Edwards rule in Oregon

2025State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572 , 789 P2d 1352 (1990) (“The Edwards rule is prophylactic; it is designated to protect a suspect in custody from being ‘badgered’ by the police.” (Citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1043 , 1044, 103 S Ct 2830 (1983))).

2025State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572 , 789 P2d 1352 (1990) (“The Edwards rule is prophylactic; it is designated to protect a suspect in custody from being ‘badgered’ by the police.” (Citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1043 , 1044, 103 S Ct 2830 (1983))).

2025State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572 , 789 P2d 1352 (1990) (“The Edwards rule is prophylactic; it is designated to protect a suspect in custody from being ‘badgered’ by the police.” (Citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1043 , 1044, 103 S Ct 2830 (1983))).

2025State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 572 , 789 P2d 1352 (1990) (“The Edwards rule is prophylactic; it is designated to protect a suspect in custody from being ‘badgered’ by the police.” (Citing Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 US 1043 , 1044, 103 S Ct 2830 (1983))).

2025As explained above, to establish a voluntary waiver the state was required to demonstrate both a “suspect initi- ated dialog” with law enforcement for a “generalized discus- sion about the investigation” and a knowing, voluntary, and 7 Although talking to a suspect about routine booking matters after an unequivocal invocation can be permissible, Fink, 285 Or App at 307 , that is not what Durr did. 8 Indeed, the conduct of the first two officers supports this conclusion.

2025As explained above, to establish a voluntary waiver the state was required to demonstrate both a “suspect initi- ated dialog” with law enforcement for a “generalized discus- sion about the investigation” and a knowing, voluntary, and 7 Although talking to a suspect about routine booking matters after an unequivocal invocation can be permissible, Fink, 285 Or App at 307 , that is not what Durr did. 8 Indeed, the conduct of the first two officers supports this conclusion.

2018Id . at 530, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 267 P.3d at 1132 .

2018Id . at 530, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 267 P.3d at 1132 .

1992Arizona v. Roberson, [supra].” McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra,_US at_, 111 S Ct at 2208 .

1992Arizona v. Roberson, [supra].” McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra,_US at_, 111 S Ct at 2208 .

1987That holding was based on a need to protect the derivative right to counsel for persons in custody, as explained in Miranda v. Arizona, supra. In State v. Kell, supra, 303 Or at 101 , the Supreme Court held that the Edwards analysis is equally applicable under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.

1987That holding was based on a need to protect the derivative right to counsel for persons in custody, as explained in Miranda v. Arizona, supra. In State v. Kell, supra, 303 Or at 101 , the Supreme Court held that the Edwards analysis is equally applicable under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution.

1986Relying on State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85 , 672 P2d 1182 (1983), however, the state asserts that the Edwards rule is not applicable to custodial interrogation concerning charges unrelated to those about which a defendant asserts his right to counsel.

1986Relying on State v. Sparklin, 296 Or 85 , 672 P2d 1182 (1983), however, the state asserts that the Edwards rule is not applicable to custodial interrogation concerning charges unrelated to those about which a defendant asserts his right to counsel.

1986Under Edwards , a suspect who is in custody and who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him * * 451 US at 484 .

1986Under Edwards , a suspect who is in custody and who has “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him * * 451 US at 484 .

1986In Michigan v. Jackson, _ US _, 106 S Ct 1404 , 89 L Ed 2d 631 (1986), the United States Supreme Court applied, under the Sixth Amendment, the Edwards rule 3 of strict non-initiation of interrogation by police.

1986In Michigan v. Jackson, _ US _, 106 S Ct 1404 , 89 L Ed 2d 631 (1986), the United States Supreme Court applied, under the Sixth Amendment, the Edwards rule 3 of strict non-initiation of interrogation by police.