Edwards rule in Tennessee

16 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1985–2021 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (8)

Case	Followed	Cited
Maryland v. Shatzergreen scotus · 2010 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2010–2021 2 sentences 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660	1	3
State v. Huddlestongreen tenn · 1996 · cited in 3 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1999–2005 2 sentences 2005Id. at 452 , 114 S. Ct. at 2350 ; Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 669-70 . 2000Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. at 452 , 114 S.Ct. at 2350 ; Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 669-70 .	1	3
State v. Manusgreen tennctapp · 1982 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660	1	1
State v. Dubrockgreen tenncrimapp · 1983 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660	1	1
Braden v. Stategreen tenn · 1976 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660	1	1
State v. Morrisgreen tenn · 1970 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013 2 sentences 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660 2013“The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of prolonged police custody by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is badgered into submission.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 105 , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1220 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 11 Tennessee’s courts have been applying Miranda for over forty years, see, e.g., State v. Morris, 224 Tenn. 437, 442 , 456 S.W.2d 840, 842 (1970); Braden v. State, 534 S.W.2d 657, 660	1	1
Minnick v. Mississippigreen scotus · 1990 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 2 sentences 2000Ed. 2d 293 (1990); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 , 111 S. Ct. 486, 489 , 112 L. 2000Ed. 2d 293 (1990); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 151 , 111 S. Ct. 486, 489 , 112 L.	1	1
United States v. Keith Bryan Webbgreen ca5 · 1985 · cited in 1 Tennessee opinions naming this issue, 1985–1985 2 sentences 1985See United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 392 (5th Cir.1985) (applying harmless error analysis to Edwards violation). 1985See United States v. Webb, 755 F.2d 382, 392 (5th Cir.1985) (applying harmless error analysis to Edwards violation).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (14)

Case	Cited	Years
Davis v. United States green scotus · 1994 2 sentences 2005Id. at 452 , 114 S. Ct. at 2350 ; Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 669-70 . 2005Id. at 452 , 114 S. Ct. at 2350 ; Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 669-70 .	3	1999–2005
Summers v. State green tenn · 2007 2 sentences 2008However, we note that Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251 , which addresses both of these issues, was released twelve days after the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in this appeal. 2008However, we note that Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, which addresses both of these issues, was released twelve days after the Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision in this appeal.	2	2008–2008
Horace Franklin Dunkins, Jr. v. Morris Thigpen, Commissioner of Alabama Department of Corrections, and W.E. Johnson, Warden, Holman Unit green ca11 · 1988 2 sentences 1990(Emphasis added.) Dunkins, 854 F.2d at 397 . 3 Each case must be judged on its particular facts. 1989Dunkins, 854 F.2d at 397 . 5 After his release from custody on November 14th, the defendant had substantial opportunity to consult with counsel before the November 24th encounter; thus, the Miranda-Edwards taint had dissipated with the passage of time.	2	1989–1990
State of Tennessee v. David Hooper Climer, Jr. green tenn · 2013 2 sentences 2021The presumption ends “‘once the suspect has been out of custody long enough (14 days) to eliminate its coercive effect,’ because ‘[c]onfessions obtained after a 2-week break in custody and a waiver of Miranda rights are most unlikely to be compelled.’” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 558 n. 11 (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)). 2021The presumption ends “‘once the suspect has been out of custody long enough (14 days) to eliminate its coercive effect,’ because ‘[c]onfessions obtained after a 2-week break in custody and a waiver of Miranda rights are most unlikely to be compelled.’” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 558 n. 11 (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)).	1	2021–2021
McNeil v. Wisconsin green scotus · 1991 2 sentences 2013The Edwards rule, a “second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel,” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 558 171, 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), recognizes that, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). 2013The Edwards rule, a “second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel,” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 558 171, 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), recognizes that, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ).	1	2013–2013
Miranda v. Arizona green scotus · 1966 2 sentences 2013The Edwards rule, a “second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel,” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 558 171, 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), recognizes that, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). 2013The Edwards rule, a “second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel,” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 558 171, 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), recognizes that, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ).	1	2013–2013
Arizona v. Roberson green scotus · 1988 2 sentences 2013The Edwards rule, a “second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel,” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 558 171, 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), recognizes that, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ). 2013The Edwards rule, a “second layer of prophylaxis for the Miranda right to counsel,” McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 558 171, 176, 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991), recognizes that, once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 ).	1	2013–2013
Texas v. Cobb green scotus · 2001 2 sentences 2011In beginning its analysis, the Montejo court observed that: Jackson represented a “wholesale importation of the Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment.” Cobb, [532 U.S.] at 175, 121 S.Ct. 1335 . 2011In beginning its analysis, the Montejo court observed that: Jackson represented a “wholesale importation of the Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment.” Cobb, [532 U.S.] at 175, 121 S.Ct. 1335 .	1	2011–2011
Michigan v. Jackson red scotus · 1986 2 sentences 2011The Jackson Court decided that a request for counsel at an arraignment should be treated as an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “at every critical stage of the prosecution,” 475 U.S., at 633 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , despite doubt that defendants “actually inten[d] their request for counsel to encompass representation during any further questioning,” id., at 632-633 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , because doubts must be “resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim,” id., at 633 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 . 2011The Jackson Court decided that a request for counsel at an arraignment should be treated as an invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “at every critical stage of the prosecution,” 475 U.S., at 633 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , despite doubt that defendants “actually inten[d] their request for counsel to encompass representation during any further questioning,” id., at 632-633 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , because doubts must be “resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim,” id., at 633 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 .	1	2011–2011
State v. Harts green tenncrimapp · 1999 1 sentence 2006Id.	1	2006–2006
Oregon v. Bradshaw green scotus · 1983 2 sentences 2005Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046-47 , 103 S.Ct. at 2835 . 2005Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046-47 , 103 S.Ct. at 2835 .	1	2005–2005
Joseph T. Huey v. Daniel Stine, Correctional Officer, Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility green ca6 · 2000 1 sentence 2002The Sixth Circuit stated it had previously applied the Heck/Edwards doctrine generally to prevent a prisoner found guilty in a prison disciplinary hearing from using § 1983 to collaterally attack the hearing’s validity. 230 F.3d at 228-229 .	1	2002–2002
Michigan v. Harvey green scotus · 1990 2 sentences 2000The purpose of the Edwards rule is to “prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 , 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1180 , 108 L. 2000The purpose of the Edwards rule is to “prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 , 110 S. Ct. 1176, 1180 , 108 L.	1	2000–2000
Edwards v. Arizona green scotus · 1981 1 sentence 1999Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484-85 .2 2 An equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel does not trigger the Edwards requirement under the Fifth Am endment.	1	1999–1999

Statutes the citing opinions construe

TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202 (4) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-402 (3) TN § Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 92 (1986–2026) CA 77 (1981–2026) IL 57 (1980–2024) VA 52 (1986–2026) PA 35 (1986–2025) GA 31 (1986–2026) WI 30 (1973–2025) OH 25 (1988–2025) MS 23 (1992–2021) DC 20 (1977–2023) AL 20 (1980–2015) CO 18 (1989–2026) LA 18 (1982–2018) FL 17 (1981–2026) TN 16 (1985–2021) KS 16 (1994–2018) WA 15 (1982–2025) MI 13 (1983–2024) MO 13 (1912–2016) MN 13 (1989–2015) IN 13 (1987–2019) NJ 12 (1986–2025) DE 10 (1986–2017) AZ 10 (1977–2022) MD 10 (1993–2013) OR 9 (1986–2025) SC 9 (1978–2016) AK 8 (1983–2019) MA 8 (1991–2014) OK 8 (1974–2008) KY 6 (1973–2021) CT 6 (1991–2022) AR 6 (1988–2001) NC 6 (1985–2018) NV 5 (1985–2013) NY 5 (1979–2018) UT 4 (1984–2023) NE 4 (2018–2025) WY 4 (1991–2011) ME 4 (1990–2012) WV 4 (1995–2013) IA 4 (2003–2021) SD 4 (1990–2019) VT 3 (1986–1999) NM 3 (2012–2016) ID 3 (1982–2011) HI 2 (1983–2014) NH 2 (1983–2003) RI 2 (2002–2004) MT 2 (2009–2011)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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