reaffirmed principle in California

2017The court reaffirmed the principle announced in Enmund that imposing the death sentence on an aider and abettor who had no intent or purpose that life would be taken would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( Tison , supra , 481 U.S. at p. 148 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 .) In addition, mere foreseeability that a murder might occur in the course of an armed robbery does not *970 establish a defendant specifically intends to kill "in the traditional sense" because "[p]articipants in violent felonies like armed robberies can frequently 'anticipat[e] that lethal force ... might be used' " and tha

2017The court reaffirmed the principle announced in Enmund that imposing the death sentence on an aider and abettor who had no intent or purpose that life would be taken would violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( Tison , supra , 481 U.S. at p. 148 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 .) In addition, mere foreseeability that a murder might occur in the course of an armed robbery does not *970 establish a defendant specifically intends to kill "in the traditional sense" because "[p]articipants in violent felonies like armed robberies can frequently 'anticipat[e] that lethal force ... might be used' " and tha

2001The court reaffirmed the rule it had stated in Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, supra, 680 F.2d 822 , that ordinary state law error does not amount to a substantive due process violation.

2001The court reaffirmed the rule it had stated in Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, supra, 680 F.2d 822 , that ordinary state law error does not amount to a substantive due process violation.

2001Nonetheless, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the plaintiff would have a valid claim of a substantive due process violation if it could “prove that his injury was due not merely to the law’s delay and [the government’s] errors but to defendants’ deliberate disregard of the state’s fundamental process.” (Roy v. City of Augusta, Maine, supra, 712 F.2d at p. 1524 .) 6 This standard is consistent with the holding of a series of cases, some of which are cited by the Gallands, that find substantive due process violations when municipalities refuse t

2001Nonetheless, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the plaintiff would have a valid claim of a substantive due process violation if it could "prove that his injury was due not merely to the law's delay and [the government's] errors but to defendants' deliberate disregard of the state's fundamental process." ( Roy v. City of Augusta, Maine, supra, 712 F.2d at p. 1524 .) [6] This standard is consistent with the holding of a series of cases, some of which are cited by the Gallands, that find substantive due process violations when municipalities refus

1990While leaving open the determination of what circumstances involving police pursuit could amount to a seizure, the court reaffirmed the test of United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. 544 , that “the police can be said to have seized an individual ‘only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave.’ [Citations.]” (Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. 567, 573 [ 100 L.Ed.2d at p. 572 , 108 S.Ct. at p. 1979 ].), finding such test “is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct

1990While leaving open the determination of what circumstances involving police pursuit could amount to a seizure, the court reaffirmed the test of United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. 544 , that “the police can be said to have seized an individual ‘only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave.’ [Citations.]” (Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. 567, 573 [ 100 L.Ed.2d at p. 572 , 108 S.Ct. at p. 1979 ].), finding such test “is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct

1990While leaving open the determination of what circumstances involving police pursuit could amount to a seizure, the court reaffirmed the test of United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. 544 , that “the police can be said to have seized an individual ‘only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he [or she] was not free to leave.’ [Citations.]” (Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. 567, 573 [ 100 L.Ed.2d at p. 572 , 108 S.Ct. at p. 1979 ].), finding such test “is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct

1990(Id., at p.572 [ 100 L.Ed.2d at p. 571 , 108 S.Ct. at p. 1979 ].) Instead, the court reaffirmed the test of United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 [ 64 L.Ed.2d 497 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ], that “the police can be said to have seized an individual ‘only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.’ [Citation.]” (Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, 486 U.S. 567, 573 [ 100 L.Ed.2d 565 , 572, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979 ].) The court also noted that mere surveillance or approach by an officer is not a seizure.

1981“In California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149 . . ., the court sets forth the present rule regarding the use of extrajudicial statements as follows: ‘[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.’ In 1971, the court reaffirmed this doctrine in Nelson v. O’Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622 ....

1975In California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 489 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 ], the court sets forth the present rule regarding the use of extrajudicial statements as follows: “[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.” In 1971, the court reaffirmed this doctrine in Nelson v. O’Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 222 , 91 S.Ct. 1723 ].

1981“In California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149 . . ., the court sets forth the present rule regarding the use of extrajudicial statements as follows: ‘[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.’ In 1971, the court reaffirmed this doctrine in Nelson v. O’Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622 ....

1975In California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149 [ 26 L.Ed.2d 489 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 ], the court sets forth the present rule regarding the use of extrajudicial statements as follows: “[T]he Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.” In 1971, the court reaffirmed this doctrine in Nelson v. O’Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622 [ 29 L.Ed.2d 222 , 91 S.Ct. 1723 ].

1949At page- [93 L.Ed.] the court reaffirmed the doctrine of Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 [ 60 S.Ct. 444 , 84 L.Ed. 604 , 125 A.L.R. 1368 ], in which it had stated: “ ‘In determining whether a taxable transfer becomes complete only at death we look to substance, not to form . . .

1949At page- [93 L.Ed.] the court reaffirmed the doctrine of Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 [ 60 S.Ct. 444 , 84 L.Ed. 604 , 125 A.L.R. 1368 ], in which it had stated: “ ‘In determining whether a taxable transfer becomes complete only at death we look to substance, not to form . . .

1949However we label the device [if] it is but a means by which the gift is rendered incomplete until the donor’s death’ the ‘possession or enjoyment’ provision applies.” The court also reaffirmed Coldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 [ 65 S.Ct. 1323 , 89 L.Ed. 1871 , 159 A.L.R. 1320 ], and at page- [93 L.Ed.] quoted, with approval, from that case the reference to the Hallock case as follows: “It thus sweeps into the gross estate all property the ultimate possession or enjoyment of which is held in suspense until the moment of the decedent’s death or thereafter. . . .

1949However we label the device [if] it is but a means by which the gift is rendered incomplete until the donor’s death’ the ‘possession or enjoyment’ provision applies.” The court also reaffirmed Coldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 [ 65 S.Ct. 1323 , 89 L.Ed. 1871 , 159 A.L.R. 1320 ], and at page- [93 L.Ed.] quoted, with approval, from that case the reference to the Hallock case as follows: “It thus sweeps into the gross estate all property the ultimate possession or enjoyment of which is held in suspense until the moment of the decedent’s death or thereafter. . . .

2021In the late 19th century, the Supreme Court explained: “Under the 8 constitution, by the lapse of time and the issuance of the remittitur the judgment has become a finality, beyond the power of this court to modify or amend.” (Martin v. Wagner (1899) 124 Cal. 204, 205 .) More than 100 years later, the court reaffirmed this principle when it stated that, upon issuance of the appellate court’s remittitur, except in “very limited circumstances” not present here, “[t]he reviewing ‘court has no appellate jurisdiction over its own judgments, and it cannot review or modify them after the cause has on

2020(Reams v. Cooley (1915) 171 Cal. 150 , 154–157 (Reams).) The Reams court held such contracts cannot be enforced, and no recovery under an implied theory for quantum meruit can be obtained.3 Reams involved a public works contract that had not been subject to the required competitive bidding process. ( Reams, supra, at pp. 151–152.) When the public entity discovered the error, it refused to pay for the work performed under the contract, and the contractor filed suit.

2020(Reams v. Cooley (1915) 171 Cal. 150 , 154–157 (Reams).) The Reams court held such contracts cannot be enforced, and no recovery under an implied theory for quantum meruit can be obtained.3 Reams involved a public works contract that had not been subject to the required competitive bidding process. ( Reams, supra, at pp. 151–152.) When the public entity discovered the error, it refused to pay for the work performed under the contract, and the contractor filed suit.

2017In doing so, the court found Raymond and Ricky's participation in the deaths of the Lyons family to be "anything but minor." ( Tison , supra , 481 U.S. at p. 152 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 .) The brothers knowingly armed two convicted murderers, one of whom had killed a guard in a previous prison escape. ( Id . at p. 151, 107 S.Ct. 1676 .) Raymond admitted he was prepared to kill during the subsequent escape. ( Ibid . ) Raymond lured the Lyons family into the clutches of his armed confederates, and Ricky guarded them at gunpoint while Gary considered killing them. ( Id . at pp. 140, 151, 107 S.Ct. 1676

2017In doing so, the court found Raymond and Ricky's participation in the deaths of the Lyons family to be "anything but minor." ( Tison , supra , 481 U.S. at p. 152 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 .) The brothers knowingly armed two convicted murderers, one of whom had killed a guard in a previous prison escape. ( Id . at p. 151, 107 S.Ct. 1676 .) Raymond admitted he was prepared to kill during the subsequent escape. ( Ibid . ) Raymond lured the Lyons family into the clutches of his armed confederates, and Ricky guarded them at gunpoint while Gary considered killing them. ( Id . at pp. 140, 151, 107 S.Ct. 1676

2015Rather, the court reaffirmed the principle that in the case of a concurrent representation conflict of interest, “ ‘disqualification . . . follows automatically, regardless of whether the simultaneous representations have anything in common.’ ” (Id. at p. 160, quoting SpeeDee Oil, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1147 .) *627 3.

2015(In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192 (Shaputis II).) In that case, the court reaffirmed the requirement of judicial deference to executive branch decisions regarding paroles.

2013(Johnson, at p. 697.) Twenty years later in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 460 , 561 P.2d 1148 ] (Solberg), the court reaffirmed the rule that a party seeking disqualification under section 170.6 need neither prove nor even allege the cause of his or her belief of judicial prejudice. ( 19 Cal.3d at p. 187 .) Section 170.6 requires the party or attorney submitting the peremptory challenge to file not only an affidavit of prejudice but also an oral or written motion “made to the assigned judge or to the presiding judge.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2); see Schoenberg v. R

2013(Johnson, at p. 697.) Twenty years later in Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 460 , 561 P.2d 1148 ] (Solberg), the court reaffirmed the rule that a party seeking disqualification under section 170.6 need neither prove nor even allege the cause of his or her belief of judicial prejudice. ( 19 Cal.3d at p. 187 .) Section 170.6 requires the party or attorney submitting the peremptory challenge to file not only an affidavit of prejudice but also an oral or written motion “made to the assigned judge or to the presiding judge.” (§ 170.6, subd. (a)(2); see Schoenberg v. R

2010In Crowley , the court reaffirmed the rule of Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43 , which held “that a suit for malicious prosecution lies for bringing an action charging multiple grounds of liability when some but not all of those grounds were asserted with malice and without probable cause.” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 671 .) Both the majority and the dissent in Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th 666 made valid points on whether the rule of Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43 , should be continued. 12 I note that in 2007 the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed this issue as follows: “Viewing the certified q

2010In Crowley , the court reaffirmed the rule of Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43 , which held “that a suit for malicious prosecution lies for bringing an action charging multiple grounds of liability when some but not all of those grounds were asserted with malice and without probable cause.” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 671 .) Both the majority and the dissent in Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th 666 made valid points on whether the rule of Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43 , should be continued. 12 I note that in 2007 the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed this issue as follows: “Viewing the certified q

2010In Crowley , the court reaffirmed the rule of Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43 , which held “that a suit for malicious prosecution lies for bringing an action charging multiple grounds of liability when some but not all of those grounds were asserted with malice and without probable cause.” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 671 .) Both the majority and the dissent in Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th 666 made valid points on whether the rule of Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43 , should be continued. 12 I note that in 2007 the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed this issue as follows: “Viewing the certified q

2010In Crowley , the court reaffirmed the rule of Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43 , which held “that a suit for malicious prosecution lies for bringing an action charging multiple grounds of liability when some but not all of those grounds were asserted with malice and without probable cause.” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 671 .) Both the majority and the dissent in Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th 666 made valid points on whether the rule of Bertero, supra, 13 Cal.3d 43 , should be continued. 12 I note that in 2007 the Supreme Court of New Mexico addressed this issue as follows: “Viewing the certified q

2009In Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 63 , footnote 6 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 460 P.2d 137 ], the court discussed the weight courts should accord legislative findings, and in California Federal the court reiterated the Bishop v. City of San Jose formulation: "Our statement in Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, 1 Cal.3d at page 63 , that `the Legislature is empowered neither to determine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide concern,' meant that legislative declarations that a subject is one of statewide concern do not ipse dixit ma

2009In Bishop v. City of San Jose (1969) 1 Cal.3d 56, 63 , footnote 6 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 465 , 460 P.2d 137 ], the court discussed the weight courts should accord legislative findings, and in California Federal the court reiterated the Bishop v. City of San Jose formulation: "Our statement in Bishop v. City of San Jose, supra, 1 Cal.3d at page 63 , that `the Legislature is empowered neither to determine what constitutes a municipal affair nor to change such an affair into a matter of statewide concern,' meant that legislative declarations that a subject is one of statewide concern do not ipse dixit ma

2009Thus Marvell cites Crown Co. v. Nye Tool Works (1923) 261 U.S. 24 [ 67 L.Ed. 516 , 43 S.Ct. 254 ] (Crown Co.), to illustrate the federal courts’ “long . . . recognition]” of an “ownership standing rule.” But the question in that case was whether an assignee of the patent-in-suit could maintain a claim for preassignment infringement. 8 In *1002 addressing that question, the court reaffirmed the analysis in Moore v. Marsh (1868) 74 U.S. 515 [ 19 L.Ed. 37 ] (Moore), which it described as deciding a question precisely analogous to the one before us: “whether a sale and assignment by a patentee of

2009Thus Marvell cites Crown Co. v. Nye Tool Works (1923) 261 U.S. 24 [ 67 L.Ed. 516 , 43 S.Ct. 254 ] (Crown Co.), to illustrate the federal courts’ “long . . . recognition]” of an “ownership standing rule.” But the question in that case was whether an assignee of the patent-in-suit could maintain a claim for preassignment infringement. 8 In *1002 addressing that question, the court reaffirmed the analysis in Moore v. Marsh (1868) 74 U.S. 515 [ 19 L.Ed. 37 ] (Moore), which it described as deciding a question precisely analogous to the one before us: “whether a sale and assignment by a patentee of