reaffirmed principle in Kentucky

2018Instead, the jury heard Auslander testify that. 8 In Brewster v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., this Court reaffirmed the rule stated in Owens concerning the duty owed by landowners to independent contractors. 279 S.W.3d 142 , 143 n.l, 144 (Ky. 2009). 16 although the portion of the roof at issue was not designed to be weight-bearing, he did not think he “would ever mistake that for a roof.” In addition, when asked whether she believed the roof was dangerous or misleading, the LLC’s expert engineer explained that “It’s an arbor.

2012Consistent with Bernheim, in Banahan this Court reaffirmed that the test for determining whether a "charity" is entitled to such an exemption was still the test as announced in Iroquois Post: "First, the institution must itself be a charity and the income from its property must be used to further its charitable purpose; secondly, the property must be employed for a purely charitable purpose." Banahan, 553 S.W.2d at 51 (quoting Iroquois Post, 309 S.W.2d at 354 ).

2012Consistent with Bemheim, in Banahan this Court reaffirmed that the test for determining whether a “charity” is entitled to such an exemption was still the test as announced in Iroquois Post: “First, the institution must itself be a charity and the income from its property must be used to further its charitable purpose; secondly, the property must be employed for a purely charitable purpose.” Banahan, 553 S.W.2d at 51 (quoting Iroquois Post, 309 S.W.2d at 354 ).

2012More recently, in Ladd v. Ladd, 323 S.W.3d 772 (Ky.App.2010), this Court reaffirmed the rule expressed in Dravo .

2012Consistent with Bernheim, in Banahan this Court reaffirmed that the test for determining whether a "charity" is entitled to such an exemption was still the test as announced in Iroquois Post: "First, the institution must itself be a charity and the income from its property must be used to further its charitable purpose; secondly, the property must be employed for a purely charitable purpose." Banahan, 553 S.W.2d at 51 (quoting Iroquois Post, 309 S.W.2d at 354 ).

2012Consistent with Bemheim, in Banahan this Court reaffirmed that the test for determining whether a “charity” is entitled to such an exemption was still the test as announced in Iroquois Post: “First, the institution must itself be a charity and the income from its property must be used to further its charitable purpose; secondly, the property must be employed for a purely charitable purpose.” Banahan, 553 S.W.2d at 51 (quoting Iroquois Post, 309 S.W.2d at 354 ).

2006In Alcan Foil Products v. Huff, supra, this court reaffirmed the principle of Randall v. Pendland, 770 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. App.1988), that a rule of discovery triggers the notice and limitations requirements in gradual injury claims.

2006In Alcan Foil Products v. Huff, supra , this court reaffirmed the principle of Randall v. Pendland, 770 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. App.1988), that a rule of discovery triggers the notice and limitations requirements in gradual injury claims.

2006Moreover, in Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., 65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky.2001); Brown-Forman Corp. v. Upchurch, 127 S.W.3d 615 (Ky.2004); and American Printing House for the Blind v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 145 (Ky.2004), it reaffirmed that principle and also determined that a worker is not required to self-diagnose the cause of a disabling condition.

2006Moreover, in Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., 65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky.2001); Brown-Forman Corp. v. Upchurch, 127 S.W.3d 615 (Ky.2004); and American Printing House for the Blind v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 145 (Ky.2004), it reaffirmed that principle and also determined that a worker is not required to self-diagnose the cause of a disabling condition.

2006Moreover, in Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., 65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky.2001); Brown-Forman Corp. v. Upchurch, 127 S.W.3d 615 (Ky.2004); and American Printing House for the Blind v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 145 (Ky.2004), it reaffirmed that principle and also determined that a worker is not required to self-diagnose the cause of a disabling condition.

2006Moreover, in Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., 65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky.2001); Brown-Forman Corp. v. Upchurch, 127 S.W.3d 615 (Ky.2004); and American Printing House for the Blind v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 145 (Ky.2004), it reaffirmed that principle and also determined that a worker is not required to self-diagnose the cause of a disabling condition.

2006Moreover, in Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., 65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky.2001); Brown-Forman Corp. v. Upchurch, 127 S.W.3d 615 (Ky.2004); and American Printing House for the Blind v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 145 (Ky.2004), it reaffirmed that principle and also determined that a worker is not required to self-diagnose the cause of a disabling condition.

2006Moreover, in Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp., 65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky.2001); Brown-Forman Corp. v. Upchurch, 127 S.W.3d 615 (Ky.2004); and American Printing House for the Blind v. Brown, 142 S.W.3d 145 (Ky.2004), it reaffirmed that principle and also determined that a worker is not required to self-diagnose the cause of a disabling condition.

2006In Alcan Foil Products v. Huff, supra, this court reaffirmed the principle of Randall v. Pendland, 770 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. App.1988), that a rule of discovery triggers the notice and limitations requirements in gradual injury claims.

2006In Alcan Foil Products v. Huff, supra , this court reaffirmed the principle of Randall v. Pendland, 770 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. App.1988), that a rule of discovery triggers the notice and limitations requirements in gradual injury claims.

1998In Graham , this Court reaffirmed the waiver logic of Howard v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 888 (1989), in which the failure to challenge the validity of a prior conviction upon conviction as a P.F.O.

1977O’Bryant v. Theobald, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 571 (1967); City of Louisville v. Helman, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 598 (1952).

1977O’Bryant v. Theobald, Ky., 421 S.W.2d 571 (1967); City of Louisville v. Helman, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 598 (1952).

1973In United States v. Seale, U.S. Court of Appeals, 7th Circuit, 461 F.2d 345 (1972), the court reaffirmed the rule that the 6th Amendment right to trial by jury applied to serious criminal contempts and that in determining whether or not such contempt was “serious” the courts were required to look at the penalty actually imposed.

1937In the more recent case of Knott County v. Michael, 264 Ky. 36 , 94 S. W. (2d) 44 , the court reaffirmed the rule laid down in Breckinridge County v. Bhodes, supra. We therefore conclude that the county attorney had authority to prosecute the appeal, without being ordered to do so by either the fiscal court or the county court.

1937In the more recent case of Knott County v. Michael, 264 Ky. 36 , 94 S. W. (2d) 44 , the court reaffirmed the rule laid down in Breckinridge County v. Bhodes, supra. We therefore conclude that the county attorney had authority to prosecute the appeal, without being ordered to do so by either the fiscal court or the county court.

1931All that was held in Miller v. Harrell, 175 Ky. 578 , 194 S. W. 782 , was that the destruction at a distance from testator of his will by another, at his direction, when ratified by him, is not equivalent to his act, or in' his constructive presence within Kentucky Statutes, sec. 4833, authorizing a revo *86 cation of will by testator or some person in Ms presence and by Ms direction destroying it with intent to revoke.

1931All that was held in Miller v. Harrell, 175 Ky. 578 , 194 S. W. 782 , was that the destruction at a distance from testator of his will by another, at his direction, when ratified by him, is not equivalent to his act, or in' his constructive presence within Kentucky Statutes, sec. 4833, authorizing a revo *86 cation of will by testator or some person in Ms presence and by Ms direction destroying it with intent to revoke.