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10 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maryland v. Shatzergreen2 sentences2012See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). ¶ 9 In Maryland v. Shatzer, — U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 1223 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010), the Supreme Court recently extended the Edwards rule to breaks in custody lasting less than fourteen days. 2012See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). ¶ 9 In Maryland v. Shatzer, — U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 1223 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010), the Supreme Court recently extended the Edwards rule to breaks in custody lasting less than fourteen days. | 1 | 2 |
Mintz v. Bell Atlantic Systems Leasing International, Inc.green1 sentence2017Leasing Int’l, Inc., 183 Ariz. 550, 554 (App. 1995) (citation omitted). ¶7 Moreover, both claims are based on Edwards’ allegations that defendants used “false and fraudulent evidence and testimony to facilitate Judgment against” him and “knew, or had reason to know, that the evidence presented to the Court was fraudulent.” “‘An absolute privilege 3 Edwards’ brief also discusses claims not asserted in the pleadings, and purported wrongful acts by non-parties not properly a part of this case. | 1 | 1 |
Fox v. Wardgreen1 sentence2013In Fox v. Ward, 200 F.3d 1286, 1297-98 (10th Cir.2000), for example, the court held that the officers had not reinitiated questioning merely by handing their business cards to the suspect after he had requested a lawyer. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Williamsgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 31 So.3d 670, 682-83 (Ala.2009) (noting that “an accused can initiate further interrogation through a third party”); cf. People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399 , 139 Ill.Dec. 447 , 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1009-11 (1989) (finding no potential Edwards violation when suspect submitted to a polygraph after speaking with family members who were asked by officers to “find out ... what actually happened”). ¶ 13 Several jurisdictions do not find that officers have reinitiated questioning unless the officers’ conduct rises to the level of interrogation of the suspect under Rhode Island | 1 | 1 |
Robert J. Van Hook v. Carl S. Anderson, Wardengreen2 sentences2013Authority from other jurisdictions is also sparse, but we are not aware of any court that has found an Edwards violation in circumstances like those presented here. ¶ 11 In assessing whether a suspect “initiate[d] a discussion with police through the communication of a third party,” the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found no distinction between direct communications and those from others, concluding that “what is important is [that] the impetus for discussion comes from the suspect himself.” Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 418, 422-23 (6th Cir.2007). 2013Authority from other jurisdictions is also sparse, but we are not aware of any court that has found an Edwards violation in circumstances like those presented here. ¶ 11 In assessing whether a suspect “initiate[d] a discussion with police through the communication of a third party,” the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found no distinction between direct communications and those from others, concluding that “what is important is [that] the impetus for discussion comes from the suspect himself.” Van Hook v. Anderson, 488 F.3d 411, 418, 422-23 (6th Cir.2007). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 31 So.3d 670, 682-83 (Ala.2009) (noting that “an accused can initiate further interrogation through a third party”); cf. People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399 , 139 Ill.Dec. 447 , 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1009-11 (1989) (finding no potential Edwards violation when suspect submitted to a polygraph after speaking with family members who were asked by officers to “find out ... what actually happened”). ¶ 13 Several jurisdictions do not find that officers have reinitiated questioning unless the officers’ conduct rises to the level of interrogation of the suspect under Rhode Island 2013See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 31 So.3d 670, 682-83 (Ala.2009) (noting that “an accused can initiate further interrogation through a third party”); cf. People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399 , 139 Ill.Dec. 447 , 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1009-11 (1989) (finding no potential Edwards violation when suspect submitted to a polygraph after speaking with family members who were asked by officers to “find out ... what actually happened”). ¶ 13 Several jurisdictions do not find that officers have reinitiated questioning unless the officers’ conduct rises to the level of interrogation of the suspect under Rhode Island | 1 | 1 |
State v. Childressgreen2 sentences2012We nonetheless ordered supplemental briefing because we must affirm a trial court if its ruling is legally correct for any reason found in the record, State v. Childress, 222 Ariz. 334, ¶ 9 , 214 P.3d 422, 426 (App.2009), and the United States Supreme Court has stated, albeit in dicta, that a second interrogation must be custodial for the Edwards rule to apply. 2012We nonetheless ordered supplemental briefing because we must affirm a trial court if its ruling is legally correct for any reason found in the record, State v. Childress, 222 Ariz. 334, ¶ 9 , 214 P.3d 422, 426 (App.2009), and the United States Supreme Court has stated, albeit in dicta, that a second interrogation must be custodial for the Edwards rule to apply. | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Robersongreen2 sentences2012See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). ¶ 9 In Maryland v. Shatzer, — U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 1223 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010), the Supreme Court recently extended the Edwards rule to breaks in custody lasting less than fourteen days. 2012See Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). ¶ 9 In Maryland v. Shatzer, — U.S. -, -, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 1223 , 175 L.Ed.2d 1045 (2010), the Supreme Court recently extended the Edwards rule to breaks in custody lasting less than fourteen days. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kinggreen2 sentences2004See State v. King, 140 Ariz. 602, 604 , 684 P.2d 174, 176 (1984) (consent to search obtained after Edwards violation could not serve to legitimize a warrant-less search). ¶34 Thus, the search was presumptively illegal because it was conducted without a warrant, without exigent circumstances, and without valid consent. 2004See State v. King, 140 Ariz. 602, 604 , 684 P.2d 174, 176 (1984) (consent to search obtained after Edwards violation could not serve to legitimize a warrant-less search). ¶34 Thus, the search was presumptively illegal because it was conducted without a warrant, without exigent circumstances, and without valid consent. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Bradshaw
green
2 sentences1988The Court did, however, point out certain types of questions that would not reopen a conversation, such as, “May I get a drink?”, or, “May I use the telephone?” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045 , 103 S.Ct. at 2835 . 1988The Court did, however, point out certain types of questions that would not reopen a conversation, such as, “May I get a drink?”, or, “May I use the telephone?” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045 , 103 S.Ct. at 2835 . | 2 | 1984–1988 |
State v. Leyva
green
1 sentence2022Such statements “carry a strong presumption of verity, and constitute a formidable barrier in a subsequent challenge to the validity of the plea.” State v. Leyva, 241 Ariz. 521 , 525 ¶ 12 (App. 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). ¶7 Edwards’s claim that the State’s failure to disclose evidence controverted his acceptance of guilt fails. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Rhode Island v. Innis
green
2 sentences2013See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 31 So.3d 670, 682-83 (Ala.2009) (noting that “an accused can initiate further interrogation through a third party”); cf. People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399 , 139 Ill.Dec. 447 , 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1009-11 (1989) (finding no potential Edwards violation when suspect submitted to a polygraph after speaking with family members who were asked by officers to “find out ... what actually happened”). ¶ 13 Several jurisdictions do not find that officers have reinitiated questioning unless the officers’ conduct rises to the level of interrogation of the suspect under Rhode Island 2013See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 31 So.3d 670, 682-83 (Ala.2009) (noting that “an accused can initiate further interrogation through a third party”); cf. People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399 , 139 Ill.Dec. 447 , 548 N.E.2d 1003, 1009-11 (1989) (finding no potential Edwards violation when suspect submitted to a polygraph after speaking with family members who were asked by officers to “find out ... what actually happened”). ¶ 13 Several jurisdictions do not find that officers have reinitiated questioning unless the officers’ conduct rises to the level of interrogation of the suspect under Rhode Island | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Edwards v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2013It creates a presumption of involuntariness of any resulting waiver that occurs in response to “further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if [the defendant] has been advised of his rights.” Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1219 -20 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ). 2013It creates a presumption of involuntariness of any resulting waiver that occurs in response to “further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if [the defendant] has been advised of his rights.” Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1219 -20 (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Michigan v. Harvey
green
2 sentences2013The Edwards rule limiting police re-initiation of questioning following the invocation of rights is designed “to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). 2013The Edwards rule limiting police re-initiation of questioning following the invocation of rights is designed “to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights.” Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 , 110 S.Ct. 1176 , 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Michigan v. Jackson
red
2 sentences1999Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 635-36 , 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1410-11 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (holding postarraignment questioning of an accused who requested counsel at the arraignment invalid). 1999Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 635-36 , 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1410-11 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (holding postarraignment questioning of an accused who requested counsel at the arraignment invalid). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1994The Edwards rule is clear — once a criminal suspect during custodial interrogation has invoked his right to have counsel present during questioning, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625-27 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the police must cease questioning until counsel is present or until the suspect validly waives his request. 1994The Edwards rule is clear — once a criminal suspect during custodial interrogation has invoked his right to have counsel present during questioning, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1625-27 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the police must cease questioning until counsel is present or until the suspect validly waives his request. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Rigney v. SUPERIOR COURT, IN AND FOR CTY. OF PIMA
green
2 sentences1977The Edwards and the Van Westrienens were adverse parties for purposes of Edwards’ motion for summary judgment, Rigney v. Superior Court, 17 Ariz.App. 546 , 499 P.2d 160 (1972), and because Edwards filed a crossclaim against the Van Westrienens for judgment over in the event appellants recovered judgment against them. 1977The Edwards and the Van Westrienens were adverse parties for purposes of Edwards’ motion for summary judgment, Rigney v. Superior Court, 17 Ariz.App. 546 , 499 P.2d 160 (1972), and because Edwards filed a crossclaim against the Van Westrienens for judgment over in the event appellants recovered judgment against them. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.