Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
15 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1953–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Berghuis v. Thompkinsgreen2 sentences2011See Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶23 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 (finding implied waiver by juvenile based on his course of conduct in answering police questions after being advised of Miranda rights). {18} We find support for our determination of an implied waiver in Berghuis v. Thompkins, in which the U.S. Supreme Court explained that [t]he course of decisions since Miranda, informed by the application of Miranda warnings in the whole course of law enforcement, demonstrates that waivers can be established even absent formal or express statements of waiver that would be expected in, say, a judi 2011See Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶23 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 (finding implied waiver by juvenile based on his course of conduct in answering police questions after being advised of Miranda rights). {18} We find support for our determination of an implied waiver in Berghuis v. Thompkins, in which the U.S. Supreme Court explained that [t]he course of decisions since Miranda, informed by the application of Miranda warnings in the whole course of law enforcement, demonstrates that waivers can be established even absent formal or express statements of waiver that would be expected in, say, a judi | 2 | 2 |
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2011See Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶23 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 (finding implied waiver by juvenile based on his course of conduct in answering police questions after being advised of Miranda rights). {18} We find support for our determination of an implied waiver in Berghuis v. Thompkins, in which the U.S. Supreme Court explained that [t]he course of decisions since Miranda, informed by the application of Miranda warnings in the whole course of law enforcement, demonstrates that waivers can be established even absent formal or express statements of waiver that would be expected in, say, a judi 2011See Martinez, 1999-NMSC-018, ¶23 , 127 N.M. 207 , 979 P.2d 718 (finding implied waiver by juvenile based on his course of conduct in answering police questions after being advised of Miranda rights). {18} We find support for our determination of an implied waiver in Berghuis v. Thompkins, in which the U.S. Supreme Court explained that [t]he course of decisions since Miranda, informed by the application of Miranda warnings in the whole course of law enforcement, demonstrates that waivers can be established even absent formal or express statements of waiver that would be expected in, say, a judi | 2 | 2 |
Bruce v. Gregorygreen2 sentences1977In Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal.2d 666 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 423 P.2d 193 (1967), the Supreme Court of California held that the rights created by the California statutes to inspect public records “are, by their very nature, not absolute, but are subject to an implied rule of reason.” Id. at 676 , 56 Cal.Rptr. at 271 , 423 P.2d at 199 ; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 548 , 7 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 354 P.2d 637 (1960) (state bar records in disciplinary proceedings); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 , 238 P.2d 581 (1951) (communication in official confi 1977In Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal.2d 666 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 423 P.2d 193 (1967), the Supreme Court of California held that the rights created by the California statutes to inspect public records “are, by their very nature, not absolute, but are subject to an implied rule of reason.” Id. at 676 , 56 Cal.Rptr. at 271 , 423 P.2d at 199 ; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 548 , 7 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 354 P.2d 637 (1960) (state bar records in disciplinary proceedings); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 , 238 P.2d 581 (1951) (communication in official confi | 1 | 2 |
State v. Lucerogreen2 sentences2018Defendant did not seek 15 to have the jury instructed that Nurse Belinski and Ms. Wood’s testimony 16 concerning HG’s statements to them should not be considered for the truth of the 17 matter asserted. 18 {9} A “defendant can waive fundamental rights,” including confrontation clause 19 rights, which “may include an implied waiver by conduct.” State v. Herrera, 2004- 20 NMCA-015, ¶ 8, 135 N.M. 79 , 84 P.3d 696 ; see State v. Lucero, 1986-NMCA- 21 085, ¶¶ 12-17, 104 N.M. 587 , 725 P.2d 266 (determining that by failing to object 22 to challenged testimony on the basis of the confrontation clause 2018Defendant did not seek 15 to have the jury instructed that Nurse Belinski and Ms. Wood’s testimony 16 concerning HG’s statements to them should not be considered for the truth of the 17 matter asserted. 18 {9} A “defendant can waive fundamental rights,” including confrontation clause 19 rights, which “may include an implied waiver by conduct.” State v. Herrera, 2004- 20 NMCA-015, ¶ 8, 135 N.M. 79 , 84 P.3d 696 ; see State v. Lucero, 1986-NMCA- 21 085, ¶¶ 12-17, 104 N.M. 587 , 725 P.2d 266 (determining that by failing to object 22 to challenged testimony on the basis of the confrontation clause | 1 | 1 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2003See State v. Garcia, 46 N.M. 302, 309 , 128 P.2d 459, 462 (1942) (“Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant’s rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive.”). 2003See State v. Garcia, 46 N.M. 302, 309 , 128 P.2d 459, 462 (1942) (“Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the foundation or basis of a defendant’s rights or must go to the foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to permit him to waive.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Corrizgreen2 sentences2003Padilla, 2002-NMSC-016, ¶ 14 , 132 N.M. 247 , 46 P.3d 1247 ; see also State v. Corriz, 86 N.M. 246, 248 , 522 P.2d 793, 795 (1974) (affirming waiver by conduct of the right to presence in court by capital defendant). {9} In this case, Defendant did not file a response to the State’s motion for the videotaped deposition. 2003Padilla, 2002-NMSC-016, ¶ 14 , 132 N.M. 247 , 46 P.3d 1247 ; see also State v. Corriz, 86 N.M. 246, 248 , 522 P.2d 793, 795 (1974) (affirming waiver by conduct of the right to presence in court by capital defendant). {9} In this case, Defendant did not file a response to the State’s motion for the videotaped deposition. | 1 | 1 |
City of Cleveland v. Fogosgreen2 sentences1998The court also determined that “[because the ordinances were enacted to promote health, safety, morals and general welfare of the public, ... enforcement [of such ordinances] must be continuous to effectuate their purpose.” Id. at 791. 1998The Double Jeopardy Clause does not create an implied immunity for a continuous violation....” Id. at 794. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Padilla
green
2 sentences2014State v. 6 Herrera, 2014-NMCA-007, ¶ 4 , 315 P.3d 343 (stating that constitutional issues are 7 reviewed de novo). 8 {4} A defendant may waive his right to be present during critical stages of the 9 proceedings by either a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver” of his presence 10 “or as an implied waiver when a defendant has forfeited his . . . right to presence by 11 conduct.” Padilla, 2002-NMSC-016, ¶ 14 . 2003Padilla, 2002-NMSC-016, ¶ 14 , 132 N.M. 247 , 46 P.3d 1247 ; see also State v. Corriz, 86 N.M. 246, 248 , 522 P.2d 793, 795 (1974) (affirming waiver by conduct of the right to presence in court by capital defendant). {9} In this case, Defendant did not file a response to the State’s motion for the videotaped deposition. | 2 | 2003–2014 |
State v. Savedra
green
2 sentences2020Our Supreme Court’s stated purpose for the rule is “to effectuate a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial and to assure prompt disposition of criminal cases.” State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 5 , 148 N.M. 301 , 236 P.3d 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {10} Defendant argues that her first appearance essentially operated as an implied waiver of arraignment, which should have triggered the rule. 2020Our Supreme Court’s stated purpose for the rule is “to effectuate a criminal defendant’s right to a speedy trial and to assure prompt disposition of criminal cases.” State v. Savedra, 2010-NMSC-025, ¶ 5 , 148 N.M. 301 , 236 P.3d 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). {10} Defendant argues that her first appearance essentially operated as an implied waiver of arraignment, which should have triggered the rule. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Allen v. LeMaster
green
1 sentence2020“When construing our procedural rules, we use the same rules of construction applicable to the interpretation of statutes.” Allen v. LeMaster, 2012-NMSC-001, ¶ 11 , 267 P.3d 806 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Sharp
green
1 sentence2020Nonetheless Defendant argues as she did in the proceedings below, that the rule was triggered by her first appearance, which “operate[d] as an implied waiver of arraignment[,]” and, based on that date, her case did not timely proceed to resolution as prescribed by the rule. {8} “We review de novo questions of law concerning the interpretation of [our] Supreme Court rules and the district court’s application of the law to the facts of the case.” State v. Sharp, 2012-NMCA-042, ¶ 5 , 276 P.3d 969 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Herrera
green
2 sentences2018Defendant did not seek 15 to have the jury instructed that Nurse Belinski and Ms. Wood’s testimony 16 concerning HG’s statements to them should not be considered for the truth of the 17 matter asserted. 18 {9} A “defendant can waive fundamental rights,” including confrontation clause 19 rights, which “may include an implied waiver by conduct.” State v. Herrera, 2004- 20 NMCA-015, ¶ 8, 135 N.M. 79 , 84 P.3d 696 ; see State v. Lucero, 1986-NMCA- 21 085, ¶¶ 12-17, 104 N.M. 587 , 725 P.2d 266 (determining that by failing to object 22 to challenged testimony on the basis of the confrontation clause 2018Defendant did not seek 15 to have the jury instructed that Nurse Belinski and Ms. Wood’s testimony 16 concerning HG’s statements to them should not be considered for the truth of the 17 matter asserted. 18 {9} A “defendant can waive fundamental rights,” including confrontation clause 19 rights, which “may include an implied waiver by conduct.” State v. Herrera, 2004- 20 NMCA-015, ¶ 8, 135 N.M. 79 , 84 P.3d 696 ; see State v. Lucero, 1986-NMCA- 21 085, ¶¶ 12-17, 104 N.M. 587 , 725 P.2d 266 (determining that by failing to object 22 to challenged testimony on the basis of the confrontation clause | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Herrera
green
1 sentence2014State v. 6 Herrera, 2014-NMCA-007, ¶ 4 , 315 P.3d 343 (stating that constitutional issues are 7 reviewed de novo). 8 {4} A defendant may waive his right to be present during critical stages of the 9 proceedings by either a “knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver” of his presence 10 “or as an implied waiver when a defendant has forfeited his . . . right to presence by 11 conduct.” Padilla, 2002-NMSC-016, ¶ 14 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State Ex Rel. Newsome v. Alarid
red
2 sentences2012Id. at 797 , 568 P.2d at 1243 (quoting Bruce v. Gregory, 423 P.2d 193, 199 (Cal. 1967)). {15} Following Bruce and other cases, Newsome adopted an approach whereby courts determine whether records not specifically exempted by IPRA nonetheless should be withheld from the requester on the grounds that disclosure “would not be in the public interest.” 90 N.M. at 798 , 568 P.2d at 1244 . 2012Id. at 797 , 568 P.2d at 1243 (quoting Bruce v. Gregory, 423 P.2d 193, 199 (Cal. 1967)). {15} Following Bruce and other cases, Newsome adopted an approach whereby courts determine whether records not specifically exempted by IPRA nonetheless should be withheld from the requester on the grounds that disclosure “would not be in the public interest.” 90 N.M. at 798 , 568 P.2d at 1244 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2004Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 , 98 S.Ct. 1670 . 2004Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 58 , 98 S.Ct. 1670 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Hernandez v. SIC Finance Co.
green
2 sentences1991Id. 1991Id. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Piner v. Pender
neutral
2 sentences1982Finer v. Pender, 83 N.M. 502 , 494 P.2d 164 (1972). 1982Finer v. Pender, 83 N.M. 502 , 494 P.2d 164 (1972). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Runyon v. Board of Prison Terms & Paroles
green
2 sentences1977In Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal.2d 666 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 423 P.2d 193 (1967), the Supreme Court of California held that the rights created by the California statutes to inspect public records “are, by their very nature, not absolute, but are subject to an implied rule of reason.” Id. at 676 , 56 Cal.Rptr. at 271 , 423 P.2d at 199 ; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 548 , 7 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 354 P.2d 637 (1960) (state bar records in disciplinary proceedings); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 , 238 P.2d 581 (1951) (communication in official confi 1977In Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal.2d 666 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 423 P.2d 193 (1967), the Supreme Court of California held that the rights created by the California statutes to inspect public records “are, by their very nature, not absolute, but are subject to an implied rule of reason.” Id. at 676 , 56 Cal.Rptr. at 271 , 423 P.2d at 199 ; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 548 , 7 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 354 P.2d 637 (1960) (state bar records in disciplinary proceedings); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 , 238 P.2d 581 (1951) (communication in official confi | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1977In Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal.2d 666 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 423 P.2d 193 (1967), the Supreme Court of California held that the rights created by the California statutes to inspect public records “are, by their very nature, not absolute, but are subject to an implied rule of reason.” Id. at 676 , 56 Cal.Rptr. at 271 , 423 P.2d at 199 ; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 548 , 7 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 354 P.2d 637 (1960) (state bar records in disciplinary proceedings); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 , 238 P.2d 581 (1951) (communication in official confi 1977In Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal.2d 666 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 423 P.2d 193 (1967), the Supreme Court of California held that the rights created by the California statutes to inspect public records “are, by their very nature, not absolute, but are subject to an implied rule of reason.” Id. at 676 , 56 Cal.Rptr. at 271 , 423 P.2d at 199 ; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 548 , 7 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 354 P.2d 637 (1960) (state bar records in disciplinary proceedings); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 , 238 P.2d 581 (1951) (communication in official confi | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Craemer v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1977In Craemer v. Superior Court in and for Marin County, 265 Cal.App.2d 216 , 71 Cal.Rptr. 193 (1968), the court called attention to the numerous California cases that had passed on this question, and to the California statute, which provides that every citizen has the right of inspection “except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.” That court stated the rule to be: [Wjhere there is no contrary statute or countervailing public policy, the right to inspect public records must be freely allowed. 1977In Craemer v. Superior Court in and for Marin County, 265 Cal.App.2d 216 , 71 Cal.Rptr. 193 (1968), the court called attention to the numerous California cases that had passed on this question, and to the California statute, which provides that every citizen has the right of inspection “except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.” That court stated the rule to be: [Wjhere there is no contrary statute or countervailing public policy, the right to inspect public records must be freely allowed. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
City & County of San Francisco v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1977In Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal.2d 666 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 423 P.2d 193 (1967), the Supreme Court of California held that the rights created by the California statutes to inspect public records “are, by their very nature, not absolute, but are subject to an implied rule of reason.” Id. at 676 , 56 Cal.Rptr. at 271 , 423 P.2d at 199 ; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 548 , 7 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 354 P.2d 637 (1960) (state bar records in disciplinary proceedings); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 , 238 P.2d 581 (1951) (communication in official confi 1977In Bruce v. Gregory, 65 Cal.2d 666 , 56 Cal.Rptr. 265 , 423 P.2d 193 (1967), the Supreme Court of California held that the rights created by the California statutes to inspect public records “are, by their very nature, not absolute, but are subject to an implied rule of reason.” Id. at 676 , 56 Cal.Rptr. at 271 , 423 P.2d at 199 ; Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.2d 548 , 7 Cal.Rptr. 109 , 354 P.2d 637 (1960) (state bar records in disciplinary proceedings); City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 156 , 238 P.2d 581 (1951) (communication in official confi | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Flaska v. State
green
2 sentences1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re 1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re | 1 | 1969–1969 |
City of Phoenix v. Bowles
green
2 sentences1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re 1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re | 1 | 1969–1969 |
McKee v. Bureau of Revenue
green
2 sentences1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re 1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co.
green
2 sentences1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re 1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Graves v. New York Ex Rel. O'Keefe
green
2 sentences1969O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 , 59 S.Ct. 595 , 83 L.Ed. 927 (1939), which involved the question of the imposition of a state income tax on the salary of an employee of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the court stated: "* * * The theory of the tax immunity of either government, state or national, and its instrumentalities, from taxation by the other, has been rested upon an implied limitation on the taxing power of each, such as to forestall undue interference, through the exercise of that power, with the governmental activities of the other. * * * "* * * "* * * the implied immunity of one governmen 1969O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 , 59 S.Ct. 595 , 83 L.Ed. 927 (1939), which involved the question of the imposition of a state income tax on the salary of an employee of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, the court stated: "* * * The theory of the tax immunity of either government, state or national, and its instrumentalities, from taxation by the other, has been rested upon an implied limitation on the taxing power of each, such as to forestall undue interference, through the exercise of that power, with the governmental activities of the other. * * * "* * * "* * * the implied immunity of one governmen | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Samosa v. Lopez
green
2 sentences1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re 1969For the expansion of the immunity of the one government correspondingly curtails the sovereign power of the other to tax, and where that immunity is invoked by the private citizen it tends to operate for his benefit at the expense of the taxing government and without corresponding benefit to the government in whose name the immunity is claimed. * * *" In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 , 69 S.Ct. 561 , 93 L.Ed. 721 (1949), which involved the question of immunity from state taxation of petroleum produced on Indian lands, the court stated: "It is true that this Court's more re | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Jones, County Judge v. Carver
neutral
2 sentences1966In Jones v. Carver, 29 Tex.Civ.App. 268 , 67 S.W. 780 , an election was held to determine if certain animals should be allowed to run at large. 1966In Jones v. Carver, 29 Tex.Civ.App. 268 , 67 S.W. 780 , an election was held to determine if certain animals should be allowed to run at large. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Pratt v. Parker
green
2 sentences1953Pratt v. Parker, 57 N.M. 103 , 255 P.2d 311 ; Yates v. American Republics Corp., 10 Cir., 163 F.2d 178 ; 1 Simes Future Interests 307, Section 170. 1953Pratt v. Parker, 57 N.M. 103 , 255 P.2d 311 ; Yates v. American Republics Corp., 10 Cir., 163 F.2d 178 ; 1 Simes Future Interests 307, Section 170. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Yates v. American Republics Corporation
green
2 sentences1953Pratt v. Parker, 57 N.M. 103 , 255 P.2d 311 ; Yates v. American Republics Corp., 10 Cir., 163 F.2d 178 ; 1 Simes Future Interests 307, Section 170. 1953Pratt v. Parker, 57 N.M. 103 , 255 P.2d 311 ; Yates v. American Republics Corp., 10 Cir., 163 F.2d 178 ; 1 Simes Future Interests 307, Section 170. | 1 | 1953–1953 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.