implied waiver in Florida

2004Id. at 1340 (citing Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331, 335 (Fla.1978), abrogated on other grounds, State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129 (Fla.1986)).

1993State v. Cumbie, 380 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Fla.1980) (citing Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331, 335 (Fla.1978)), abrogated on other grounds; Kelly, 451 So.2d at 897 .

2017If counsel fails to object or if, after having objected, fails to move for a mistrial, his silence will be considered an implied waiver.” Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336, 1340 (Fla. 1990).

2014If counsel fails to object or if, after having objected, fails to move for a mistrial, his silence will be considered an implied waiver.” Nixon v. State, 572 So.2d 1336, 1340 (Fla.1990).

2013See Lee v. Lee, 157 Fla. 439 , 26 So.2d 177, 179 (1946); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 499 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “[I]f the language of the agreement ‘indicates a clear intention by the parties that the agreed-upon provisions for alimony would be controlling, and that its terms would be modifiable only as authorized therein,’ then the language is sufficient to operate as an implied waiver of any other ground for modification.” DePoorter v. DePoorter, 509 So.2d 1141, 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (quoting Cunningham, 499 So.2d at 882 ).

2013See Lee v. Lee, 157 Fla. 439 , 26 So.2d 177, 179 (1946); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 499 So.2d 880, 882 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). “[I]f the language of the agreement ‘indicates a clear intention by the parties that the agreed-upon provisions for alimony would be controlling, and that its terms would be modifiable only as authorized therein,’ then the language is sufficient to operate as an implied waiver of any other ground for modification.” DePoorter v. DePoorter, 509 So.2d 1141, 1145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) (quoting Cunningham, 499 So.2d at 882 ).

2024See Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4 , 5–6 (Fla. 1984) ("We therefore hold that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law, the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from action arising from the state's breach of that contract."); see also Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus, 188 So. 3d 840, 844 (Fla. 2016) (describing Pan-Am Tobacco as having "found an implied waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims"); Town of Gulf Stream v. Palm Beach County, 206 So. 3d 721, 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("S

2024See Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4 , 5–6 (Fla. 1984) ("We therefore hold that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law, the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from action arising from the state's breach of that contract."); see also Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus, 188 So. 3d 840, 844 (Fla. 2016) (describing Pan-Am Tobacco as having "found an implied waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims"); Town of Gulf Stream v. Palm Beach County, 206 So. 3d 721, 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("S

2024See Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4 , 5–6 (Fla. 1984) ("We therefore hold that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law, the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from action arising from the state's breach of that contract."); see also Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus, 188 So. 3d 840, 844 (Fla. 2016) (describing Pan-Am Tobacco as having "found an implied waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims"); Town of Gulf Stream v. Palm Beach County, 206 So. 3d 721, 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("S

2024See Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4 , 5–6 (Fla. 1984) ("We therefore hold that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law, the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from action arising from the state's breach of that contract."); see also Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus, 188 So. 3d 840, 844 (Fla. 2016) (describing Pan-Am Tobacco as having "found an implied waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims"); Town of Gulf Stream v. Palm Beach County, 206 So. 3d 721, 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("S

2024See Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4 , 5–6 (Fla. 1984) ("We therefore hold that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law, the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from action arising from the state's breach of that contract."); see also Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus, 188 So. 3d 840, 844 (Fla. 2016) (describing Pan-Am Tobacco as having "found an implied waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims"); Town of Gulf Stream v. Palm Beach County, 206 So. 3d 721, 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("S

2024See Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep't of Corr., 471 So. 2d 4 , 5–6 (Fla. 1984) ("We therefore hold that where the state has entered into a contract fairly authorized by the powers granted by general law, the defense of sovereign immunity will not protect the state from action arising from the state's breach of that contract."); see also Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. Schwefringhaus, 188 So. 3d 840, 844 (Fla. 2016) (describing Pan-Am Tobacco as having "found an implied waiver of sovereign immunity for contract claims"); Town of Gulf Stream v. Palm Beach County, 206 So. 3d 721, 726 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) ("S

2022And “[w]hen a waiver is implied, the acts, conduct or circumstances relied upon to show waiver must make out a clear case.” See Kirschner v. Baldwin, 988 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (citation omitted).

2022And “[w]hen a waiver is implied, the acts, conduct or circumstances relied upon to show waiver must make out a clear case.” See Kirschner v. Baldwin, 988 So. 2d 1138, 1142 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (citation omitted).

2004See Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 39 (Fla.1976), modified on other grounds, Tanner v. Hartog, 618 So.2d 177 (Fla.1993); S.A.P. v. Dep't of Health & Rehab.

1995Subsequently, in Nardone v. Reynolds, 333 So.2d 25, 37 (Fla. 1976), which also involved medical malpractice, the Florida Supreme Court stated in dicta: Generally, two elements are required before the equitable principle of fraudulent concealment will be utilized to toll the statute of limitations, to-wit: plaintiff must show both successful concealment of the cause of action and fraudulent means to achieve that concealment.

1993State v. Cumbie, 380 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Fla.1980) (citing Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331, 335 (Fla.1978)), abrogated on other grounds; Kelly, 451 So.2d at 897 .

1993State v. Cumbie, 380 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 1980) (citing Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1978)), abrogated on other grounds; Kelly, 451 So.2d at 897 .

2025In our review of the Fifth District’s Miorelli decision, we began by recounting Pan-Am’s recognition of the implied waiver of sovereign immunity arising from the legislative authorization of contracting by state entities. 703 So. 2d at 1050 .

2025We then discussed Southern Roadbuilders and Champagne-Webber, explaining how those two cases presented different issues, and concluding that the question in the Miorelli case was the same as the question in Southern Roadbuilders, but was “outside the parameters of Champagne-Webber.” Id. at 1050-51 .

1936It is well settled in this jurisdiction that “The presentation ■of pleas to the merits or in bar, with a plea of the privilege to be sued in the county where the defendant, a natural person, resides, or with other pleas in abatement has not been regarded as an implied waiver of the right or privilege.” Gibbs v. Davis, 27 Fla. 531 , 8 Sou. 633 ; Hanover Fire Ins.

1907See Gibbs v. Davis, 27 Fla. 531 , 8 South.

2025Instead, “[a]n ‘implicit waiver’ of the ‘right to remain silent’ is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into evidence.” Kalisz, 124 So. 3d at 203 (quoting Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384). 13 Thus, “where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement [made subsequent to the giving of the Miranda warning] establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384.

2025Instead, “[a]n ‘implicit waiver’ of the ‘right to remain silent’ is sufficient to admit a suspect’s statement into evidence.” Kalisz, 124 So. 3d at 203 (quoting Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384). 13 Thus, “where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement [made subsequent to the giving of the Miranda warning] establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.” Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 384.

2024Even still, the waiver applies “only to suits on express, written contracts into which the state agency has statutory authority to enter.” 3 Id. at 6; see also Cruz, 342 So. 3d at 743; S. Roadbuilders, Inc. v. Lee Cnty., 495 So. 2d 189, 190 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986) (“The additional costs claimed by appellant were neither addressed in the original contract nor in any subsequent legally operative instrument.”).

2018“The right to modify awarded alimony may be waived by either party, and this waiver may be implied; however, an implied waiver must be clear and unambiguous.” Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 199 So. 3d 541, 542 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

2016“It is well settled that a ‘true’ or ‘pure’ marital settlement agreement, containing provisions whereby one party surrenders valuable property interests in consideration for the right to receive periodic payments, is not subject to modification.’ ” Hughes v. Hughes, 553 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (citing Salomon v. Salomon, 196 So.2d 111, 112 (Fla.1967)).

2016The right to modify awarded alimony may be waived by either party, and this waiver may be implied; however, an implied waiver must be clear and unambiguous: “ ‘Parties to a marriage may waive their statutory right to seek modification of alimony provisions in a settlement agreement if the language in the agreement clearly and unambiguously expresses waiver or if the interpretation of the agreement as a whole can lead to no other conclusion but waiver.’ ” Cook v. Cook, 94 So.3d 683, 685-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Tapp v. Tapp, 887 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (internal citation omitte

2016“It is well settled that a ‘true’ or ‘pure’ marital settlement agreement, containing provisions whereby one party surrenders valuable property interests in consideration for the right to receive periodic payments, is not subject to modification.’ ” Hughes v. Hughes, 553 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (citing Salomon v. Salomon, 196 So.2d 111, 112 (Fla.1967)).

2016The right to modify awarded alimony may be waived by either party, and this waiver may be implied; however, an implied waiver must be clear and unambiguous: “ ‘Parties to a marriage may waive their statutory right to seek modification of alimony provisions in a settlement agreement if the language in the agreement clearly and unambiguously expresses waiver or if the interpretation of the agreement as a whole can lead to no other conclusion but waiver.’ ” Cook v. Cook, 94 So.3d 683, 685-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (quoting Tapp v. Tapp, 887 So.2d 442, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (internal citation omitte