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10 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1935–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mounteer Enters., Inc. v. Homeowners Ass'n for the Colony at White Pine Canyongreen1 sentence2024The court explained that as a general matter, implied waiver occurs where a party “intentionally acted in a manner inconsistent with its contractual rights.” Mounteer, 2018 UT 23, ¶ 17 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 1 |
Berghuis v. Thompkinsgreen2 sentences2020See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”). 2020See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that “the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored’” (emphasis added)); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”) And Velarde tells us precisely what to do in that situation: “[I] | 1 | 1 |
State v. Velardegreen2 sentences2020See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that “the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored’” (emphasis added)); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”) And Velarde tells us precisely what to do in that situation: “[I] 2020But Argueta, like Velarde, “broke the silence guaranteed constitutionally,” id., and is thus in no position to invoke Doyle—a point that remains unrefuted by the majority. 28 This is a strange charge coming from a majority unconcerned with the “key words” that do appear in Velarde. | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Mosleygreen1 sentence2020See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975) (holding that “the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored’” (emphasis added)); see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010) (“Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”) And Velarde tells us precisely what to do in that situation: “[I] | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Roman G. Weningergreen1 sentence2006See United States v. Weninger, 624 F.2d 163, 167 (10th Cir.1980) ("We hold that [the defendant's] stubborn failure to hire an attorney constituted a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to assistance of counsel."). 18 The Utah Supreme Court has determined that an implied waiver must meet two requirements: it must be voluntary, and the defendant must have given it knowingly and intelligently. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pedockiegreen2 sentences2006See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28 at ¶ 36 , 137 P.3d 716 . 2006See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28 at ¶ 36 , 137 P.3d 716 . | 1 | 1 |
Fitzgerald v. Stategreen2 sentences2003See also Fitzgerald v. State, 782 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluding that defendant had escaped from custody when he left specific housing unit within the prison to which he was confined). 1 29 While it is possible to read into section 76-8-809 the implied requirement that to be convicted of the erime of escape a prisoner must successfully escape all boundaries of the prison in which he finds himself, I believe that had the legislature intended that effect it could have, and would have, clearly communicated that intent in the statutory language. 2003See also Fitzgerald v. State, 782 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (concluding that defendant had escaped from custody when he left specific housing unit within the prison to which he was confined). ¶ 29 While it is possible to read into section 76-8-309 the implied requirement that to be convicted of the crime of escape a prisoner must successfully escape all boundaries of the prison in which he finds himself, I believe that had the legislature intended that effect it could have, and would have, clearly communicated that intent in the statutory language. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Penagreen1 sentence1997We reaffirm today that a waiver of a suspect’s rights “may be inferred from his acknowledgment of his understanding of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct.” State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)); see also Pena, 869 P.2d at 940 (holding same only few months after Wood was decided). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hegelmangreen1 sentence1997We reaffirm today that a waiver of a suspect’s rights “may be inferred from his acknowledgment of his understanding of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct.” State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)); see also Pena, 869 P.2d at 940 (holding same only few months after Wood was decided). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Horrocks
green
2 sentences2025Id. ¶22 Here, though, the facts are much more analogous to Pedockie, Montes, and Houston than they are to Santonio. 2025And because the parties agree that there was no true waiver or forfeiture, we conclude that Horrocks did not ever voluntarily waive his right to counsel. 20230322-CA 12 2025 UT App 157 State v. Horrocks B. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Neeshan v. Ravonsheed
neutral
2 sentences2024In Mounteer, our supreme court set forth the 20230122-CA 6 2024 UT App 144 Neeshan v. Ravonsheed contours of the implied waiver doctrine. 2024Based on instructional error alone, the verdict in question was infirm. (continued…) 20230122-CA 11 2024 UT App 144 Neeshan v. Ravonsheed ¶26 Finally, we offer two clarifications about the scope of our decision. ¶27 First, this isn’t to say that a party who has engaged in a course of conduct that’s suggestive of waiver could subsequently and unilaterally defeat an implied waiver claim by simply testifying that he or she lacked such intent. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
AL-IN Partners v. LifeVantage
green
1 sentence2021In Mounteer, we held in the context of an implied waiver that “a party asserting waiver in the face of an antiwaiver clause must establish ‘a clear intent to waive both the [antiwaiver] 4 Cite as: 2021 UT 42 Opinion of the Court clause and the underlying contract provision.’” Id. ¶ 21 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2016For-conduct to amount to an implied waiver of a contractual right, it *74 must be intentional, Meadow Valley, 2011 UT 35, ¶ 45 , 266 P.3d 671 , and must be done "in a manner that is unambiguous," McCleve Props., LLC v. D. 2016For-conduct to amount to an implied waiver of a contractual right, it *74 must be intentional, Meadow Valley, 2011 UT 35, ¶ 45 , 266 P.3d 671 , and must be done "in a manner that is unambiguous," McCleve Props., LLC v. D. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Houston
neutral
2 sentences2007See id. at ¶¶ 33-36; State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ¶ 10 , 147 P.3d 543 (holding that the trial court's "urg[ing]" defendant to obtain counsel was insufficient to find a voluntary waiver). 2007See id. at ¶¶ 33-36; State v. Houston, 2006 UT App 437, ¶ 10 , 147 P.3d 543 (holding that the trial court's "urg[ing]" defendant to obtain counsel was insufficient to find a voluntary waiver). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Kelly
green
1 sentence1997The State directs our attention to State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987), and State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986), cases with facts the State claims are “analytically indistinguishable” from the case before us, as two examples of instances where we found implied waivers of Miranda rights. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Calamity
green
1 sentence1997The State directs our attention to State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39 (Utah 1987), and State v. Kelly, 718 P.2d 385 (Utah 1986), cases with facts the State claims are “analytically indistinguishable” from the case before us, as two examples of instances where we found implied waivers of Miranda rights. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences1997We reaffirm today that a waiver of a suspect’s rights “may be inferred from his acknowledgment of his understanding of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct.” State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)); see also Pena, 869 P.2d at 940 (holding same only few months after Wood was decided). 1997We reaffirm today that a waiver of a suspect’s rights “may be inferred from his acknowledgment of his understanding of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct.” State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)); see also Pena, 869 P.2d at 940 (holding same only few months after Wood was decided). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co.
neutral
2 sentences1935Laches has been defined to be “negligence in the assertion of a right,” Riley v. Blacker, 51 Mont. 364 , 152 P. 758, 759 ; “unreasonable delay in enforcing a known right,” State v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 122 Minn. 400 , 142 N. W. 717, 719 ; “in not doing something which a party might do and might reasonably be expected to do in the vindication of his right,” Troll v. St. 1935Laches has been defined to be “negligence in the assertion of a right,” Riley v. Blacker, 51 Mont. 364 , 152 P. 758, 759 ; “unreasonable delay in enforcing a known right,” State v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 122 Minn. 400 , 142 N. W. 717, 719 ; “in not doing something which a party might do and might reasonably be expected to do in the vindication of his right,” Troll v. St. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Riley v. Blacker
green
2 sentences1935Laches has been defined to be “negligence in the assertion of a right,” Riley v. Blacker, 51 Mont. 364 , 152 P. 758, 759 ; “unreasonable delay in enforcing a known right,” State v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 122 Minn. 400 , 142 N. W. 717, 719 ; “in not doing something which a party might do and might reasonably be expected to do in the vindication of his right,” Troll v. St. 1935Laches has been defined to be “negligence in the assertion of a right,” Riley v. Blacker, 51 Mont. 364 , 152 P. 758, 759 ; “unreasonable delay in enforcing a known right,” State v. Brooks-Scanlon Lumber Co., 122 Minn. 400 , 142 N. W. 717, 719 ; “in not doing something which a party might do and might reasonably be expected to do in the vindication of his right,” Troll v. St. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.