Edwards rule in New Jersey

2022“The Edwards rule thus serves the purpose of providing ‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines to the law enforcement profession.” Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682 .

2022“The Edwards rule thus serves the purpose of providing ‘clear and unequivocal’ guidelines to the law enforcement profession.” Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682 .

2022The Court added that the prosecution cannot establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel “by showing only that [the accused] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” Id. at 484 .8 Additionally, “officials may not reinitiate 8 Shatzer carved out an exception to the Edwards rule for cases where “a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects.” 559 U.S. at 109 .

2022The Court added that the prosecution cannot establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel “by showing only that [the accused] responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights.” Id. at 484 .8 Additionally, “officials may not reinitiate 8 Shatzer carved out an exception to the Edwards rule for cases where “a suspect who initially requested counsel is reinterrogated after a break in custody that is of sufficient duration to dissipate its coercive effects.” 559 U.S. at 109 .

2022It acknowledged that, absent the reinitiating of communications with the detectives, “an Edwards violation could not be subject to an attenuation analysis,” citing Wint, 236 N.J. at 206 .

2022It acknowledged that, absent the reinitiating of communications with the detectives, “an Edwards violation could not be subject to an attenuation analysis,” citing Wint, 236 N.J. at 206 .

2018See Roberson , 486 U.S. at 677-78 , 687-88 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 (stating that when defendant requests counsel during interrogation by one law enforcement agency, another law enforcement agency may not initiate second interrogation relating to another investigation); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171 , 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) ("The Edwards rule ... is not offense specific: Once a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present." (citing Roberson , 486 U.S.

2018See Roberson , 486 U.S. at 677-78 , 687-88 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 (stating that when defendant requests counsel during interrogation by one law enforcement agency, another law enforcement agency may not initiate second interrogation relating to another investigation); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin , 501 U.S. 171 , 177, 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) ("The Edwards rule ... is not offense specific: Once a suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel for interrogation regarding one offense, he may not be reapproached regarding any offense unless counsel is present." (citing Roberson , 486 U.S.

2018The Edwards doctrine, which bars continuing an interrogation after a request for counsel, applies even if a different law enforcement agency seeks to question the accused about an unrelated crime, Arizona v. Roberson , 486 U.S. 675 , 686-88, 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), and even if the accused has consulted with an attorney, Minnick v. Mississippi , 498 U.S. 146 , 153, 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990).

2018The Edwards doctrine, which bars continuing an interrogation after a request for counsel, applies even if a different law enforcement agency seeks to question the accused about an unrelated crime, Arizona v. Roberson , 486 U.S. 675 , 686-88, 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988), and even if the accused has consulted with an attorney, Minnick v. Mississippi , 498 U.S. 146 , 153, 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990).

2025See Patane, 542 U.S. at 636 (noting that "the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self- Incrimination Clause.

2025See Patane, 542 U.S. at 636 (noting that "the Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect against violations of the Self- Incrimination Clause.

2017The Edwards rule has since been applied "to any subsequent interrogation, whether it pertained to the crime that prompted the initial interrogation or to a different crime." State v. Wessells, 209 N.J. 395, 403 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683-84 , 108 S. Ct. 2093, 2098-99 , 100 L.

2017The Edwards rule has since been applied "to any subsequent interrogation, whether it pertained to the crime that prompted the initial interrogation or to a different crime." State v. Wessells, 209 N.J. 395, 403 (2012) (emphasis added) (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683-84 , 108 S. Ct. 2093, 2098-99 , 100 L.

2012The Court observed that the Edwards rule served an important purpose because it was “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1180 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293, 302 (1990).

2012The Court observed that the Edwards rule served an important purpose because it was “designed to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1180 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293, 302 (1990).

2009In United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 , 103 S.Ct. 3569 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 1410 (1983), it was held that Edwards protection does not apply where the suspect was not in continuous custody.

2009In United States v. Skinner, 667 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229 , 103 S.Ct. 3569 , 77 L.Ed. 2d 1410 (1983), it was held that Edwards protection does not apply where the suspect was not in continuous custody.

2009In Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F. 2d 394, 397 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1329 , 103 L.Ed. 2d 597 (1989), the Eleventh Circuit held that a one-day break in custody, following an assertion of the right to the assistance of counsel, was sufficient to overcome the Edwards rule prohibiting subsequent custodial interrogation.

2009In Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F. 2d 394, 397 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 , 109 S.Ct. 1329 , 103 L.Ed. 2d 597 (1989), the Eleventh Circuit held that a one-day break in custody, following an assertion of the right to the assistance of counsel, was sufficient to overcome the Edwards rule prohibiting subsequent custodial interrogation.

2000Michigan v. Jackson, supra, 475 U.S. at 635, 106 S.Ct. at 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 642 .

2000Michigan v. Jackson, supra, 475 U.S. at 635, 106 S.Ct. at 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d at 642 .

1997See State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 27 , 446 A. 2d 1201 (1982).

1997See State v. McCloskey, 90 N.J. 18, 27 , 446 A. 2d 1201 (1982).

1986In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), the Supreme Court was sharply divided as to whether the defendant, who had invoked his right to counsel, satisfied the Edwards test of initiating further communication when he inquired of a police officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” Four members of the Court viewed the defendant’s comment as reflecting nothing more than his desire “to find out where the police were going to take him,” rather than a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.

1986In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 , 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), the Supreme Court was sharply divided as to whether the defendant, who had invoked his right to counsel, satisfied the Edwards test of initiating further communication when he inquired of a police officer, “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” Four members of the Court viewed the defendant’s comment as reflecting nothing more than his desire “to find out where the police were going to take him,” rather than a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation.