11 Delaware opinions name it 3 courts 1957–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New Castle County v. Pike Creek Recreational Services, LLCgreen2 sentences2025No. 2023-1039-LM March 5, 2025 Page 15 of 25 notice, either actual or constructive, of their existence.”61 “[A]s a general rule the party advocating for the land use restriction bears the burden of demonstrating the restriction is valid and enforceable.”62 Plaintiff, citing to the cases Bagley and Dover Historical Society, appears to argue that historical preservation restrictions for the construction of additions and new structures are reasonable.63 Disregarding the fact that Bagley was decided by a court outside of the State of Delaware, both of these cases deal with restrictions prohibiting 2025Ch. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). 62 Id. 63 D.I. 20 at 15; Dover Hist. | 1 | 1 |
Norcross v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See also Ward, 2018 WL 3752753 , at *3 (“The right to silence may be invoked, in any manner, at any time before or during a custodial interrogation.”). 17 As with the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, Delaware Constitution Article I, § 7, expands the protection to require police to clarify a suspect’s unequivocal invocation before continuing.69 This clarifying approach is “vital to safeguarding the values embedded in the Fifth Amendment right to silence[.]”70 To be unequivocal, an accused may be indecisive or contradictory as to whether or not they wish to waive their right.71 Determining whet | 1 | 1 |
Stifel Financial Corp. v. Cochrangreen1 sentence2022Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 561 (Del. 2002) (The purpose of Section 145(a) is to encourage capable persons “to serve as corporate directors, secure in the knowledge that expenses incurred by them in upholding their honesty and integrity as directors will be borne by the corporation they serve.”). 126 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 1985) (“In upholding the intentions of the parties, a court must construe the agreement as a whole, giving effect to all provisions therein.”). 127 The following exchange took place: The Court: Let me ask you a quest | 1 | 1 |
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co.green1 sentence2022Corp. v. Cochran, 809 A.2d 555, 561 (Del. 2002) (The purpose of Section 145(a) is to encourage capable persons “to serve as corporate directors, secure in the knowledge that expenses incurred by them in upholding their honesty and integrity as directors will be borne by the corporation they serve.”). 126 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 498 A.2d 1108, 1113 (Del. 1985) (“In upholding the intentions of the parties, a court must construe the agreement as a whole, giving effect to all provisions therein.”). 127 The following exchange took place: The Court: Let me ask you a quest | 1 | 1 |
Asb Allegiance Real Estate Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing Member, LLCgreen1 sentence2021Fund v. Scion Breckenridge Managing 36 Member, LLC, 50 A.3d 434, 442 (Del. | 1 | 1 |
Douglas v. Owensgreen1 sentence2014See also Douglas v. Owens, 50 F.3d 1226, 1236 (3d Cir.1995) (‘‘[A]n issue has not been tried by implied consent if evidence relevant to the new claim is also relevant to the claim originally pled, because the defendant does not have any notice that the implied claim was being tried.”); 6A Wright & Miller § 1493. . | 1 | 1 |
Malpiede v. Townsongreen1 sentence2010See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1082-83 (Del.2001); Romero v. Career Educ. | 1 | 1 |
Alonzo Bonner, Cross-Appellant v. Joseph Coughlin, Cross-Appelleesgreen2 sentences1992Bonner, 657 F.2d at 938 ; Beebe, 373 F.2d at 888. 1992See e.g., Bonner, 657 F.2d at 983 (implied waiver rebutted when trial court reserved decision on the motion or where, after plaintiff moved for a directed verdict, defendant sought jury instruction that amounted to reargument of a previously denied motion for a directed verdict). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 275009green1 sentence1992Bonner, 657 F.2d at 938 ; Beebe, 373 F.2d at 888. | 1 | 1 |
Garland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1970See Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 , 34 S.Ct. 456 , 58 L.Ed. 772 (1914). 1970See Garland v. Washington, 232 U.S. 642 , 34 S.Ct. 456 , 58 L.Ed. 772 (1914). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Scotton v. Wright
green
2 sentences1957In applying laches, the Chancellor is not required to follow the analogous statute at law, but, as the equities require, may apply a period either shorter or longer than that fixed by statute, Scotton v. Wright, 13 Del.Ch. 214 , 117 A. 131 . 1957In applying laches, the Chancellor is not required to follow the analogous statute at law, but, as the equities require, may apply a period either shorter or longer than that fixed by statute, Scotton v. Wright, 13 Del.Ch. 214 , 117 A. 131 . | 2 | 1957–1957 |
Shellhorn & Hill, Inc. v. State
green
1 sentence1985Once again our analysis must begin with the basic proposition that only the legislature can provide for the waiver of municipal immunity. 10 Del.C. § 4011(a); Shellhorn, 187 A.2d 71 (1962); Flait, 97 A.2d 545 (1953). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Flait v. Mayor & Council of Wilmington
green
1 sentence1985Once again our analysis must begin with the basic proposition that only the legislature can provide for the waiver of municipal immunity. 10 Del.C. § 4011(a); Shellhorn, 187 A.2d 71 (1962); Flait, 97 A.2d 545 (1953). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.