Edwards rule in Illinois

2023Id. ¶ 133 In applying the Edwards rule, we must first determine whether the defendant invoked his right to counsel.

2023Id. ¶ 133 In applying the Edwards rule, we must first determine whether the defendant invoked his right to counsel.

2020The Edwards rule is a rigid “ ‘bright-line 10 rule’ that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel.” (Emphasis in original.) Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 (1984)).

2020The Edwards rule is a rigid “ ‘bright-line 10 rule’ that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel.” (Emphasis in original.) Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984) (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 646 (1984)).

2022See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994) (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991)). ¶ 31 At issue here is the application of the “Edwards rule”: If a suspect in custody knowingly and intelligently waives his Miranda rights after being warned, law-enforcement officers are free to question him, but if he then requests counsel, at any time during the interview, the questioning must stop until an attorney has been made available to him or the suspect himself reinitiates the conversation.

2008The Edwards rule is not required by the fifth amendment itself, but is part of Miranda’s “prophylactic purpose.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 458 , 129 L.

2023“Inquiries or statements that relate to the routine incidents of the custodial relationship will not generally ‘initiate’ a discussion for purposes of the Edwards rule.” Id. at 198-99 (quoting Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045 ).

2023“Inquiries or statements that relate to the routine incidents of the custodial relationship will not generally ‘initiate’ a discussion for purposes of the Edwards rule.” Id. at 198-99 (quoting Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045 ).

2022Burke, J., specially concurring). -7- 2021 IL App (2d) 200453-U ¶ 23 We need not decide between the two standards because, under either one, the defendant’s request for leave to file fails the general Edwards standard; in other words, “it is clear from a review of the petition and supporting documentation that, as a matter of law, the petition cannot set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 44 . ¶ 24 To begin with, we are unpersuaded that any portion of the T.G.’s video-recorded interview was newly discovered evidence.

2021Burke, J., specially concurring). -7- 2021 IL App (2d) 200453-U ¶ 23 We need not decide between the two standards because, under either one, the defendant’s request for leave to file fails the general Edwards standard; in other words, “it is clear from a review of the petition and supporting documentation that, as a matter of law, the petition cannot set forth a colorable claim of actual innocence.” Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 44 . ¶ 24 To begin with, we are unpersuaded that any portion of the T.G.’s video-recorded interview was newly discovered evidence.

2020See also People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 135 (1984) (holding that “[t]he testimony of Molstad’s codefendants clearly qualifies as newly discovered evidence” because no amount of diligence could have compelled them to incriminate themselves at trial). ¶ 62 The Edwards defendant also argued that his alibi witnesses were unavailable, and therefore “new,” because they refused to testify on his behalf at trial.

2020No amount of diligence could have forced him to violate that right if he did not choose to do so.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 38. -18- No. 1-19-0828 See also People v. Molstad, 101 Ill. 2d 128, 135 (1984) (holding that “[t]he testimony of Molstad’s codefendants clearly qualifies as newly discovered evidence” because no amount of diligence could have compelled them to incriminate themselves at trial). ¶ 62 The Edwards defendant also argued that his alibi witnesses were unavailable, and therefore “new,” because they refused to testify on his behalf at trial.

2010Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199 ; see also State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 527 , 412 S.E.2d 20, 26 (1992) (where the defendant was placed in custody for several hours before questioning, supreme court held that the defendant could invoke her right to counsel for impending interrogation though she was not actively being questioned at the time); State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶42 , 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶42 , 745 N.W.2d 48, ¶42 (finding that the defendant effectively invoked his right to counsel where he asked for an attorney at time of his arrest but before interrogation began).

2010Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199 ; see also State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 527 , 412 S.E.2d 20, 26 (1992) (where the defendant was placed in custody for several hours before questioning, supreme court held that the defendant could invoke her right to counsel for impending interrogation though she was not actively being questioned at the time); State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶42 , 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶42 , 745 N.W.2d 48, ¶42 (finding that the defendant effectively invoked his right to counsel where he asked for an attorney at time of his arrest but before interrogation began).

2010Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199 ; see also State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 527 , 412 S.E.2d 20, 26 (1992) (where the defendant was placed in custody for several hours before questioning, supreme court held that the defendant could invoke her right to counsel for impending interrogation though she was not actively being questioned at the time); State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶42 , 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶42 , 745 N.W.2d 48, ¶42 (finding that the defendant effectively invoked his right to counsel where he asked for an attorney at time of his arrest but before interrogation began).

2010Kelsey, 951 F.2d at 1199 ; see also State v. Torres, 330 N.C. 517, 527 , 412 S.E.2d 20, 26 (1992) (where the defendant was placed in custody for several hours before questioning, supreme court held that the defendant could invoke her right to counsel for impending interrogation though she was not actively being questioned at the time); State v. Hambly, 2008 WI 10, ¶42 , 307 Wis. 2d 98, ¶42 , 745 N.W.2d 48, ¶42 (finding that the defendant effectively invoked his right to counsel where he asked for an attorney at time of his arrest but before interrogation began).

2021After a jury trial, he was convicted of first degree murder with a firearm and sentenced to 75 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections. ¶2 In this appeal, defendant claims (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his statements on the ground that the police questioned him after he had invoked his right to counsel in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and (2) that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Edwards violation. ¶3 In response, the State arg

2021After a jury trial, he was convicted of first degree murder with a firearm and sentenced to 75 years with the Illinois Department of Corrections. ¶2 In this appeal, defendant claims (1) that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress his statements on the ground that the police questioned him after he had invoked his right to counsel in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), and (2) that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the Edwards violation. ¶3 In response, the State arg

2020The Edwards rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990). ¶ 35 Determining the admissibility of a defendant’s statements made after he has invoked his right to counsel involves a two-part inquiry.

2020The Edwards rule is “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990). ¶ 35 Determining the admissibility of a defendant’s statements made after he has invoked his right to counsel involves a two-part inquiry.

2009People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 349-50 , 606 N.E.2d 1186, 1194-95 (1992) (holding that the “Edwards rule is designed to prevent the police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights”).

2009People v. Winsett, 153 Ill. 2d 335, 349-50 , 606 N.E.2d 1186, 1194-95 (1992) (holding that the “Edwards rule is designed to prevent the police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights”).

2021See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). ¶4 In reply, defendant argues (1) that, although defendant’s pretrial motion claimed that interrogation continued after defendant invoked his right to counsel, the motion did not specifically cite Edwards; (2) that, although the State cited an Illinois case discussing Edwards, defendant’s trial counsel did not offer an argument in response; and (3) that, although the trial court denied defendant’s motion on credibility grounds, the trial court did not specifically articulate a ruling on the Edwards issue.

1986Ed. 2d 694, 718-19 , 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1623 .) Thus subsequent decisions have also applied the Edwards rule to factual circumstances similar to those presented in Edwards, viz, where the second police interrogation without the benefit of counsel requested by the accused is, in its impact upon the suspect, nothing more than an extension of the original questioning and forms a single, continuous period of coercive interrogation.

2024We find no fault with Edwards’s analysis and hold that no clear and obvious error occurred because defendant waived the 48-hour window for his detention hearing by requesting the continuance. ¶ 30 We note, however, that even if we disagreed with Edwards on the issue of waiver, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “a defendant’s invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver’ ” (People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004) (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001))) and is sometimes referred to as an issue of estoppel (id. (c

2024“Under the doctrine of invited error, an accused may not request to proceed in one manner and then contend on appeal that the course of action was in error.” People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309, 319 (2003) (citing Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d at 227-28 , People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 240-41 (2000), and People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992)).

2024We find no fault with Edwards’s analysis and hold that no clear and obvious error occurred because defendant waived the 48-hour window for his detention hearing by requesting the continuance. ¶ 30 We note, however, that even if we disagreed with Edwards on the issue of waiver, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “a defendant’s invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver’ ” (People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004) (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001))) and is sometimes referred to as an issue of estoppel (id. (c

2024We find no fault with Edwards’s analysis and hold that no clear and obvious error occurred because defendant waived the 48-hour window for his detention hearing by requesting the continuance. ¶ 30 We note, however, that even if we disagreed with Edwards on the issue of waiver, the Illinois Supreme Court has stated that “a defendant’s invitation or agreement to the procedure later challenged on appeal ‘goes beyond mere waiver’ ” (People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (2004) (quoting People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 227 (2001))) and is sometimes referred to as an issue of estoppel (id. (c

2024“Under the doctrine of invited error, an accused may not request to proceed in one manner and then contend on appeal that the course of action was in error.” People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309, 319 (2003) (citing Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d at 227-28 , People v. Segoviano, 189 Ill. 2d 228, 240-41 (2000), and People v. Lowe, 153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992)).