Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
19 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2022 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Buckholt Ex Rel. Buckholt v. Second Judicial District Court of Nevadagreen2 sentences2000In deciding whether to apply the doctrine to preclude consideration of such a petition, a court must determine whether “(1) there was an inexcusable delay in seeking the petition; (2) an implied waiver arose from petitioners’ knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and, (3) there were circumstances causing prejudice to respondent.” Id. at 633 , 584 P.2d at 673-74 . 2000In deciding whether to apply the doctrine to preclude consideration of such a petition, a court must determine whether “(1) there was an inexcusable delay in seeking the petition; (2) an implied waiver arose from petitioners’ knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and, (3) there were circumstances causing prejudice to respondent.” Id. at 633 , 584 P.2d at 673-74 . | 4 | 6 |
Bertelsen v. Allstate Insurance Co.green2 sentences2017Co., 796 N.W. 2d 685, 703 (S.D. 2011). "[Al client only waives the [attorney-client] privilege by expressly or impliedly injecting his attorney's advice into the case." Id. 2017Co., 796 N.W. 2d 685, 703 (S.D. 2011). "[Al client only waives the [attorney-client] privilege by expressly or impliedly injecting his attorney's advice into the case." Id. | 4 | 4 |
State v. Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevadagreen2 sentences2022In considering whether to apply the doctrine of laches, this court will consider "whether `(1) there was an inexcusable delay in seeking the petition; (2) an implied waiver arose from petitioners' knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and, (3) there were circumstances causing prejudice to respondent." Id. (quoting Buckholt v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 2022In considering whether to apply the doctrine of laches, this court will consider “whether ‘(1) there was an inexcusable delay in seeking the petition; (2) an implied waiver arose from petitioners’ knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and, (3) there were circumstances causing prejudice to respondent.” Id. (quoting Buckholt v. Eighth Judicial Dist. | 2 | 4 |
Berghuis v. Thompkinsgreen1 sentence2015See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 ("Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent."); Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 276 , 130 P.3d 176, 182 (2006) (stating that written or oral statement of waiver of right to remain silent unnecessary but waiver of right may be inferred from actions and words of 'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
Mendoza v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 ("Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent."); Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 276 , 130 P.3d 176, 182 (2006) (stating that written or oral statement of waiver of right to remain silent unnecessary but waiver of right may be inferred from actions and words of 'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 2015See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 ("Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent."); Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 276 , 130 P.3d 176, 182 (2006) (stating that written or oral statement of waiver of right to remain silent unnecessary but waiver of right may be inferred from actions and words of 'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
University of Cincinnati v. Arkwright Mutual Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2014Co., 51 F.3d 1277, 1281 (6th Cir. 1995) ("The application of the implied requirement of fortuity [to insurance contracts] is universally recognized." (internal quotation omitted)); see also Avis v. Hartford Fire Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Hart v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Laches requires the court to consider several factors including: "(1) whether there was an inexcusable delay in seeking relief; (2) whether an implied waiver has arisen from the defendant's knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) whether circumstances exist that prejudice the State." Id. at 563-64, 1 P.3d at 972 . 2014Laches requires the court to consider several factors including: "(1) whether there was an inexcusable delay in seeking relief; (2) whether an implied waiver has arisen from the defendant's knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) whether circumstances exist that prejudice the State." Id. at 563-64, 1 P.3d at 972. | 1 | 1 |
Building & Construction Trades Council of Northern Nevada v. State Ex Rel. Public Works Boardgreen2 sentences2014Public Works Bd., 108 Nev. 605, 611 , 836 P.2d 633, 637 (1992) (considering "whether an implied waiver arose from the petitioner's knowing acquiescence in existing conditions" in deciding whether laches precludes consideration of writ). 2014Public Works Bd., 108 Nev. 605, 611 , 836 P.2d 633, 637 (1992) (considering "whether an implied waiver arose from the petitioner's knowing acquiescence in existing conditions" in deciding whether laches precludes consideration of writ). | 1 | 1 |
Avis v. Hartford Fire Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2014Co., 195 S.E.2d 545, 547-49 (N.C. 1973). | 1 | 1 |
Thran v. First Judicial District Courtgreen2 sentences2012Corp., 93 Nev. 597 , 571 P.2d 815 (1977) (rejecting an argument that the parties’ stipulation contained an implied waiver of the five-year rule and noting that NRCP 41(e) requires any such stipulation to be in writing); Thran v. District Court, 79 Nev. 176, 181 , 380 P.2d 297, 300 (1963) (concluding that “[wjords and conduct, short of a written stipulation” cannot estop a defendant from seeking dismissal pursuant to the five-year rule). 2012Corp., 93 Nev. 597 , 571 P.2d 815 (1977) (rejecting an argument that the parties’ stipulation contained an implied waiver of the five-year rule and noting that NRCP 41(e) requires any such stipulation to be in writing); Thran v. District Court, 79 Nev. 176, 181 , 380 P.2d 297, 300 (1963) (concluding that “[wjords and conduct, short of a written stipulation” cannot estop a defendant from seeking dismissal pursuant to the five-year rule). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence2015See Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384 ("Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent."); Mendoza v. State, 122 Nev. 267, 276 , 130 P.3d 176, 182 (2006) (stating that written or oral statement of waiver of right to remain silent unnecessary but waiver of right may be inferred from actions and words of 'Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Flintkote Co. v. Interstate Equipment Corp.
green
2 sentences2012Corp., 93 Nev. 597 , 571 P.2d 815 (1977) (rejecting an argument that the parties’ stipulation contained an implied waiver of the five-year rule and noting that NRCP 41(e) requires any such stipulation to be in writing); Thran v. District Court, 79 Nev. 176, 181 , 380 P.2d 297, 300 (1963) (concluding that “[wjords and conduct, short of a written stipulation” cannot estop a defendant from seeking dismissal pursuant to the five-year rule). 2012Corp., 93 Nev. 597 , 571 P.2d 815 (1977) (rejecting an argument that the parties’ stipulation contained an implied waiver of the five-year rule and noting that NRCP 41(e) requires any such stipulation to be in writing); Thran v. District Court, 79 Nev. 176, 181 , 380 P.2d 297, 300 (1963) (concluding that “[wjords and conduct, short of a written stipulation” cannot estop a defendant from seeking dismissal pursuant to the five-year rule). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
McKay v. Board of County Commissioners
green
1 sentence1997Comm’r, 103 Nev. 490, 492 , 746 P.2d 124 , 125 (1987): [I]t is important to note with respect to the first proposition, the implied exception argument, that it is not the business of this court to fill in alleged legislative omissions based on *419 conjecture as to what the legislature would or should have done. ... | 1 | 1997–1997 |
McKay v. BD. OF COM'RS OF DOUGLAS CTY.
green
1 sentence1997Comm’r, 103 Nev. 490, 492 , 746 P.2d 124 , 125 (1987): [I]t is important to note with respect to the first proposition, the implied exception argument, that it is not the business of this court to fill in alleged legislative omissions based on *419 conjecture as to what the legislature would or should have done. ... | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State Ex Rel. Crooke v. Lugar
green
1 sentence1978State, Crooke v. Lugar, 354 N.E.2d 755 (Ind.App. 1976). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.