Edwards rule in Maryland

2012Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1219-20 (discussing the “Edwards presumption of involuntariness”).

2010The Court deemed it “appropriate to specify a period of time to avoid the consequence that continuation of the Edwards presumption ‘will not reach the correct result most of the time.’ ” Id. at 1223. (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 737 , 111 S.Ct. 2546 , 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)).

2008See, e.g., Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir.2000) (stating in dicta that "[o]ther circuits have noted that various factors such as a break in custody or a lapse in time may vitiate the coercive effect of an impermissible interrogation so that the admission of subsequent statements is not barred by the Edwards rule.

2008See, e.g., Holman v. Kemna, 212 F.3d 413, 419 (8th Cir.2000) (stating in dicta that "[o]ther circuits have noted that various factors such as a break in custody or a lapse in time may vitiate the coercive effect of an impermissible interrogation so that the admission of subsequent statements is not barred by the Edwards rule.

2004See Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that break in custody after invocation of Fifth Amendment rights ends the need for the Edwards rule); United States v. Walker, 624 F.Supp. 103, 105 (D.Md.1985) (holding that following defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights, delay of approximately one hour not sufficient to constitute waiver of right to have counsel present before he made any statement).

2001See Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 833, 842 (6th Cir.1999) (lapse in time), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Mar. 21, 2000) (No. 99-8773); United States v. Gomez, 927 F.2d 1530 , 1539 n. 8 (11th Cir.1991) (same); Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir.1988) (break in custody dissolves a defendant’s Edwards claim); McFadden v. Garraghty, 820 F.2d 654, 661 (4th Cir.1987) (same).

2012The Shatzer Court explained the rationale of the Edwards presumption as follows: [O]nee a suspect indicates that “he is not capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning without advice of counsel,” “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 [ 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 ] (1988).

2012The Shatzer Court explained the rationale of the Edwards presumption as follows: [O]nee a suspect indicates that “he is not capable of undergoing [custodial] questioning without advice of counsel,” “any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities’ behest, and not at the suspect’s own instigation, is itself the product of the ‘inherently compelling pressures’ and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.” Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 [ 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 ] (1988).

2012More recently, in Ballard v. State, 420 Md. 480 , 24 A.3d 96 (2011), we observed that: “The Edwards rule establishes a ‘bright-line’ prohibition against all subsequent questioning because, in the absence of such a prohibition, ‘the authorities through “badgering” or “overreaching” — explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional — might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance.’ ” Id. at 489 , 24 A.3d at 101 (quoting in part from Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 , 105 S.Ct. 490, 494 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488,

2012More recently, in Ballard v. State, 420 Md. 480 , 24 A.3d 96 (2011), we observed that: “The Edwards rule establishes a ‘bright-line’ prohibition against all subsequent questioning because, in the absence of such a prohibition, ‘the authorities through “badgering” or “overreaching” — explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional — might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel’s assistance.’ ” Id. at 489 , 24 A.3d at 101 (quoting in part from Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 , 105 S.Ct. 490, 494 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488,

2001In Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 , 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), the Court expanded the Edwards rule still further.

2001In Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 , 111 S.Ct. 486 , 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), the Court expanded the Edwards rule still further.

2008See, e.g., Kochutin v. State, 875 P.2d 778, 779 (Alaska App.1994) (“The continuous custody requirement has been universally recognized by federal courts of appeal and appears to be a well-established feature of the Edwards rule.”); Elizabeth Levy, Non-Continuous Custody and the Miranda-Edwards Rule: Break in Custody Severs Safeguards, 20 New Eng.

2008See, e.g., Kochutin v. State, 875 P.2d 778, 779 (Alaska App.1994) (“The continuous custody requirement has been universally recognized by federal courts of appeal and appears to be a well-established feature of the Edwards rule.”); Elizabeth Levy, Non-Continuous Custody and the Miranda-Edwards Rule: Break in Custody Severs Safeguards, 20 New Eng.

2011The Supreme Court made clear in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), that applicability of the Edwards rule “requires courts to determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) That inquiry, moreover, is “objective.” Id. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (“To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry.”).

2011The Supreme Court made clear in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994), that applicability of the Edwards rule “requires courts to determine whether the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.” (Internal quotation marks and citation omitted.) That inquiry, moreover, is “objective.” Id. at 458-59, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (“To avoid difficulties of proof and to provide guidance to officers conducting interrogations, this is an objective inquiry.”).

2008While no other case has addressed the Edwards issue in this Court since Blake, the Court of Special Appeals in Clark v. State, 140 Md.App. 540 , 781 A.2d 913 (2001), cert. denied, 368 Md. 527 , 796 A.2d 695 (2002), held that a five-year lapse between interrogations, between which the defendant pled guilty and was sentenced for the crime involved in the first interrogation, constituted a break in custody sufficient to serve as an exception to Edwards .

2008While no other case has addressed the Edwards issue in this Court since Blake, the Court of Special Appeals in Clark v. State, 140 Md.App. 540 , 781 A.2d 913 (2001), cert. denied, 368 Md. 527 , 796 A.2d 695 (2002), held that a five-year lapse between interrogations, between which the defendant pled guilty and was sentenced for the crime involved in the first interrogation, constituted a break in custody sufficient to serve as an exception to Edwards .

2008L.J. 883 , 935 & n. 174 (1997) ("[a]fter Mathis , numerous state and lower courts expressly held that not all incarceration constitutes Miranda custody and that `incarceration does not ipso facto render an interrogation custodial'"). [12] In Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 133 , 411 A.2d 415, 421 (1980) declined to recognize an emergency exception to Miranda, noting that "the United States Supreme Court itself has not placed any per se limitation on where and when Miranda safeguards should be applied." The Supreme Court subsequently recognized an emergency exception in N.Y. v. Quarles, 467 U.

2008L.J. 883 , 935 & n. 174 (1997) ("[a]fter Mathis , numerous state and lower courts expressly held that not all incarceration constitutes Miranda custody and that `incarceration does not ipso facto render an interrogation custodial'"). [12] In Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 133 , 411 A.2d 415, 421 (1980) declined to recognize an emergency exception to Miranda, noting that "the United States Supreme Court itself has not placed any per se limitation on where and when Miranda safeguards should be applied." The Supreme Court subsequently recognized an emergency exception in N.Y. v. Quarles, 467 U.

2008In sum, reliance on Dedo v. State, 343 Md. 2, 9 , 680 A.2d 464, 468 (1996), and similar cases is inappropriate. 8 I, accordingly, would use federal constitutional law, including Miranda progeny, to determine the meaning of “in custody” for purposes of the Edwards rule.

2008In sum, reliance on Dedo v. State, 343 Md. 2, 9 , 680 A.2d 464, 468 (1996), and similar cases is inappropriate. 8 I, accordingly, would use federal constitutional law, including Miranda progeny, to determine the meaning of “in custody” for purposes of the Edwards rule.

2008L.J. 883 , 935 & n. 174 (1997) ("[a]fter Mathis , numerous state and lower courts expressly held that not all incarceration constitutes Miranda custody and that `incarceration does not ipso facto render an interrogation custodial'"). [12] In Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 133 , 411 A.2d 415, 421 (1980) declined to recognize an emergency exception to Miranda, noting that "the United States Supreme Court itself has not placed any per se limitation on where and when Miranda safeguards should be applied." The Supreme Court subsequently recognized an emergency exception in N.Y. v. Quarles, 467 U.

2008L.J. 883 , 935 & n. 174 (1997) ("[a]fter Mathis , numerous state and lower courts expressly held that not all incarceration constitutes Miranda custody and that `incarceration does not ipso facto render an interrogation custodial'"). [12] In Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 133 , 411 A.2d 415, 421 (1980) declined to recognize an emergency exception to Miranda, noting that "the United States Supreme Court itself has not placed any per se limitation on where and when Miranda safeguards should be applied." The Supreme Court subsequently recognized an emergency exception in N.Y. v. Quarles, 467 U.

2008Although this is an issue of first impression in this circuit, we note that other courts have unanimously reached this conclusion”); State v. Scanlon, 719 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn.2006) (“[M]any state and federal courts have held that a break in custody defeats the Edwards rule”); cases cited at n. 6, swpra.

2008Although this is an issue of first impression in this circuit, we note that other courts have unanimously reached this conclusion”); State v. Scanlon, 719 N.W.2d 674, 682 (Minn.2006) (“[M]any state and federal courts have held that a break in custody defeats the Edwards rule”); cases cited at n. 6, swpra.

2004See also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 , 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631, 642 (1986) (applying Edwards rule to a claimed violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and holding that "if police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion ... of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid”).

2004See also Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 , 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1411 , 89 L.Ed.2d 631, 642 (1986) (applying Edwards rule to a claimed violation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel and holding that "if police initiate interrogation after a defendant’s assertion ... of his right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant's right to counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid”).

2004If we find that petitioner did not initiate further discussions with the police, following Edwards , we do not consider whether he subsequently waived his right to counsel. 5 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 413 (1983) (stating that “[s]ince there was no violation of the Edwards rule in this case, the next inquiry was *233 ‘whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred’ ”); Radovsky, 296 Md. at 392 , 464 A.2d at 242 (holding that “the defendant’s right to have counsel during interrogation was violated, u

2004If we find that petitioner did not initiate further discussions with the police, following Edwards , we do not consider whether he subsequently waived his right to counsel. 5 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 413 (1983) (stating that “[s]ince there was no violation of the Edwards rule in this case, the next inquiry was *233 ‘whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred’ ”); Radovsky, 296 Md. at 392 , 464 A.2d at 242 (holding that “the defendant’s right to have counsel during interrogation was violated, u

2004If we find that petitioner did not initiate further discussions with the police, following Edwards , we do not consider whether he subsequently waived his right to counsel. 5 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 413 (1983) (stating that “[s]ince there was no violation of the Edwards rule in this case, the next inquiry was *233 ‘whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred’ ”); Radovsky, 296 Md. at 392 , 464 A.2d at 242 (holding that “the defendant’s right to have counsel during interrogation was violated, u

2004If we find that petitioner did not initiate further discussions with the police, following Edwards , we do not consider whether he subsequently waived his right to counsel. 5 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046 , 103 S.Ct. 2830, 2835 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405, 413 (1983) (stating that “[s]ince there was no violation of the Edwards rule in this case, the next inquiry was *233 ‘whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred’ ”); Radovsky, 296 Md. at 392 , 464 A.2d at 242 (holding that “the defendant’s right to have counsel during interrogation was violated, u

2004See Dunkins v. Thigpen, 854 F.2d 394, 397 (11th Cir.1988) (holding that break in custody after invocation of Fifth Amendment rights ends the need for the Edwards rule); United States v. Walker, 624 F.Supp. 103, 105 (D.Md.1985) (holding that following defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights, delay of approximately one hour not sufficient to constitute waiver of right to have counsel present before he made any statement).