Edwards rule in Minnesota

2006There are three steps to determine whether the Edwards rule, and thus a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, was violated: First, the court must determine whether the suspect invoked his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation; if so, then “courts may admit responses to further questioning only on finding that [the accused] (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right invoked.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 138-39 (Minn.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2006There are three steps to determine whether the Edwards rule, and thus a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, was violated: First, the court must determine whether the suspect invoked his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation; if so, then “courts may admit responses to further questioning only on finding that [the accused] (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right invoked.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 138-39 (Minn.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

1999The bright-line rule of Edwards establishes a duty on the part of police to cease interrogation after a suspect invokes his right to counsel “unless the [suspect] himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 . “[I]f the police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion * * * of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.” Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (applying the Edwards

1999The bright-line rule of Edwards establishes a duty on the part of police to cease interrogation after a suspect invokes his right to counsel “unless the [suspect] himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 . “[I]f the police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion * * * of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.” Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631 (1986) (applying the Edwards

1999In discussing the first step in the Edwards analysis, both parties in the present case cited to our decision in State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217 (Minn.1988).

1999In discussing the first step in the Edwards analysis, both parties in the present case cited to our decision in State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217 (Minn.1988).

2006See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir.2000) (three-hour break in custody defeated Edwards protection, as defendant "had ample opportunity to consult his family, friends, or a lawyer"); United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945 (5th Cir.1994) (following other circuits in holding that if, "after invoking her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect is released from custody, then the concerns that prompted Edwards ’ prophylactic rule are sufficiently minimized that any Edwards violation allegedly founded on those prior requests simply ‘dissolves.’ ”); McFadden v.

2006See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir.2000) (three-hour break in custody defeated Edwards protection, as defendant "had ample opportunity to consult his family, friends, or a lawyer"); United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945 (5th Cir.1994) (following other circuits in holding that if, "after invoking her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect is released from custody, then the concerns that prompted Edwards ’ prophylactic rule are sufficiently minimized that any Edwards violation allegedly founded on those prior requests simply ‘dissolves.’ ”); McFadden v.

2006See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir.2000) (three-hour break in custody defeated Edwards protection, as defendant "had ample opportunity to consult his family, friends, or a lawyer"); United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945 (5th Cir.1994) (following other circuits in holding that if, "after invoking her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect is released from custody, then the concerns that prompted Edwards ’ prophylactic rule are sufficiently minimized that any Edwards violation allegedly founded on those prior requests simply ‘dissolves.’ ”); McFadden v.

2006See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir.2000) (three-hour break in custody defeated Edwards protection, as defendant "had ample opportunity to consult his family, friends, or a lawyer"); United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945 (5th Cir.1994) (following other circuits in holding that if, "after invoking her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect is released from custody, then the concerns that prompted Edwards ’ prophylactic rule are sufficiently minimized that any Edwards violation allegedly founded on those prior requests simply ‘dissolves.’ ”); McFadden v.

2006See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir.2000) (three-hour break in custody defeated Edwards protection, as defendant "had ample opportunity to consult his family, friends, or a lawyer"); United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945 (5th Cir.1994) (following other circuits in holding that if, "after invoking her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect is released from custody, then the concerns that prompted Edwards ’ prophylactic rule are sufficiently minimized that any Edwards violation allegedly founded on those prior requests simply ‘dissolves.’ ”); McFadden v.

2006Additionally, many state and federal courts have held that a break in custody defeats the Edwards rule. 11 Indeed, *683 one court observed that “Although this is an issue of first impression in this circuit, we note that other courts have unanimously reached this conclusion.” Kyger v. Carlton, 146 F.3d 374, 380-81 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that Edwards does not apply to suspects who are not in continuous custody).

2006Additionally, many state and federal courts have held that a break in custody defeats the Edwards rule. 11 Indeed, *683 one court observed that “Although this is an issue of first impression in this circuit, we note that other courts have unanimously reached this conclusion.” Kyger v. Carlton, 146 F.3d 374, 380-81 (6th Cir.1998) (holding that Edwards does not apply to suspects who are not in continuous custody).

2006See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir.2000) (three-hour break in custody defeated Edwards protection, as defendant "had ample opportunity to consult his family, friends, or a lawyer"); United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945 (5th Cir.1994) (following other circuits in holding that if, "after invoking her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect is released from custody, then the concerns that prompted Edwards ’ prophylactic rule are sufficiently minimized that any Edwards violation allegedly founded on those prior requests simply ‘dissolves.’ ”); McFadden v.

2006See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 221 F.3d 1048, 1052-53 (8th Cir.2000) (three-hour break in custody defeated Edwards protection, as defendant "had ample opportunity to consult his family, friends, or a lawyer"); United States v. Barlow, 41 F.3d 935, 945 (5th Cir.1994) (following other circuits in holding that if, "after invoking her Fifth Amendment right to counsel, a suspect is released from custody, then the concerns that prompted Edwards ’ prophylactic rule are sufficiently minimized that any Edwards violation allegedly founded on those prior requests simply ‘dissolves.’ ”); McFadden v.

2001See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2880 .

2001See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2880 .

1998Finally, the state contends that Jackson only testified about routine police procedure and did not vouch for Edwards. “[T]he credibility of a witness is for the jury to decide.” State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn.1995).

1998Finally, the state contends that Jackson only testified about routine police procedure and did not vouch for Edwards. "[T]he credibility of a witness is for the jury to decide." State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Minn.1995).

1991See State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 775-76 (Minn.1989) (applying traditional fruit-of-the-poisonous tree analysis to an Edwards violation).

1991See State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 775-76 (Minn.1989) (applying traditional fruit-of-the-poisonous tree analysis to an Edwards violation).

1989Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372, 377-78 , 92 S.Ct. 2174, 2175, 2177-78 , 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (“Assuming, arguendo, that the challenged testimony should have been excluded” as being obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel, “any error in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224-26 (Minn.1988) (erroneous admission of in-custody statement obtained in violation of the Edwards rule was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

1989Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371, 372, 377-78 , 92 S.Ct. 2174, 2175, 2177-78 , 33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972) (“Assuming, arguendo, that the challenged testimony should have been excluded” as being obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel, “any error in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt”); State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224-26 (Minn.1988) (erroneous admission of in-custody statement obtained in violation of the Edwards rule was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).