implied waiver in Nebraska

2018A "defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver," may establish a valid, implied waiver. [ North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).] Thus, "[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. [ Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 .] Hernandez, 299 Neb. at 919 , 911 N.W.2d at 544 .

2018A "defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver," may establish a valid, implied waiver. [ North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).] Thus, "[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. [ Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 .] Hernandez, 299 Neb. at 919 , 911 N.W.2d at 544 .

2018A "defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver," may establish a valid, implied waiver. [ North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).] Thus, "[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. [ Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 .] Hernandez, 299 Neb. at 919 , 911 N.W.2d at 544 .

2018Ed. 2d 1098 (2010). 44 North Carolina v. Butler, supra note 42 , 441 U.S. at 373 . 45 Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra note 43 , 560 U.S. at 384 . 46 See, Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra note 43 ; North Carolina v. Butler, supra note 42 . - 920 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HERNANDEZ Cite as 299 Neb. 896 Not only did Hernandez’ conduct constitute an implied waiver, but he also validly provided an express oral waiver.

2018A "defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver," may establish a valid, implied waiver. [ North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).] Thus, "[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. [ Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 .] Hernandez, 299 Neb. at 919 , 911 N.W.2d at 544 .

2018A "defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver," may establish a valid, implied waiver. [ North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979).] Thus, "[w]here the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. [ Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 , 130 S.Ct. 2250 .] Hernandez, 299 Neb. at 919 , 911 N.W.2d at 544 .

2018Thus, by voluntarily speaking with the investiga- tors, Hernandez impliedly waived his rights.46 42 U.S. v. Sturdivant, 796 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2015); U.S. v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2007).

2018Thus, by voluntarily speaking with the investiga- tors, Hernandez impliedly waived his rights.46 42 U.S. v. Sturdivant, 796 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2015); U.S. v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2007).

2018Thus, by voluntarily speaking with the investiga- tors, Hernandez impliedly waived his rights.46 42 U.S. v. Sturdivant, 796 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2015); U.S. v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2007).

2018Thus, by voluntarily speaking with the investiga- tors, Hernandez impliedly waived his rights.46 42 U.S. v. Sturdivant, 796 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 2015); U.S. v. Murdock, 491 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2007).

2005We have recognized that “[t]he general rule supported by the decisions in most jurisdictions is that the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action from the one to whom it belongs, by the one against whom it lies, constitutes an implied exception to the statute of limitations, postponing the commencement of the running of the statute until discovery or reasonable opportunity of discovery of the fact by the owner of the cause of action . . . .” See Muller v. Thaut, 230 Neb. at 256 , 430 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting with approval 51 Am.

2005We have recognized that “[t]he general rule supported by the decisions in most jurisdictions is that the fraudulent concealment of a cause of action from the one to whom it belongs, by the one against whom it lies, constitutes an implied exception to the statute of limitations, postponing the commencement of the running of the statute until discovery or reasonable opportunity of discovery of the fact by the owner of the cause of action . . . .” See Muller v. Thaut, 230 Neb. at 256 , 430 N.W.2d at 892 (quoting with approval 51 Am.

1998See, e.g., Gretna State Bank v. Cornbelt Livestock Co., 236 Neb. 715 , 463 N.W.2d 795 (1990); Farmers State Bank v. Farmland Foods, 225 Neb. 1 , 402 N.W.2d 277 (1987); Garden City Production Credit Assn. v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668 , 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971).

1998See, e.g., Gretna State Bank v. Cornbelt Livestock Co., 236 Neb. 715 , 463 N.W.2d 795 (1990); Farmers State Bank v. Farmland Foods, 225 Neb. 1 , 402 N.W.2d 277 (1987); Garden City Production Credit Assn. v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668 , 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971).

2000As we stated in Turner v. Metro Area Transit, 220 Neb. 189 , 368 N.W.2d 809 (1985), accepting what one is entitled to by statute is not sufficient to show an implied waiver.

2000As we stated in Turner v. Metro Area Transit, 220 Neb. 189 , 368 N.W.2d 809 (1985), accepting what one is entitled to by statute is not sufficient to show an implied waiver.

1998See, e.g., Gretna State Bank v. Cornbelt Livestock Co., 236 Neb. 715 , 463 N.W.2d 795 (1990); Farmers State Bank v. Farmland Foods, 225 Neb. 1 , 402 N.W.2d 277 (1987); Garden City Production Credit Assn. v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668 , 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971).

1998See, e.g., Gretna State Bank v. Cornbelt Livestock Co., 236 Neb. 715 , 463 N.W.2d 795 (1990); Farmers State Bank v. Farmland Foods, 225 Neb. 1 , 402 N.W.2d 277 (1987); Garden City Production Credit Assn. v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668 , 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971).

1961So, the doctrine of immunity has been said not to be undergoing a process of expansion; rather, the more recent cases indicate a tendency to restrict more sharply than ever the various exemptions which arise out of the doctrine.” In Todd v. County of Box Butte, 169 Neb. 311 , 99 N. W. 2d 245 , this court said: “ * * statutes exempting property from taxation should be strictly construed, and one contending that his property is exempt from such tax must show clearly that he is within the exceptions provided by statute.’ ” We hold that open accounts not bearing interest and not liquidated in the

1961So, the doctrine of immunity has been said not to be undergoing a process of expansion; rather, the more recent cases indicate a tendency to restrict more sharply than ever the various exemptions which arise out of the doctrine.” In Todd v. County of Box Butte, 169 Neb. 311 , 99 N. W. 2d 245 , this court said: “ * * statutes exempting property from taxation should be strictly construed, and one contending that his property is exempt from such tax must show clearly that he is within the exceptions provided by statute.’ ” We hold that open accounts not bearing interest and not liquidated in the

1940In Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Bartzat, 114 Neb. 35 , 206 N. W. 7 , the general principle of waiver is announced in the fifth paragraph of the syllabus as follows: “ ‘A written contract may be waived in whole or in part, either directly or inferentially, and the waiver may be proved by express declarations manifesting the intent not to claim the advantage, or by so neglecting and failing to act as to induce the belief that it was the intention to waive.’ Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Nelson, 217 Fed. 218 .” In the case of Welsh v. Dick, 236 Pa. St. 155, 84 Atl. 769 , the court said (p. 160) : “

1940In Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Bartzat, 114 Neb. 35 , 206 N. W. 7 , the general principle of waiver is announced in the fifth paragraph of the syllabus as follows: “ ‘A written contract may be waived in whole or in part, either directly or inferentially, and the waiver may be proved by express declarations manifesting the intent not to claim the advantage, or by so neglecting and failing to act as to induce the belief that it was the intention to waive.’ Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Nelson, 217 Fed. 218 .” In the case of Welsh v. Dick, 236 Pa. St. 155, 84 Atl. 769 , the court said (p. 160) : “

1940In Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Bartzat, 114 Neb. 35 , 206 N. W. 7 , the general principle of waiver is announced in the fifth paragraph of the syllabus as follows: “ ‘A written contract may be waived in whole or in part, either directly or inferentially, and the waiver may be proved by express declarations manifesting the intent not to claim the advantage, or by so neglecting and failing to act as to induce the belief that it was the intention to waive.’ Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Nelson, 217 Fed. 218 .” In the case of Welsh v. Dick, 236 Pa. St. 155, 84 Atl. 769 , the court said (p. 160) : “

1940In Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Bartzat, 114 Neb. 35 , 206 N. W. 7 , the general principle of waiver is announced in the fifth paragraph of the syllabus as follows: “ ‘A written contract may be waived in whole or in part, either directly or inferentially, and the waiver may be proved by express declarations manifesting the intent not to claim the advantage, or by so neglecting and failing to act as to induce the belief that it was the intention to waive.’ Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Nelson, 217 Fed. 218 .” In the case of Welsh v. Dick, 236 Pa. St. 155, 84 Atl. 769 , the court said (p. 160) : “