reaffirmed rule in Texas

1996The Supreme Court of Texas discussed sovereign immunity in Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740 at 741-742 (Tex.1980): In Lowe v. Texas Tech University, 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.1976), this Court reaffirmed the rule that the State is not liable for torts of its officers or agents in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provi *188 sion therefor.

1980In Lowe v. Texas Tech University, 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex.1976), this Court reaffirmed the rule that the State is not liable for torts of its officers or agents in the absence of a constitutional or statutory provision therefor.

1995Id., 691 S.W.2d at 661 . [3] The Court reaffirmed the doctrine of waiver and overruled DeGarmo's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

1995Id., 691 S.W.2d at 661 . [3] The Court reaffirmed the doctrine of waiver and overruled DeGarmo's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

1978The court reaffirmed that rule in Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 , 97 S.Ct. 1730 , 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977).

1978The court reaffirmed that rule in Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145 , 97 S.Ct. 1730 , 52 L.Ed.2d 203 (1977).

2023Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 636 ).

2021Later, in Guridi, this Court reaffirmed the rule in Frommer that “findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be recited in a judgment,” and held that because the judgment there “improperly recited the fraud findings . . . [t]he separately-filed findings of fact control.” Guridi, 98 S.W.3d at 317 .

2019We conclude that the failure to order the appraisals will vitiate or severely compromise the defendants’ defenses to those claims.” Id.

2015In Whirlpool, the Court relied both on Pollock - in which it held 335 Elizondo, 415 S.W.3d at 265 . 336 The Robinson factors (which we generally refer to as the Daubert factors except in this subsection) are discussed in detail as part of ″methodological reliability″ below.

2007Relying on its Havner decision, the court reaffirmed the principle that “epidemiological studies are without evidentiary significance if the injured person cannot show that ‘the exposure or dose levels were comparable to or greater than those in the studies.’” Id. (quoting Havner , 953 S.W.2d at 720–21).

2007Relying on its Hamer decision, the court reaffirmed the principle that “epidemiological studies are without evidentiary significance if the injured person cannot show that ‘the exposure or dose levels were comparable to or greater than those in the studies.’ ” Id. (quoting Hamer, 953 S.W.2d at 720-21).

2003The court reaffirmed its analysis in a subsequent opinion denying rehearing after the Supreme Court issued Egelhoff , stating that “our conclusion that federal law controls is supported by Egelhoff.” 43 S.W.3d at 544-46 .

2003The court reaffirmed its analysis in a subsequent opinion denying rehearing after the Supreme Court issued Egelhoff , stating that "our conclusion that federal law controls is supported by Egelhoff ." 43 S.W.3d at 544-46 .

2001The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment, “has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). 30 Finally, the Court clearly reaffirmed this principle most recently in Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 31 which held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to probation revocati

2001The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment, “has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). 30 Finally, the Court clearly reaffirmed this principle most recently in Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 31 which held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to probation revocati

2001The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment, “has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). 30 Finally, the Court clearly reaffirmed this principle most recently in Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 31 which held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to probation revocati

2001The Fifth Amendment theory has not withstood critical analysis or the test of time, see Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 , 96 S.Ct. 2737 , 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976), and the Fourth Amendment, “has never been interpreted to proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976). 30 Finally, the Court clearly reaffirmed this principle most recently in Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 31 which held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to probation revocati

1999The Court reaffirmed the requirement of reliability which it previously set out in Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), but stated the requirement would be applied with "less rigor." Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561 .

1999The Court reaffirmed the requirement of reliability which it previously set out in Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), but stated the requirement would be applied with “less rigor.” Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561 .

1999The Court reaffirmed the requirement of reliability which it previously set out in Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), but stated the requirement would be applied with "less rigor." Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561 .

1999The Court reaffirmed the requirement of reliability which it previously set out in Kelly v. State, 824 S.W.2d 568 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), but stated the requirement would be applied with “less rigor.” Nenno, 970 S.W.2d at 561 .

1998Indeed, just over three years ago, this Court reaffirmed the rule that the "reasonable certainty" requirement for proof of lost profits "is intended to be flexible enough to accommodate the myriad circumstances in which claims of lost profits arise." Texas Instruments, 877 S.W.2d at 279 .

1998Indeed, just over three years ago, this Court reaffirmed the rule that the “reasonable certainty” requirement for proof of lost profits “is intended to be flexible enough to accommodate the myriad circumstances in which claims of lost profits arise.” Texas Instruments, 877 S.W.2d at 279 .

1998Id. at 552 . *690 In Dallas Merchant’s v. City of Dallas, 852 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex.1993), the Court reaffirmed the rule that an ordinance of a home rule city that attempts to regulate a subject matter preempted by state statute is unenforceable to the extent it conflicts with the state statute.

1996Recently in McGlothlin v. State, 896 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.Crim.App.1995), the court reaffirmed the rule, stating: The DeGarmo doctrine has been described as a “common-sense rule of procedure” because “the function of trial is to sift out the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence.” Stated another way, “The basic purpose of a trial is the determination of truth.” When the defendant testifies and judicially confesses to the charged offense, the purpose of the trial process has been served — the truth has been determined and the purpose of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial has been satisfied

1993Second, appellant attacks the constitutionality of this rule relying on Herbert v. State, 827 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no pet’n).

1991Thereafter, albeit for somewhat different purposes, in Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), quoting and relying on Banks v. State, supra, the Court reaffirmed that rule, viz: "Sufficiency of the evidence as determined by this Court is a question of law....

1991Thereafter, albeit for somewhat different purposes, in Combs v. State, 643 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.Cr.App.1982), quoting and relying on Banks v. State, supra, the Court reaffirmed that rule, viz: “Sufficiency of the evidence as determined by this Court is a question of law....

1990In reversing Roeder’s conviction, this Court reaffirmed the principle that a prospective juror is not excluda-ble for cause under Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 , 100 S.Ct. 2521 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), merely because the death penalty would affect or influence his or her deliberations.

1990In reversing Roeder’s conviction, this Court reaffirmed the principle that a prospective juror is not excluda-ble for cause under Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 , 100 S.Ct. 2521 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), merely because the death penalty would affect or influence his or her deliberations.

1988This Court reaffirmed the rule set out in Drake, supra, that regardless of the number of allegations in a charging instrument, the State may obtain only one conviction and one sentence thereon, except in cases concerning the repeated commission of one property offense listed in Chapter 7 of the Penal Code.

1988This Court reaffirmed the rule set out in Drake, supra, that regardless of the number of allegations in a charging instrument, the State may obtain only one conviction and one sentence thereon, except in cases concerning the repeated commission of one property offense listed in Chapter 7 of the Penal Code.

1987City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).

1982The Dallas Court of Appeals then reversed the conviction, relying on Ferguson, supra, on the grounds that “the term ‘appropriate’ goes to an act or omission of the accused and the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant’s motion to quash the indictment.” In upholding the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the conviction this Court stated: “... if a word or term in a charging instrument goes to an act or omission of the defendant, and the defendant files and presents to the trial court a motion to quash, the word or term, even though statutorily defined, must be further clarified by the Stat