89 Indiana opinions name it 3 courts 1882–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shafer v. Lambiegreen2 sentences2012To prevail in a defense of laches, the defendant must show “ ‘(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party.’” SMDfund, Inc., 831 N.E.2d at 729 (quoting Shafer v. Lambie, 667 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)). 2010Laches has three elements that must be proven: "'(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (8) a change in cireumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party'" SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Auth., 831 N.E.2d 725, 729 (Ind.2005) (quoting Shafer v. Lambie, 667 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)), cert. denied (2006). | 8 | 10 |
SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Authoritygreen2 sentences2018Airport Auth. , 831 N.E.2d 725 , 729 (Ind. 2005), cert. denied , reh'g denied ) (internal quotation omitted). [32] The doctrine of laches may bar a plaintiff's claim if a defendant establishes the following three elements: (1) an inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party. 2012To prevail in a defense of laches, the defendant must show “ ‘(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party.’” SMDfund, Inc., 831 N.E.2d at 729 (quoting Shafer v. Lambie, 667 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Ind.Ct.App.1996)). | 7 | 15 |
Shriner v. Sheehangreen2 sentences2012Shriner v. Sheehan, 773 N.E.2d 833, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. 2006Shriner v. Sheehan, 773 N.E.2d 833, 846 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied. | 3 | 3 |
Frazier v. Stategreen2 sentences1986It is an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them, the neglect to assert a right, as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the other party and thus operating as a bar in a court of equity.'" Id. at 712 (quoting Frazier v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 614 , 335 N.E.2d 623 ). 1986It is an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them, the neglect to assert a right, as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the other party and thus operating as a bar in a court of equity.'" Id. at 712 (quoting Frazier v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 614 , 335 N.E.2d 623 ). | 2 | 9 |
Perry v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Perry v. State , 512 N.E.2d 841 , 842 (Ind. 1987). 2000Perry v. State, 512 N.E.2d 841, 842 (Ind.1987) (citing Frazier v. State, 263 Ind. 614, 616-617 , 335 N.E.2d 623, 624 (1975)). | 2 | 3 |
Indiana Real Estate Commission v. Ackmangreen2 sentences2017“Laches is an equitable defense that may be raised to stop a person from asserting a claim that he would normally be entitled to assert.” Ind. Real Estate Comm’n v. Ademan, 766 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002): “Laches requires: ‘(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party.’ ” SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Alien Cty. 2015In order to establish lach-es, a party must prove: “(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances resulting in prejudice to the adverse party.” Indiana Real Estate Comm’n v. Ackman, 766 N.E.2d 1269, 1274 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). | 2 | 2 |
Twyman v. Stategreen2 sentences2012“It is an implied waiver resulting from knowing 4 acquiescence in the conditions and a neglect for an unreasonable length of time to assert a right, resulting in prejudice to the opposing party.” Harrington v. State, 466 N.E.2d 1379, 1381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705 (Ind. 1984)). 1986It is an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them, the neglect to assert a right, as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the other party and thus operating as a bar in a court of equity.'" Id. at 712 (quoting Frazier v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 614 , 335 N.E.2d 623 ). | 1 | 4 |
Lowry v. Lowrygreen2 sentences2011Lowry v. Lowry, 590 N.E.2d 612, 621 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). 2002Id. | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Rosivito Hoskinsgreen2 sentences2015The Court also observed that, “[i]n each of these waiver-by-conduct cases, ... the courts , recognized that, just like an express verbal waiver, an implied waiver is not valid absent a finding under the totality of the circumstances that the waiver is knowing and intelligent” and that “this finding invariably included evidence of an admonition to the defendant on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Id. (citing Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 411 ; Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 ). [18] The Court in Poynter then noted that, in United States v. Hoskins, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in 2015Id. at 1127-1128 (citing Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 411 ). | 1 | 2 |
Matson v. Matsongreen2 sentences1999Matson v. Matson, 569 N.E.2d 732, 733 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). 1992In the case before us, unresolved questions of fact remain precluding summary judgment on the grounds of either laches or sufficiency of the evidence. '"Laches requires the presence of three elements: (1) inexcusable delay in asserting a right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (8) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party." Matson v. Matson (1991), Ind.App., 569 N.E.2d 732, 733 . | 1 | 2 |
Douglas v. Stategreen1 sentence2023Stated differently, laches “‘is an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them, the neglect to assert a right, as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the other party and thus acting as a bar in a court of equity.’” Thompson v. State, 31 N.E.3d 1002 , 1005–06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Douglas v. State, 634 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)), trans. denied. [13] The doctrine of laches may bar a plaintiff’s claim if a defendant establishes the following three elements of l | 1 | 1 |
Harrington v. Stategreen1 sentence2012“It is an implied waiver resulting from knowing 4 acquiescence in the conditions and a neglect for an unreasonable length of time to assert a right, resulting in prejudice to the opposing party.” Harrington v. State, 466 N.E.2d 1379, 1381 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (citing Twyman v. State, 459 N.E.2d 705 (Ind. 1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Grantham Realty Corp. v. Bowers, Jr., Tr.green2 sentences2012Despite this structured test, “[tjhere is no fixed or definite rule for the application of the doctrine of laches.” *1013 Grantham Realty Corp. v. Bowers, 215 Ind. 672, 686 , 22 N.E.2d 832, 839 (1939). 2012Despite this structured test, “[tjhere is no fixed or definite rule for the application of the doctrine of laches.” *1013 Grantham Realty Corp. v. Bowers, 215 Ind. 672, 686 , 22 N.E.2d 832, 839 (1939). | 1 | 1 |
Richmond State Hospital v. Brattaingreen1 sentence2012Richmond State Hosp. v. Brattain, 961 N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (Ind. 2012) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
Bender v. Bendergreen1 sentence2010In re Bender, 844 N.E.2d 170, 184 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Heck v. Robeygreen1 sentence2009In Indiana this has been accomplished by the Comparative Fault Act as construed in Heck v. Robey, 659 N.E.2d 498, 504-05 (Ind.1995). | 1 | 1 |
| Stewart v. Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ebersol v. Mishlergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Biberstine v. New York Blower Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Beiger Heritage Corp. v. Kilbeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Geislergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coffin v. Hollargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Collins v. Dunifongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Union Assurance Society, Ltd. v. Reneergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Haas v. Holder, Trustee
green
2 sentences1996Id. < Before a court will bar a claim due to laches, it must find the presence of three elements: 1) inexcusable delay in asserting a right, 2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions, and 3) cireum-stances resulting in prejudice to the adverse party. 1976Laches is said to contain three elements: (1) an “inexcusable delay in asserting a right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiesence in them;... and (3) other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party. . . .” Haas v. Holder (1941), 218 Ind. 263, 272 , 32 N.E.2d 590, 593 ; see also State ex rel. | 6 | 1975–1996 |
Simon v. City of Auburn, Board of Zoning Appeals
green
2 sentences1993Simon v. Auburn Board of Zoning Appeals (1988), Ind.App., 519 N.E.2d 205, 215 . 1992Simon v. City of Auburn, Ind. Board of Zoning Appeals (1988), Ind.App., 519 N.E.2d 205, 215 . | 5 | 1991–1993 |
Gabriel v. Gabriel
green
2 sentences2026Id. [10] Here, Donald alleges the twenty-year delay is inexcusable because the decree “is very clear” that Rebecca was awarded a percentage of his retirement funds to be transferred through QDROs and that she was aware of this provision. 2017Id. | 2 | 2017–2026 |
Gleeson v. Preferred Sourcing, LLC
green
2 sentences2016Gleeson, 883 N.E.2d at 179-80 . 2016Gleeson, 883 N.E.2d at 179-80 . | 2 | 2008–2016 |
United States v. Lucky Irorere
green
2 sentences2015The Court also observed that, “[i]n each of these waiver-by-conduct cases, ... the courts , recognized that, just like an express verbal waiver, an implied waiver is not valid absent a finding under the totality of the circumstances that the waiver is knowing and intelligent” and that “this finding invariably included evidence of an admonition to the defendant on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Id. (citing Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 411 ; Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 ). [18] The Court in Poynter then noted that, in United States v. Hoskins, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in 2015The Court also observed that, “[i]n each of these waiver-by-conduct cases, ... the courts , recognized that, just like an express verbal waiver, an implied waiver is not valid absent a finding under the totality of the circumstances that the waiver is knowing and intelligent” and that “this finding invariably included evidence of an admonition to the defendant on the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Id. (citing Hoskins, 243 F.3d at 411 ; Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828 ). [18] The Court in Poynter then noted that, in United States v. Hoskins, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in | 2 | 2001–2015 |
LaPorte Production Credit Ass'n v. Kalwitz
green
2 sentences1994LaPorte Production Credit Ass'n v. Kalwitz (1991), Ind.App., 567 N.E.2d 1202, 1204 , trans. denied. 1992Id. | 2 | 1992–1994 |
Jay R. Thompson v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2023Stated differently, laches “‘is an implied waiver arising from knowledge of existing conditions and an acquiescence in them, the neglect to assert a right, as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the other party and thus acting as a bar in a court of equity.’” Thompson v. State, 31 N.E.3d 1002 , 1005–06 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Douglas v. State, 634 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)), trans. denied. [13] The doctrine of laches may bar a plaintiff’s claim if a defendant establishes the following three elements of l | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Orndorff v. Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2020Laches requires “‘(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party.’” Orndorff, 982 N.E.2d at 320 (quoting SMDfund, Inc. v. Fort Wayne-Allen Cty. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Penn Mutual Life Insurance v. Austin
green
2 sentences2019Co. v. Austin, 168 U.S. 685, 698 , (1898)). [21] In their brief on appeal, Landowners correctly set out the elements of laches, namely: “(1) [an] inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party.” See id. 2019Co. v. Austin, 168 U.S. 685, 698 , (1898)). [21] In their brief on appeal, Landowners correctly set out the elements of laches, namely: “(1) [an] inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (3) a change in circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party.” See id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Oakes v. Hattabaugh
green
2 sentences2018"Laches is comprised of 1) an inexcusable delay in asserting a right, 2) an implied waiver from a knowing acquiescence in existing conditions, and 3) prejudice to the adverse party." Oakes , 631 N.E.2d at 953 . 2018"Laches implies something more than mere lapse of time; it requires some actual or presumable change of circumstances rendering relief inequitable." Id. [16] In claiming that Homeowners' action was barred by laches, the Fair relies on this Court's opinion in Oakes . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Betty J. Angel v. Kent H. Powelson and Marjorie A. Powelson
green
2 sentences2013The defendant raising such a defense must establish: "(1) inexcusable delay in asserting a known right; (2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions; and (8) a change in cireumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party." Id. 2013A mere lapse of time is insufficient to show laches; "it is also necessary to show an unreasonable delay that causes prejudice or injury." Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Tocci v. Fort Wayne-Allen County Airport Authority
neutral
2 sentences2010Id. 2010Id. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Hunt v. Indiana Department of State Revenue
green
1 sentence2008“Before a court will bar a claim due to laches, it must find the presence of three elements: 1) inexcusable delay in asserting a right, 2) an implied waiver arising from knowing acquiescence in existing conditions, and 3) circumstances resulting in prejudice to the adverse party.” Id. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
PSI Energy, Inc. v. Home Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2006Rather, it holds only that "even if there is no express policy language, 'there is an implied exception that denies liability insurance coverage for harm ... intentionally inflicted by the insured"" Id. at 724 (quoting Eric Holmes, 16 APPLEMAN INSURANCE 2d § 116.1 at 6 (2000)). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Brown green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Hufstetler v. International Indemnity Co. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Storm, Inc. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Williams v. Rogier green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| United States v. Kneeland green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| United States v. Roman G. Weninger green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| United States v. Frederick W. Bauer green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| American Telephone And Telegraph Company v. Ann R. Merry green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Harbour Town Associates, Ltd. v. City of Noblesville green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Pickett v. Pickett green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Alber v. Standard Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Citizens National Bank of Grant County v. Harvey green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Smith v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Van Bibber v. Norris green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Hartford Insurance v. County of Nassau green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Key v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| cluster 308599 green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Ely v. City of Montpelier green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| State Ex Rel. Harris, Etc. v. MUTSCHLER green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Ryason v. Dunten green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Hobart Township v. Town of Miller neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Davis v. Thiede neutral | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Schlarb v. Henderson green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Mutual Life Insurance v. Wiler green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Mascari v. Mascari neutral | 1 | 1943–1943 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.