2d 807, 810 (1971) cited with approval Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), reh. denied, 400 U.S. 856 , which in turn had relied on Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), for the proposition that “[a] warrantless search of an automobile can be made *434 even though not ‘incident to arrest’, ‘provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.’ ” Twenty days later, however, the Supreme Court of the United States

1973On June 1, 1971, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Commonwealth v. Smith, 443 Pa. 151, 156 , 277 A. 2d 807, 810 (1971) cited with approval Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), reh. denied, 400 U.S. 856 , which in turn had relied on Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), for the proposition that “[a] warrantless search of an automobile can be made *434 even though not ‘incident to arrest’, ‘provided that there is probable cause to believe that the car contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize.’ ” Twenty days later, however, the Supreme Court of the United States