reaffirmed principle in New Jersey

2014Notably, the Court reaffirmed the rule that “where a fee simple is being condemned, negotiations will take place with the fee owner alone.” Id. at 407 , 16 A.3d 300 .

2014Notably, the Court reaffirmed the rule that “where a fee simple is being condemned, negotiations will take place with the fee owner alone.” Id. at 407 , 16 A.3d 300 .

2026Controversies or claims shall be submitted to arbitration regardless of the theory under which they arise . . . . [Ibid.] In Kernahan, the Court reaffirmed the standard enunciated in Atalese, noting that to be enforceable, an arbitration agreement must be "the product of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law." Id. at 319 (quoting Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442 ).

2026Controversies or claims shall be submitted to arbitration regardless of the theory under which they arise . . . . [Ibid.] In Kernahan, the Court reaffirmed the standard enunciated in Atalese, noting that to be enforceable, an arbitration agreement must be "the product of mutual assent, as determined under customary principles of contract law." Id. at 319 (quoting Atalese, 219 N.J. at 442 ).

2021However, the Court reaffirmed the principle that jail credit shall be applied "to the front end of the aggregate sentence." Id. at 121- 22.

2019Terry, 232 N.J. at 239 .

2017In Benjamin, supra, the Court reaffirmed the standard a defendant must satisfy to successfully challenge the prosecutor's decision, stating, [S]ince the Appellate Division's 1991 decision in Alvarez, . . . defendants have been able to seek judicial review of prosecutors' waiver decisions.

2017The Court reaffirmed the principle that officers conducting a protective patdown search for weapons may seize contraband detected during that search "so long as the officers' search stays within the bounds marked by Terry." Id. at 373 , 113 S. Ct. at 2136 , 124 L.

2017The Court reaffirmed the principle that officers conducting a protective patdown search for weapons may seize contraband detected during that search "so long as the officers' search stays within the bounds marked by Terry." Id. at 373 , 113 S. Ct. at 2136 , 124 L.

2014In Fitzgerald, the Court reaffirmed the rule articulated in Graham, supra, 126 N.J. at 373 , 599 A.2d 149 , but distinguished Graham from the case before it.

2014In Fitzgerald, the Court reaffirmed the rule articulated in Graham, supra, 126 N.J. at 373 , 599 A.2d 149 , but distinguished Graham from the case before it.

2013In Discount City, supra, the Court reaffirmed the principle that “where a fee simple is being condemned, negotiations will take place with the fee owner alone.” 205 N.J. at 407 , 16 A.3d 300 (citing Cynwyd Invs., supra, 148 N.J. at 70-71 , 689 A.2d 712 ).

2013In Discount City, supra, the Court reaffirmed the principle that “where a fee simple is being condemned, negotiations will take place with the fee owner alone.” 205 N.J. at 407 , 16 A.3d 300 (citing Cynwyd Invs., supra, 148 N.J. at 70-71 , 689 A.2d 712 ).

2010In both Medici, 107 N.J. at 18 , 526 A. 2d 109 , and Burbridge, 117 N.J. at 385 , 568 A. 2d 527 , the Court reaffirmed the principle stated in Kohl v. Mayor of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 275 , 234 A. 2d 385 (1967), that "[v]ariances to allow new nonconforming uses should be granted only sparingly and with great caution since they tend to impair sound zoning." The Court in Medici explained the reason for taking this restrictive view of the requirement of special reasons for granting a variance to allow a new nonconforming use: Although certain commercial uses may inherently serve the general welfa

2010In both Medici, 107 N.J. at 18 , 526 A. 2d 109 , and Burbridge, 117 N.J. at 385 , 568 A. 2d 527 , the Court reaffirmed the principle stated in Kohl v. Mayor of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 275 , 234 A. 2d 385 (1967), that "[v]ariances to allow new nonconforming uses should be granted only sparingly and with great caution since they tend to impair sound zoning." The Court in Medici explained the reason for taking this restrictive view of the requirement of special reasons for granting a variance to allow a new nonconforming use: Although certain commercial uses may inherently serve the general welfa

2010In both Medici, 107 N.J. at 18 , 526 A. 2d 109 , and Burbridge, 117 N.J. at 385 , 568 A. 2d 527 , the Court reaffirmed the principle stated in Kohl v. Mayor of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 275 , 234 A. 2d 385 (1967), that "[v]ariances to allow new nonconforming uses should be granted only sparingly and with great caution since they tend to impair sound zoning." The Court in Medici explained the reason for taking this restrictive view of the requirement of special reasons for granting a variance to allow a new nonconforming use: Although certain commercial uses may inherently serve the general welfa

2010In both Medici, 107 N.J. at 18 , 526 A. 2d 109 , and Burbridge, 117 N.J. at 385 , 568 A. 2d 527 , the Court reaffirmed the principle stated in Kohl v. Mayor of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 275 , 234 A. 2d 385 (1967), that "[v]ariances to allow new nonconforming uses should be granted only sparingly and with great caution since they tend to impair sound zoning." The Court in Medici explained the reason for taking this restrictive view of the requirement of special reasons for granting a variance to allow a new nonconforming use: Although certain commercial uses may inherently serve the general welfa

2010In both Medici, 107 N.J. at 18 , 526 A. 2d 109 , and Burbridge, 117 N.J. at 385 , 568 A. 2d 527 , the Court reaffirmed the principle stated in Kohl v. Mayor of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 275 , 234 A. 2d 385 (1967), that "[v]ariances to allow new nonconforming uses should be granted only sparingly and with great caution since they tend to impair sound zoning." The Court in Medici explained the reason for taking this restrictive view of the requirement of special reasons for granting a variance to allow a new nonconforming use: Although certain commercial uses may inherently serve the general welfa

2010In both Medici, 107 N.J. at 18 , 526 A. 2d 109 , and Burbridge, 117 N.J. at 385 , 568 A. 2d 527 , the Court reaffirmed the principle stated in Kohl v. Mayor of Fair Lawn, 50 N.J. 268, 275 , 234 A. 2d 385 (1967), that "[v]ariances to allow new nonconforming uses should be granted only sparingly and with great caution since they tend to impair sound zoning." The Court in Medici explained the reason for taking this restrictive view of the requirement of special reasons for granting a variance to allow a new nonconforming use: Although certain commercial uses may inherently serve the general welfa

2010For such uses, any benefit to the general welfare derives not from the use itself but from the development of a site in the community that is particularly appropriate for that very enterprise. [ 107 N.J. at 18 , 526 A. 2d 109 .] In Stop & Shop Supermarket Company v. Board of Adjustment of Springfield, 162 N.J. 418, 431 , 744 A. 2d 1169 (2000), the Court held that when a property owner applies for a use variance for a commercial use that is not inherently beneficial, the required proof of special reasons focuses exclusively on the special characteristics of the property and imposes on the appli

2010For such uses, any benefit to the general welfare derives not from the use itself but from the development of a site in the community that is particularly appropriate for that very enterprise. [ 107 N.J. at 18 , 526 A. 2d 109 .] In Stop & Shop Supermarket Company v. Board of Adjustment of Springfield, 162 N.J. 418, 431 , 744 A. 2d 1169 (2000), the Court held that when a property owner applies for a use variance for a commercial use that is not inherently beneficial, the required proof of special reasons focuses exclusively on the special characteristics of the property and imposes on the appli

2007In the course of the opinion, the Court reminded us that “the doctrine ... arise[s] from ... underlying concepts of fundamental fairness in the exercise of governmental power.” Id. at 209, 456 A.2d 390 .

2007In Mount Laurel II, supra, the Court reaffirmed the doctrine and fashioned a procedure for use by trial courts to determine municipalities’ obligation to provide the opportunity for low- and moderate-income housing. 92 N.J. at 220-23, 456 A.2d 390 .

2007The trial court reaffirmed the principle that “ ‘[b]ecause the right to vote is the bedrock upon which the entire structure of our system of government rests, our jurisprudence is steadfastly committed to the [principle] that election laws must be liberally construed to effectuate the overriding public policy in favor of the enfranchisement of voters.’ ” (quoting Afran v. County of Somerset, 244 N.J.Super. 229, 232 , 581 A.2d 1359 (App.Div.1990)).

2007The trial court reaffirmed the principle that “ ‘[b]ecause the right to vote is the bedrock upon which the entire structure of our system of government rests, our jurisprudence is steadfastly committed to the [principle] that election laws must be liberally construed to effectuate the overriding public policy in favor of the enfranchisement of voters.’ ” (quoting Afran v. County of Somerset, 244 N.J.Super. 229, 232 , 581 A.2d 1359 (App.Div.1990)).

2007Finally, in 287 Corporate Center Associates. v. Township of Bridgewater, 101 F. 3d 320 (3d Cir.1996), acknowledging that neither 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 , nor the Fifth Amendment include a statute of limitations provision, the court reaffirmed the principle that, in such situations, "we must look to the most `appropriate' or `analogous' state statute of limitations." Id. at 323 (quoting Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 , 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942 , 85 L.Ed. 2d 254, 261 (1985)).

2001The Court reaffirmed the principle that "`[p]roperly analyzed, joint custody is comprised of two elements-legal custody and physical custody[.]'" Id. at 595-96 , 660 A. 2d 485 (quoting Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486 , 432 A. 2d 63 (1981)).

2001The Court reaffirmed the principle that "`[p]roperly analyzed, joint custody is comprised of two elements-legal custody and physical custody[.]'" Id. at 595-96 , 660 A. 2d 485 (quoting Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486 , 432 A. 2d 63 (1981)).

2001The Court reaffirmed the principle that "`[p]roperly analyzed, joint custody is comprised of two elements-legal custody and physical custody[.]'" Id. at 595-96 , 660 A. 2d 485 (quoting Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486 , 432 A. 2d 63 (1981)).

2001The Court reaffirmed the principle that "`[p]roperly analyzed, joint custody is comprised of two elements-legal custody and physical custody[.]'" Id. at 595-96 , 660 A. 2d 485 (quoting Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486 , 432 A. 2d 63 (1981)).

1999Bauer v. City of Newark, 7 N.J. 426, 434 , 81 A.2d 727 (1951).

1999Bauer v. City of Newark, 7 N.J. 426, 434 , 81 A.2d 727 (1951).

1999Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the principle of broad sovereign immunity for Indian tribes observing that "Congress, subject to constitutional limitation, can alter its limits through explicit legislation." Id. at 759 , 118 S.Ct. 1700 .

1999Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the principle of broad sovereign immunity for Indian tribes observing that "Congress, subject to constitutional limitation, can alter its limits through explicit legislation." Id. at 759 , 118 S.Ct. 1700 .

1997Id. at 35, 384 A.2d 1086 .

1995Affirming the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the plaintiffs cause of action against Ench, this Court reaffirmed the principle endorsed by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Younkers, supra, that “' “there is an inference that the actor remains in his general employment so long as, by the service rendered another, he is performing the business entrusted to him by the general employer.” ’ ” 13 N.J. at 6 , 97 A.2d 680 (quoting Younkers, supra, 130 N.J.L. at 610 , 33 A.2d 898 (quoting Restatement of Agency § 227 cmt. (b) (1933))).

1995Affirming the Appellate Division's reinstatement of the plaintiff's cause of action against Ench, this Court reaffirmed the principle endorsed by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Younkers, supra, that "`"there is an inference that the actor remains in his general employment so long as, by the service rendered another, he is performing the business entrusted to him by the general employer."'" 13 N.J. at 6 , 97 A. 2d 680 (quoting Younkers, supra, 130 N.J.L. at 610 , 33 A. 2d 898 (quoting Restatement of Agency § 227 cmt. (b) (1933))).

1995A leading case in New Jersey’s borrowed-servant jurisprudence is Viggiano, supra, 55 N.J.Super. 114 , 150 A.2d 40 , which involved a claim for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the driver of a dump truck that had been leased by the plaintiffs employer in connection with the construction of a utility plant.

1995A leading case in New Jersey’s borrowed-servant jurisprudence is Viggiano, supra, 55 N.J.Super. 114 , 150 A.2d 40 , which involved a claim for personal injuries caused by the negligence of the driver of a dump truck that had been leased by the plaintiffs employer in connection with the construction of a utility plant.

1995Affirming the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the plaintiffs cause of action against Ench, this Court reaffirmed the principle endorsed by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Younkers, supra, that “' “there is an inference that the actor remains in his general employment so long as, by the service rendered another, he is performing the business entrusted to him by the general employer.” ’ ” 13 N.J. at 6 , 97 A.2d 680 (quoting Younkers, supra, 130 N.J.L. at 610 , 33 A.2d 898 (quoting Restatement of Agency § 227 cmt. (b) (1933))).

1995Affirming the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the plaintiffs cause of action against Ench, this Court reaffirmed the principle endorsed by the Court of Errors and Appeals in Younkers, supra, that “' “there is an inference that the actor remains in his general employment so long as, by the service rendered another, he is performing the business entrusted to him by the general employer.” ’ ” 13 N.J. at 6 , 97 A.2d 680 (quoting Younkers, supra, 130 N.J.L. at 610 , 33 A.2d 898 (quoting Restatement of Agency § 227 cmt. (b) (1933))).

1994And in Ross v. Transport of New Jersey, 114 N.J. 132, 142 , 553 A. 2d 12 (1989), the Court reaffirmed the principle that the "status of a self-insured is considered the equivalent of insurance, thus requiring the provision of UM coverage. [1] None of the linchpins of the Transport of New Jersey and Christy rationale apply to UIM.

1994And in Ross v. Transport of New Jersey, 114 N.J. 132, 142 , 553 A. 2d 12 (1989), the Court reaffirmed the principle that the "status of a self-insured is considered the equivalent of insurance, thus requiring the provision of UM coverage. [1] None of the linchpins of the Transport of New Jersey and Christy rationale apply to UIM.