implied waiver in New York

2007To the contrary, a waiver not only need not be express, it need not be expressed in words (see id. [“A waiver, the intentional relinquishment of a known right, may be accomplished by express agreement or by such conduct or failure to act as to evince an intent not to claim the purported advantage” (citations omitted)]).

1993"A waiver, the intentional relinquishment of a known right * * * may be accomplished by express agreement or by such conduct or failure to act as to evince an intent not to claim the purported advantage [citation omitted]”, and with the exception of "instances where there would be transgressions of public policy”, any of the "rights and privileges to which one is legally entitled” may be waived (Hadden v Consolidated Edison Co., 45 NY2d 466, 469 ).

2002However, giving defendant the broadest benefit of any doubt, the court directed a court officer to make still another search of the courthouse facilities abutting the courtroom, ruling that, in the circumstances presented, if defendant was not found or did not appear within an additional 15 minutes, defendant’s actions would constitute an implied waiver of his right to be present, as instructed by the Court of Appeals in People v Parker (supra at 140 ).

1983Consequently, it was improper to conduct the hearing and to try defendant in absentia {see People v Parker, supra; People v Thompson, 94 AD2d 898 ).

1999A defendant’s implied waiver of his right to counsel is ineffective absent “ ‘a sufficiently “searching inquiry” of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the “dangers and disadvantages” of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant’ ” (People v Slaughter, 78 NY2d 485, 491 , quoting People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 21 , cert denied 459 US 1178 ; see, Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835 ).

1997A defendant’s implied waiver of his right to counsel is ineffective absent “ ‘a sufficiently “searching inquiry” of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the “dangers and disadvantages” of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant’ ” (People v Slaughter, 78 NY2d 485, 491 , quoting People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 21 , cert denied 459 US 1178 ; see, Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835 ).

1999A defendant’s implied waiver of his right to counsel is ineffective absent “ ‘a sufficiently “searching inquiry” of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the “dangers and disadvantages” of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant’ ” (People v Slaughter, 78 NY2d 485, 491 , quoting People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 21 , cert denied 459 US 1178 ; see, Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835 ).

1997A defendant’s implied waiver of his right to counsel is ineffective absent “ ‘a sufficiently “searching inquiry” of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the “dangers and disadvantages” of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant’ ” (People v Slaughter, 78 NY2d 485, 491 , quoting People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 21 , cert denied 459 US 1178 ; see, Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835 ).

1999A defendant’s implied waiver of his right to counsel is ineffective absent “ ‘a sufficiently “searching inquiry” of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the “dangers and disadvantages” of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant’ ” (People v Slaughter, 78 NY2d 485, 491 , quoting People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 21 , cert denied 459 US 1178 ; see, Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835 ).

1997A defendant’s implied waiver of his right to counsel is ineffective absent “ ‘a sufficiently “searching inquiry” of the defendant to be reasonably certain that the “dangers and disadvantages” of giving up the fundamental right to counsel have been impressed on the defendant’ ” (People v Slaughter, 78 NY2d 485, 491 , quoting People v Sawyer, 57 NY2d 12, 21 , cert denied 459 US 1178 ; see, Faretta v California, 422 US 806, 835 ).

1989There are also cases in which a defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice system is considered as a factor in finding an implied waiver (see, e.g., People v Davis, 55 NY2d 731 , affg 79 AD2d 547 ; People v Pino, 116 AD2d 601 ; People v Moore, 114 AD2d 595 ; People v Rooney, 82 AD2d 840 ; People v Harris, 79 AD2d 615 ; People v Norris, 75 AD2d 650, 652 ).

1988Facts which demonstrate that a suspect fully understood his rights and that he was making an informed decision to speak will, generally, suffice to establish an implied waiver (see, People v Harris, 115 AD2d 619 ; People v Rooney, 82 AD2d 840 ; People v Norris, 75 AD2d 650 ).

1989There are also cases in which a defendant’s familiarity with the criminal justice system is considered as a factor in finding an implied waiver (see, e.g., People v Davis, 55 NY2d 731 , affg 79 AD2d 547 ; People v Pino, 116 AD2d 601 ; People v Moore, 114 AD2d 595 ; People v Rooney, 82 AD2d 840 ; People v Harris, 79 AD2d 615 ; People v Norris, 75 AD2d 650, 652 ).

1988Facts which demonstrate that a suspect fully understood his rights and that he was making an informed decision to speak will, generally, suffice to establish an implied waiver (see, People v Harris, 115 AD2d 619 ; People v Rooney, 82 AD2d 840 ; People v Norris, 75 AD2d 650 ).

1977In those circumstances we concluded that a nursing home operator was entitled to an evidentiary hearing where recoupment was sought for past overpayments (Matter of Park Crescent Nursing Home v Whalen, supra; Matter of White Plains Nursing Home v Whalen, 53 AD2d 926 ).

1976(Matter of White Plains Nursing Home v Whalen, 53 AD2d 926 .) Similarly, we likewise find no merit to petitioner’s claim that it is entitled to immediate repayment of the disputed funds.

1915Matter of Investigation, City and County of Albany, 74 Misc.

1915Matter of Investigation, City County of Albany, 74 Misc.

2025Also, the confidentiality of information is deemed to be waived when a patient places physician-patient information into the hands of a third party who is unconnected to his or her treatment and who is not subject to any privilege ( see People v Bloom , 193 NY 1, 7-8 ; People v Martinez , 22 AD3d 318 ; Matter of Farrow v Allen , 194 AD2d at 44 ).

2025Also, the confidentiality of information is deemed to be waived when a patient places physician-patient information into the hands of a third party who is unconnected to his or her treatment and who is not subject to any privilege ( see People v Bloom , 193 NY 1, 7-8 ; People v Martinez , 22 AD3d 318 ; Matter of Farrow v Allen , 194 AD2d at 44 ).

2025Also, the confidentiality of information is deemed to be waived when a patient places physician-patient information into the hands of a third party who is unconnected to his or her treatment and who is not subject to any privilege ( see People v Bloom , 193 NY 1, 7-8 ; People v Martinez , 22 AD3d 318 ; Matter of Farrow v Allen , 194 AD2d at 44 ).

2025An implied waiver is most frequently seen in personal injury actions, where the confidentiality of medical records is waived by plaintiffs who commence litigation that places the nature and extent of their injuries at issue ( see generally Prink v Rockefeller Ctr. , 48 NY2d 309, 316 ).

2022The business account agreement also contained a merger clause that provided that the written agreement "sets forth the entire agreement and understanding of [the plaintiffs] and the Bank," that all prior or contemporaneous agreements and understandings "are deemed to be merged into and included in [the] Agreement," and that "neither party is relying on any promise, agreement or understanding not set forth in [the] Agreement." Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the provision of the business account agreement that prohibits any implied waivers of the bank's rights is unambiguous ( see Yarom

2022The business account agreement also contained a merger clause that provided that the written agreement "sets forth the entire agreement and understanding of [the plaintiffs] and the Bank," that all prior or contemporaneous agreements and understandings "are deemed to be merged into and included in [the] Agreement," and that "neither party is relying on any promise, agreement or understanding not set forth in [the] Agreement." Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the provision of the business account agreement that prohibits any implied waivers of the bank's rights is unambiguous ( see Yarom

2022The business account agreement also contained a merger clause that provided that the written agreement "sets forth the entire agreement and understanding of [the plaintiffs] and the Bank," that all prior or contemporaneous agreements and understandings "are deemed to be merged into and included in [the] Agreement," and that "neither party is relying on any promise, agreement or understanding not set forth in [the] Agreement." Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the provision of the business account agreement that prohibits any implied waivers of the bank's rights is unambiguous ( see Yarom

2016The Kimberley-Clark Court did note that the implied waiver of subrogation in that case was nothing more than another attempt by defendant to exempt itself from all liability, which “would defeat the statute and must be held void” (see Kimberly-Clark, 49 AD2d at 495 ).

2016In People v Stroman ( 36 NY2d 939 [1975]), we declined to find an implied waiver of that right where the defendant was sentenced in absentia, notwithstanding the fact that defendant was in a detention pen adjacent to the courtroom (see id. at 940 ).

2016In People v Stroman ( 36 NY2d 939 [1975]), we declined to find an implied waiver of that right where the defendant was sentenced in absentia, notwithstanding the fact that defendant was in a detention pen adjacent to the courtroom (see id. at 940 ).

2015Corp. v New York State Commn. of Correction, 19 NY3d 239 [2012] [finding an implied exception to the physician-patient privilege from the legislature’s express provisions that granted a commission the power to investigate inmate deaths]; Matter of Camperlengo v Blum, 56 NY2d 251 [1982] [finding an implied exception to the physician-patient privilege where the State Department of Social Services sought medical records as part of a Medicaid fraud investigation]; People v Fuller, 24 NY2d 292 [1969] [finding an implied exception to the physician-patient privilege under the Narcotics Control Act of

2015Corp. v New York State Commn. of Correction, 19 NY3d 239 [2012] [finding an implied exception to the physician-patient privilege from the legislature’s express provisions that granted a commission the power to investigate inmate deaths]; Matter of Camperlengo v Blum, 56 NY2d 251 [1982] [finding an implied exception to the physician-patient privilege where the State Department of Social Services sought medical records as part of a Medicaid fraud investigation]; People v Fuller, 24 NY2d 292 [1969] [finding an implied exception to the physician-patient privilege under the Narcotics Control Act of

2015Corp. v New York State Commn. of Correction, 19 NY3d 239 [2012] [finding an implied exception to the physician-patient privilege from the legislature’s express provisions that granted a commission the power to investigate inmate deaths]; Matter of Camperlengo v Blum, 56 NY2d 251 [1982] [finding an implied exception to the physician-patient privilege where the State Department of Social Services sought medical records as part of a Medicaid fraud investigation]; People v Fuller, 24 NY2d 292 [1969] [finding an implied exception to the physician-patient privilege under the Narcotics Control Act of

2015In People v Connor ( 63 NY2d 11 [1984]) this Court stated that a waiver of the mandated reading of the right does not “by itself constitute a waiver of the procedural right to be tried on information” (id. at 14 n; People v Fernandez, 20 NY3d 44 , 55 n 1 [2012]).

2015In People v Connor ( 63 NY2d 11 [1984]) this Court stated that a waiver of the mandated reading of the right does not "by itself constitute a waiver of the procedural right to be tried on information" (id. at 14 n*; People v Fernandez, 20 NY3d 44 , 55 n1 [2010]).

2015In People v Connor ( 63 NY2d 11 [1984]) this Court stated that a waiver of the mandated reading of the right does not “by itself constitute a waiver of the procedural right to be tried on information” (id. at 14 n; People v Fernandez, 20 NY3d 44 , 55 n 1 [2012]).

2015In People v Connor ( 63 NY2d 11 [1984]) this Court stated that a waiver of the mandated reading of the right does not "by itself constitute a waiver of the procedural right to be tried on information" (id. at 14 n*; People v Fernandez, 20 NY3d 44 , 55 n1 [2010]).

2010(Pultz, 10 NY3d at 548 ; Hirsch, 63 AD3d at 79 ; Horsford v Bacott, 32 AD3d 310, 312 [1st Dept 2006].) That is, the “good faith” inquiry asks whether the owner seeks the apartment for the reason or reasons stated in the notice.

2010(Pultz, 10 NY3d at 548 ; Hirsch, 63 AD3d at 79 ; Horsford v Bacott, 32 AD3d 310, 312 [1st Dept 2006].) That is, the “good faith” inquiry asks whether the owner seeks the apartment for the reason or reasons stated in the notice.

2007While we agree that County Court reached the correct conclusion in denying suppression, we are of the view that defendant’s conduct following the initial administration of the Miranda warnings constituted an implied waiver of his rights (see People v Nunez, 176 AD2d 70, 72 [1992], affd 80 NY2d 858 [1992]).