Edwards rule in Indiana

2018Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1707-PC-1651 | April 12, 2018 Page 11 of 25 in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

2018We are not "at liberty to rewrite the trust agreement any more than it is at liberty to rewrite contracts." Malachowski v. Bank One, Indianapolis , 590 N.E.2d 559 , 565-66 (Ind. 1992). [10] For two reasons, we conclude that the trial court properly granted Edwards's motion for summary judgment.

2018Id. [42] Edwards contends that the post-conviction court should have granted his motion to correct error because, he claims, the court failed to include certain undisputed facts in its findings of fact and conclusions of law.11 It is well settled, 10 Interspersed among Edwards’s argument regarding his motion to correct error is a discussion regarding Edwards’s motion seeking to have the presiding judge, not the magistrate, rule on his post-conviction petition.

2012Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 , 458- 59, 114 S. Ct. 2350 , 129 L.

2012Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 , 458- 59, 114 S. Ct. 2350 , 129 L.

2005Since the briefs were filed in this case, our Supreme Court has issued its decision in Iitchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind.2005).

1998Cf. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). (when suspect invokes Fifth Amendment right to the presence of an attorney during custodial interrogation, all questioning must cease until counsel is made available or the suspect voluntarily initiates communication with the police); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (applying Edwards rule to Sixth Amendment violations); Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648 , 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949) (police refusal during interrogation to honor suspect’s request for counsel rendered confession inadmiss

1998Cf. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). (when suspect invokes Fifth Amendment right to the presence of an attorney during custodial interrogation, all questioning must cease until counsel is made available or the suspect voluntarily initiates communication with the police); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (applying Edwards rule to Sixth Amendment violations); Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648 , 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949) (police refusal during interrogation to honor suspect’s request for counsel rendered confession inadmiss

1998Cf. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). (when suspect invokes Fifth Amendment right to the presence of an attorney during custodial interrogation, all questioning must cease until counsel is made available or the suspect voluntarily initiates communication with the police); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (applying Edwards rule to Sixth Amendment violations); Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648 , 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949) (police refusal during interrogation to honor suspect’s request for counsel rendered confession inadmiss

1998Cf. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). (when suspect invokes Fifth Amendment right to the presence of an attorney during custodial interrogation, all questioning must cease until counsel is made available or the suspect voluntarily initiates communication with the police); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (applying Edwards rule to Sixth Amendment violations); Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648 , 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949) (police refusal during interrogation to honor suspect’s request for counsel rendered confession inadmiss

1997Although we acknowledge that Edwards was under a duty to present an adequate basis for his objection, our review of the record, similar to Serano, supra, indicates that the trial court understood that the grounds for Edwards’ objection were those proffered in his motion to suppress and accompanying memorandum.

1997Although we acknowledge that Edwards was under a duty to present an adequate basis for his objection, our review of the record, similar to Serano, supra, indicates that the trial court understood that the grounds for Edwards’ objection were those proffered in his motion to suppress and accompanying memorandum.

1991Cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425-426 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1142-1144 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).

1991Cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 425-426 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1142-1144 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).

1991Minnick v. Mississippi, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990).

1991Minnick v. Mississippi, - U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990).

1991We have confirmed that the Edwards rule provides “ ‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines to the law enforcement profession.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 , 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2098 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988).

1991We have confirmed that the Edwards rule provides “ ‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines to the law enforcement profession.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 , 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2098 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988).

1987The Supreme Court expressly approved the warrantless seizure of Edwards’ clothing: “This was and is a normal incident of a custodial arrest, and reasonable delay in effectuating it does not change the fact that Edwards was no more imposed upon than he could have been at the time and place of the arrest or immediately upon arrival at the place of detention.... [i]t is difficult to perceive what is unreasonable about the police’s examining and holding as evidence those personal effects of the accused that they already have in their lawful custody as the result of a lawful arrest.” 415 U.S. at 80

1987The Supreme Court expressly approved the warrantless seizure of Edwards’ clothing: “This was and is a normal incident of a custodial arrest, and reasonable delay in effectuating it does not change the fact that Edwards was no more imposed upon than he could have been at the time and place of the arrest or immediately upon arrival at the place of detention.... [i]t is difficult to perceive what is unreasonable about the police’s examining and holding as evidence those personal effects of the accused that they already have in their lawful custody as the result of a lawful arrest.” 415 U.S. at 80