implied waiver in Kentucky

2018Id.

2018Id.

2018After acknowledging that the Hearn v. Rhay standard is “widely seen as the majority view,” id. at 682 , the Christenbury court decided, in a case of first impression under Georgia law, that the implied waiver may extend to a non- party’s legal advice.

2018After acknowledging that the Hearn v. Rhay standard is “widely seen as the majority view,” id. at 682 , the Christenbury court decided, in a case of first impression under Georgia law, that the implied waiver may extend to a non- party’s legal advice.

2005(Emphasis added.) We have already held in this opinion and in Withers, 939 S.W.2d at 346 , that mere authorization to purchase liability insurance does not constitute an implied waiver of immunity.

1997KRS 65.150 states "the county or city or urban county government ... may expend funds necessary to insure any of its employees, officials and property against any liability or property damage arising out of an act or omission committed in the scope and course of performing legal duties." As described in Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (1997), and in a series of cases beginning with Dunlap v. University of Kentucky Student Health Services Clinic, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 219 (1986), this Court has previously held that the enactment of statutes permitting the purchase of liability

1997KRS 65.150 states "the county or city or urban county government ... may expend funds necessary to insure any of its employees, officials and property against any liability or property damage arising out of an act or omission committed in the scope and course of performing legal duties." As described in Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (1997), and in a series of cases beginning with Dunlap v. University of Kentucky Student Health Services Clinic, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 219 (1986), this Court has previously held that the enactment of statutes permitting the purchase of liability

1997KRS 65.150 states “the county or city or urban county government ... may expend funds necessary to insure any of its employees, officials and property against any liability or property damage arising out of an act or omission committed in the scope and course of performing legal duties.” As described in Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340 (1997), and in a series of cases beginning with Dunlap v. University of Kentucky Student Health Services Clinic, Ky., 716 S.W.2d 219 (1986), this Court has previously held that the enactment of statutes permitting the purchase of liability

2017Rejecting the plaintiffs arguments, this Court held that “participation in a self-insurance fund is not an implied waiver of immunity” and that “[pjartic-ipation in a self-insurance fund pursuant to an inter-local cooperation act does not give rise to an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 203-204 .

2013Id. at 384, 130 S.Ct. 2250 .

2013Her proceeding with the polygraph examination after being advised of her rights was “inconsistent with their exercise” and her actions can be interpreted as “a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.” Id. at 385, 130 S.Ct. 2250 .

2013In so ruling, we noted that (1) the information sought was highly relevant and no longer privileged due to the implied waiver; (2) there was no other means of obtaining the information and (3) the information was crucial and “could very well determine the ultimate outcome in this case.” 328 S.W.3d at 188-90 .

2013In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 , 103 S.Ct. 394 , 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with nearly identical circumstances and had to decide whether a criminal defendant’s initial waiver of Miranda rights extended to post-exam questioning by the polygraph examiner.

2013In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 , 103 S.Ct. 394 , 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982), the U.S. Supreme Court was presented with nearly identical circumstances and had to decide whether a criminal defendant’s initial waiver of Miranda rights extended to post-exam questioning by the polygraph examiner.

2008Timoteo, supra ; Boyd, supra .

2006The Appellee argues that we interpret KRS 395.278 and CR 25.01 to have an implied requirement of notice of death to trigger the running of the limitation period, so as to be consistent with the Federal rule, FRCP 25(a)(1), and our surrounding sister states, e.g., Carter v. Burns, 332 Mo. 1128, 1138-39 , 61 S.W.2d 933 (Mo.1933); Carroll Hardwood Lumber Company v. Stephenson, 131 W.Va. 784 , 51 S.E.2d 313, 315 (W.Va.1949).

2006The Appellee argues that we interpret KRS 395.278 and CR 25.01 to have an implied requirement of notice of death to trigger the running of the limitation period, so as to be consistent with the Federal rule, FRCP 25(a)(1), and our surrounding sister states, e.g., Carter v. Burns, 332 Mo. 1128, 1138-39 , 61 S.W.2d 933 (Mo.1933); Carroll Hardwood Lumber Company v. Stephenson, 131 W.Va. 784 , 51 S.E.2d 313, 315 (W.Va.1949).

2005Since Casey did not sue any individual Board members of the Grayson County Board of Education, we are not now required to construe the statutory language authorizing the expenditure of funds for the defense of a civil action brought against an individual board member “in his official ... capacity.” However, in Wallace v. Laurel County Board of Education, 287 Ky. 454 , 153 S.W.2d 915 (1941), our predecessor court held that the “sue and be sued” language in KRS 160.160(1) authorizes suits on contracts or to protect one’s property, but not for torts.

2005Since Casey did not sue any individual Board members of the Grayson County Board of Education, we are not now required to construe the statutory language authorizing the expenditure of funds for the defense of a civil action brought against an individual board member “in his official ... capacity.” However, in Wallace v. Laurel County Board of Education, 287 Ky. 454 , 153 S.W.2d 915 (1941), our predecessor court held that the “sue and be sued” language in KRS 160.160(1) authorizes suits on contracts or to protect one’s property, but not for torts.

2000This Court has quite recently again rejected this same argument as applied to the adults in Shamrock Coal Co., Inc. v. Maricle, Ky., 5 S.W.3d 130, 134 (1999) (citing Wells v. Jefferson County, Ky., 255 S.W.2d 462 (1953)).

1997As noted earlier, this Court has held in a series of cases including Dunlap, Kestler v. Transit Authority of Northern Kentucky, Ky., 758 S.W.2d 38 (1988) and Green River Health Dept. v. Wigginton, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 475 (1989), that the enactment of statutes permitting the purchase of liability insurance constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.

1997As noted earlier, this Court has held in a series of cases including Dunlap, Kestler v. Transit Authority of Northern Kentucky, Ky., 758 S.W.2d 38 (1988) and Green River Health Dept. v. Wigginton, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 475 (1989), that the enactment of statutes permitting the purchase of liability insurance constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.

1997As noted earlier, this Court has held in a series of cases including Dunlap, Kestler v. Transit Authority of Northern Kentucky, Ky., 758 S.W.2d 38 (1988) and Green River Health Dept. v. Wigginton, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 475 (1989), that the enactment of statutes permitting the purchase of liability insurance constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.

1997As noted earlier, this Court has held in a series of cases including Dunlap, Kestler v. Transit Authority of Northern Kentucky, Ky., 758 S.W.2d 38 (1988) and Green River Health Dept. v. Wigginton, Ky., 764 S.W.2d 475 (1989), that the enactment of statutes permitting the purchase of liability insurance constitutes an implied waiver of sovereign immunity.

1993That principle was applied to a materialman’s lien in McCorkle v. Lawson & Co., Ky., 259 S.W.2d 27 (1953).

1993In Taylor v. Fuller, 162 Ky. 568 , 172 S.W. 959 (1915), dealing with a mechanic’s lien, it was said that an express waiver must be supported by consideration, and that an implied waiver arises only where a party has engaged in conduct or performed acts inconsistent with the existence of the right alleged to have been waived, misleading the other party to his prejudice.

1993In Taylor v. Fuller, 162 Ky. 568 , 172 S.W. 959 (1915), dealing with a mechanic’s lien, it was said that an express waiver must be supported by consideration, and that an implied waiver arises only where a party has engaged in conduct or performed acts inconsistent with the existence of the right alleged to have been waived, misleading the other party to his prejudice.

1938Included in the authorities cited and relied on by appellants are Fox Film Corporation v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 , 52 S. Ct. 546 , 76 L.

1938Included in the authorities cited and relied on by appellants are Fox Film Corporation v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 , 52 S. Ct. 546 , 76 L.

1938To the same effect see Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra. Appellants also rely on the case of Parker v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 178 Miss. 680 , 174 So. 567 , where it was held that the salary of an officer of the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans and who was a resident of Mississippi was subject to the Mississippi income tax law, and especially so because the Supreme Court of the United States denied a writ of certiorari. 302 U. S. 742 , 58 S. Ct. 144 , 82 L.

1938To the same effect see Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra. Appellants also rely on the case of Parker v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 178 Miss. 680 , 174 So. 567 , where it was held that the salary of an officer of the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans and who was a resident of Mississippi was subject to the Mississippi income tax law, and especially so because the Supreme Court of the United States denied a writ of certiorari. 302 U. S. 742 , 58 S. Ct. 144 , 82 L.

1938To the same effect see Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra. Appellants also rely on the case of Parker v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 178 Miss. 680 , 174 So. 567 , where it was held that the salary of an officer of the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans and who was a resident of Mississippi was subject to the Mississippi income tax law, and especially so because the Supreme Court of the United States denied a writ of certiorari. 302 U. S. 742 , 58 S. Ct. 144 , 82 L.

1938To the same effect see Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra. Appellants also rely on the case of Parker v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 178 Miss. 680 , 174 So. 567 , where it was held that the salary of an officer of the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans and who was a resident of Mississippi was subject to the Mississippi income tax law, and especially so because the Supreme Court of the United States denied a writ of certiorari. 302 U. S. 742 , 58 S. Ct. 144 , 82 L.

1938To the same effect see Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra. Appellants also rely on the case of Parker v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 178 Miss. 680 , 174 So. 567 , where it was held that the salary of an officer of the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans and who was a resident of Mississippi was subject to the Mississippi income tax law, and especially so because the Supreme Court of the United States denied a writ of certiorari. 302 U. S. 742 , 58 S. Ct. 144 , 82 L.

1938To the same effect see Helvering v. Gerhardt, supra. Appellants also rely on the case of Parker v. Mississippi State Tax Commission, 178 Miss. 680 , 174 So. 567 , where it was held that the salary of an officer of the Federal Land Bank of New Orleans and who was a resident of Mississippi was subject to the Mississippi income tax law, and especially so because the Supreme Court of the United States denied a writ of certiorari. 302 U. S. 742 , 58 S. Ct. 144 , 82 L.

1931Although it is true that jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn to try an accused under an indictment sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, yet if during the trial the jury is discharged with consent of the accused, express or implied, such consent is an implied waiver of any objection to being tried anew and he may be so tried. 1 Bishop on Criminal Law, Secs. 995, 996, 998; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 468; Sacra v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 578 , 96 S. W. 858 , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1010 ; Riley v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. *168 204, 227 S. W. 146, 147 .

1931Although it is true that jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn to try an accused under an indictment sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, yet if during the trial the jury is discharged with consent of the accused, express or implied, such consent is an implied waiver of any objection to being tried anew and he may be so tried. 1 Bishop on Criminal Law, Secs. 995, 996, 998; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 468; Sacra v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 578 , 96 S. W. 858 , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1010 ; Riley v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. *168 204, 227 S. W. 146, 147 .

1931Although it is true that jeopardy attaches when a jury is sworn to try an accused under an indictment sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, yet if during the trial the jury is discharged with consent of the accused, express or implied, such consent is an implied waiver of any objection to being tried anew and he may be so tried. 1 Bishop on Criminal Law, Secs. 995, 996, 998; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, p. 468; Sacra v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 578 , 96 S. W. 858 , 29 Ky. Law Rep. 1010 ; Riley v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky. *168 204, 227 S. W. 146, 147 .