8 Oklahoma opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oklahoma courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cook v. Oklahoma Board of Public Affairsgreen2 sentences2002Additionally, “[whenever there is statutory authority to award counsel fees in the trial court, additional fees may also be allowed for services rendered in the appellate court.” Cook, 1987 OK 22, ¶ 46 , 736 P.2d at 154 (footnote omitted). ¶ 11 We grant Mr. Edwards’ motion for appellate attorney fees. 2002Additionally, “[whenever there is statutory authority to award counsel fees in the trial court, additional fees may also be allowed for services rendered in the appellate court.” Cook, 1987 OK 22, ¶ 46 , 736 P.2d at 154 (footnote omitted). ¶ 11 We grant Mr. Edwards’ motion for appellate attorney fees. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oklahoma. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Bradshaw
green
2 sentences1993As there was no violation of the Edwards rule in this case, the next inquiry is “whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 , 103 S.Ct. at 2835 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 413 , quoting Edwards v. Arizona, (citation omitted). 1993As there was no violation of the Edwards rule in this case, the next inquiry is “whether a valid waiver of the right to counsel and the right to silence had occurred, that is, whether the purported waiver was knowing and intelligent and found to be so under the totality of the circumstances, including the necessary fact that the accused, not the police, reopened the dialogue with the authorities.” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046 , 103 S.Ct. at 2835 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 413 , quoting Edwards v. Arizona, (citation omitted). | 2 | 1993–2002 |
Burkes v. Estate of Marie Burkes
neutral
2 sentences2008Burkes v. Estate of Burkes, 1997 OK 76 , 945 P.2d 481, 484 . 2008Burkes v. Estate of Burkes, 1997 OK 76 , 945 P.2d 481, 484 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Minnick v. Mississippi
green
1 sentence1994The Supreme Court in Minnick extended the Edwards’ rule by holding “that when counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present, whether or not the accused has consulted with his attorney.” 498 U.S. at 153 , 111 S.Ct. at 491. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Smith v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1990Smith, 469 U.S. at 95 , 105 S.Ct. at 493 . *1068 Applying the Edwards test to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the appellant did invoke his right to counsel. 1990Smith, 469 U.S. at 95 , 105 S.Ct. at 493 . *1068 Applying the Edwards test to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the appellant did invoke his right to counsel. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Shea v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1986In Shea, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1070 , the Edwards rule was held to apply retroactively to all cases in which the process of direct appeal had not yet been completed when Edwards was decided. 1986In Shea, supra, 105 S.Ct. at 1070 , the Edwards rule was held to apply retroactively to all cases in which the process of direct appeal had not yet been completed when Edwards was decided. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Solem v. Stumes
green
2 sentences1986In Solem, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 1345 -1346 — a federal collateral attack upon a state conviction that had become final — the Court held that the rule announced in Edwards, supra, should not be applied retroactively. 1986In Solem, supra, 104 S.Ct. at 1345 -1346 — a federal collateral attack upon a state conviction that had become final — the Court held that the rule announced in Edwards, supra, should not be applied retroactively. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
White v. Oliver
green
2 sentences1974Gillis v. First Nat’l Bank, 47 Okl. 411 , 148 P. 994 (1915); Posey v. Citizens’ State Bank, 93 Okl. 266 , 220 P. 628 (1923); and White v. Oliver, 173 Okl. 5S9, 49 P.2d 147 (1935). 1974Gillis v. First Nat’l Bank, 47 Okl. 411 , 148 P. 994 (1915); Posey v. Citizens’ State Bank, 93 Okl. 266 , 220 P. 628 (1923); and White v. Oliver, 173 Okl. 5S9, 49 P.2d 147 (1935). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Gillis v. First Nat. Bank of Frederick
neutral
2 sentences1974Gillis v. First Nat’l Bank, 47 Okl. 411 , 148 P. 994 (1915); Posey v. Citizens’ State Bank, 93 Okl. 266 , 220 P. 628 (1923); and White v. Oliver, 173 Okl. 5S9, 49 P.2d 147 (1935). 1974Gillis v. First Nat’l Bank, 47 Okl. 411 , 148 P. 994 (1915); Posey v. Citizens’ State Bank, 93 Okl. 266 , 220 P. 628 (1923); and White v. Oliver, 173 Okl. 5S9, 49 P.2d 147 (1935). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Posey v. Citizens' State Bank
green
2 sentences1974Gillis v. First Nat’l Bank, 47 Okl. 411 , 148 P. 994 (1915); Posey v. Citizens’ State Bank, 93 Okl. 266 , 220 P. 628 (1923); and White v. Oliver, 173 Okl. 5S9, 49 P.2d 147 (1935). 1974Gillis v. First Nat’l Bank, 47 Okl. 411 , 148 P. 994 (1915); Posey v. Citizens’ State Bank, 93 Okl. 266 , 220 P. 628 (1923); and White v. Oliver, 173 Okl. 5S9, 49 P.2d 147 (1935). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.