Edwards rule in District of Columbia

2013Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 , 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (emphasis added); see also Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1220 ("The Edwards presumption of involuntariness [was designed to] ensure[] that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of ‘prolonged police custody’ by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is ‘badgered into submission[.]‘ ” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). .

2013Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153 , 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (emphasis added); see also Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1220 ("The Edwards presumption of involuntariness [was designed to] ensure[] that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of ‘prolonged police custody’ by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is ‘badgered into submission[.]‘ ” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). .

2005While the Edwards rule is considered to be a rigid one, ensuring protection of Fifth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has noted that “there are undoubtedly situations where a bare inquiry by either a defendant or by a police officer should not be held to ‘initiate’ any conversation or dialogue.” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983).

2005While the Edwards rule is considered to be a rigid one, ensuring protection of Fifth Amendment rights, the Supreme Court has noted that “there are undoubtedly situations where a bare inquiry by either a defendant or by a police officer should not be held to ‘initiate’ any conversation or dialogue.” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983).

2013But, the benefits of the new prophylactic rule an- nouneed in the majority opinion must be “measured by the number of coerced confessions it suppresses that otherwise would have been admitted.” Id. (citing Montejo, supra, 556 U.S. at 798 , 129 S.Ct. 2079 ).

2013But, the benefits of the new prophylactic rule an- nouneed in the majority opinion must be “measured by the number of coerced confessions it suppresses that otherwise would have been admitted.” Id. (citing Montejo, supra, 556 U.S. at 798 , 129 S.Ct. 2079 ).

2007Two seminal Fifth Amendment cases, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), and Missouri *844 v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), provide the legal framework that we must apply to Edwards’ claim that his statements should have been suppressed.

2007Two seminal Fifth Amendment cases, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), and Missouri *844 v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), provide the legal framework that we must apply to Edwards’ claim that his statements should have been suppressed.

2007Once the right is asserted, no interrogation is permitted “until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (extending the Edwards rule, but limited to the charged offense, to requests for counsel under Sixth Amendment).

2007Once the right is asserted, no interrogation is permitted “until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 626 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (extending the Edwards rule, but limited to the charged offense, to requests for counsel under Sixth Amendment).

2023Most notably, the court did not inform Mr. Edwards of the elements of second-degree murder, see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969), and did not deal with the inconsistency between those elements and Mr. Edwards’s own account of the events that resulted in Mr. Perry’s death, in which he disputed that he acted with malice. “[A]n essential component of malice”—on which the government bears the burden—is “the absence of justification, excuse, or mitigation.” Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 , 38- 41 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).

2023That characterization contradicts the record of the plea hearing, where, among other things, the trial court described “urban gun battle” as a doctrine that would “not allow people to escape responsibility” even where they were “withdrawing or perhaps acting in self- defense.” Aside from factually misconstruing the discussion preceding Mr. Edwards’s plea, the trial court also misapplied the legal standard for evaluating Mr. Edwards’s assertion of legal innocence by declining to engage in an assessment whether Mr. Edwards had presented facts that, taken as true, made out “some legally cognizabl

2019Cf. Campbell, 55 A.3d at 387–89; Tolson, 860 A.2d at 345 . * * * For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Ms. Edwards’s motion to amend her complaint, but reverse its rulings barring her from presenting evidence to support a claim for punitive damages.

2019See id. at 480 ; Eagle Wine, 402 A.2d at 35–36. 6 III.

2019Cf. Campbell, 55 A.3d at 387–89; Tolson, 860 A.2d at 345 . * * * For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny Ms. Edwards’s motion to amend her complaint, but reverse its rulings barring her from presenting evidence to support a claim for punitive damages.

2008Id. at 459-60 (citing Connelly). 52 .See also, e.g., Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 428, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (en banc) (“The Constitution protects a suspect from official coercion-it does not protect a suspect from himself or his mother,” who advised the defendant to “tell the truth” after he cut off questioning by asking for an attorney); Roberson v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Ky.2006) (finding no Edwards violation where defendant’s mother "freely volunteered to speak with her son to encourage him to confess in order to gain more favorable treatment”); Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d

2008Id. at 459-60 (citing Connelly). 52 .See also, e.g., Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 428, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (en banc) (“The Constitution protects a suspect from official coercion-it does not protect a suspect from himself or his mother,” who advised the defendant to “tell the truth” after he cut off questioning by asking for an attorney); Roberson v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Ky.2006) (finding no Edwards violation where defendant’s mother "freely volunteered to speak with her son to encourage him to confess in order to gain more favorable treatment”); Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d

2008Id. at 459-60 (citing Connelly). 52 .See also, e.g., Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 428, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (en banc) (“The Constitution protects a suspect from official coercion-it does not protect a suspect from himself or his mother,” who advised the defendant to “tell the truth” after he cut off questioning by asking for an attorney); Roberson v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Ky.2006) (finding no Edwards violation where defendant’s mother "freely volunteered to speak with her son to encourage him to confess in order to gain more favorable treatment”); Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d

2007Two seminal Fifth Amendment cases, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), and Missouri *844 v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), provide the legal framework that we must apply to Edwards’ claim that his statements should have been suppressed.

2007Two seminal Fifth Amendment cases, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 , 105 S.Ct. 1285 , 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), and Missouri *844 v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 , 124 S.Ct. 2601 , 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004), provide the legal framework that we must apply to Edwards’ claim that his statements should have been suppressed.

2003We also once again noted that the determination of ineffective assistance of counsel is necessarily fact based, id. at 248 , and that all of the Edwards’ factors must be considered in making that determination.

2003In these circumstances, his decision to forego the alibi defense was purely a "reasonable tactical choice[] [made] in light of the situation as it appeared at the time ...." Edwards, 767 A.2d at 248 . *758 In sum, after weighing the five Edwards factors, I agree with the trial court's ruling that Lipps's performance was not deficient within the meaning of Strickland . [14] The decision to forego the alibi defense was a reasonable tactical decision for the reasons stated above.

2003I conclude, therefore, that counsel’s course of action can not be characterized as conduct “so serious that he was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment.” Frederick, 741 A.2d at 437 .

2003I conclude, therefore, that counsel's course of action can not be characterized as conduct "so serious that he was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment." Frederick, 741 A.2d at 437 .

2001Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 , 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), recognized several reasons for the Edwards principle: (1) “ ‘to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,’ “ id. at 150, 111 S.Ct. 486 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990)); (2) to “ensure[ ] that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures,” id. at 151, 111 S.Ct. 486 ; and (3) to “conserve[ ] judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult deter

2001Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 , 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), recognized several reasons for the Edwards principle: (1) “ ‘to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,’ “ id. at 150, 111 S.Ct. 486 (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990)); (2) to “ensure[ ] that any statement made in subsequent interrogation is not the result of coercive pressures,” id. at 151, 111 S.Ct. 486 ; and (3) to “conserve[ ] judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult deter