reaffirmed rule in Wisconsin

2005Id. at 533 .

1983Co., 217 Wis. 601 , 258 N.W. 846 (1935), this court reaffirmed the rule that procedural stipulations “ ‘are always understood to have reference to the trial then pending, and not as stipulations which shall bind at any future trial.’ ” Id. at 605 , quoting Weisbrod v. Chicago & N.W.

1983Co., 217 Wis. 601 , 258 N.W. 846 (1935), this court reaffirmed the rule that procedural stipulations “ ‘are always understood to have reference to the trial then pending, and not as stipulations which shall bind at any future trial.’ ” Id. at 605 , quoting Weisbrod v. Chicago & N.W.

1980In Konigsberg , the Court reaffirmed the principle that "constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk." 366 U.S. at 50 .

1980The Court has consistently recognized that: [G]eneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental interest involved. 366 U.S. at 50 -51 .

1979Id. at 137 .

1976In State v. George (1975), 69 Wis. 2d 92, 98 , 230 N. W. 2d 253 , this court reaffirmed the test for determining existence of double jeopardy as it relates to the facts supporting the separate charges: “In Anderson v. State (1936), 221 Wis. 78, 87 , 256 N. W. 210 , this court adopted the following test to determine whether, subsequent to a prosecution on an indictment (or complaint), another prosecution on a different indictment (or complaint) would entail a violation of the right against double jeopardy: if ‘ “. . . ‘facts alleged under either of the indictments would, if proved under the oth

1976In State v. George (1975), 69 Wis. 2d 92, 98 , 230 N. W. 2d 253 , this court reaffirmed the test for determining existence of double jeopardy as it relates to the facts supporting the separate charges: “In Anderson v. State (1936), 221 Wis. 78, 87 , 256 N. W. 210 , this court adopted the following test to determine whether, subsequent to a prosecution on an indictment (or complaint), another prosecution on a different indictment (or complaint) would entail a violation of the right against double jeopardy: if ‘ “. . . ‘facts alleged under either of the indictments would, if proved under the oth

1976In State v. George (1975), 69 Wis. 2d 92, 98 , 230 N. W. 2d 253 , this court reaffirmed the test for determining existence of double jeopardy as it relates to the facts supporting the separate charges: “In Anderson v. State (1936), 221 Wis. 78, 87 , 256 N. W. 210 , this court adopted the following test to determine whether, subsequent to a prosecution on an indictment (or complaint), another prosecution on a different indictment (or complaint) would entail a violation of the right against double jeopardy: if ‘ “. . . ‘facts alleged under either of the indictments would, if proved under the oth

1976In State v. George (1975), 69 Wis. 2d 92, 98 , 230 N. W. 2d 253 , this court reaffirmed the test for determining existence of double jeopardy as it relates to the facts supporting the separate charges: “In Anderson v. State (1936), 221 Wis. 78, 87 , 256 N. W. 210 , this court adopted the following test to determine whether, subsequent to a prosecution on an indictment (or complaint), another prosecution on a different indictment (or complaint) would entail a violation of the right against double jeopardy: if ‘ “. . . ‘facts alleged under either of the indictments would, if proved under the oth

1972In Semons Department Store v. ILHR Department (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 518, 523 , 184 N. W. 2d 871 , this court reaffirmed the standard on review in workmen’s compensation cases: “ ‘The question is not whether there is credible evidence in the record to sustain a finding the commission did not make, but whether there is any credible evidence to sustain the finding the commission did make.’ Unruh v. Industrial Comm. (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 394, 398 , 99 N. W. 2d 182 .” In Worsch v. ILHR Department (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 504, 512, 513 , 175 N. W. 2d 201 , this court restated the governing principles where there

1972In Semons Department Store v. ILHR Department (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 518, 523 , 184 N. W. 2d 871 , this court reaffirmed the standard on review in workmen’s compensation cases: “ ‘The question is not whether there is credible evidence in the record to sustain a finding the commission did not make, but whether there is any credible evidence to sustain the finding the commission did make.’ Unruh v. Industrial Comm. (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 394, 398 , 99 N. W. 2d 182 .” In Worsch v. ILHR Department (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 504, 512, 513 , 175 N. W. 2d 201 , this court restated the governing principles where there

1972In Semons Department Store v. ILHR Department (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 518, 523 , 184 N. W. 2d 871 , this court reaffirmed the standard on review in workmen’s compensation cases: “ ‘The question is not whether there is credible evidence in the record to sustain a finding the commission did not make, but whether there is any credible evidence to sustain the finding the commission did make.’ Unruh v. Industrial Comm. (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 394, 398 , 99 N. W. 2d 182 .” In Worsch v. ILHR Department (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 504, 512, 513 , 175 N. W. 2d 201 , this court restated the governing principles where there

1972In Semons Department Store v. ILHR Department (1971), 50 Wis. 2d 518, 523 , 184 N. W. 2d 871 , this court reaffirmed the standard on review in workmen’s compensation cases: “ ‘The question is not whether there is credible evidence in the record to sustain a finding the commission did not make, but whether there is any credible evidence to sustain the finding the commission did make.’ Unruh v. Industrial Comm. (1959), 8 Wis. 2d 394, 398 , 99 N. W. 2d 182 .” In Worsch v. ILHR Department (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 504, 512, 513 , 175 N. W. 2d 201 , this court restated the governing principles where there

1972In Kohler Co. v. ILHR Department (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 396 , 167 N. W. 2d 431 , this court reaffirmed the principle of Kurschner insofar as it applies to occupational diseases and to other nonschedule and nonrelative injuries.

1972In Kohler Co. v. ILHR Department (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 396 , 167 N. W. 2d 431 , this court reaffirmed the principle of Kurschner insofar as it applies to occupational diseases and to other nonschedule and nonrelative injuries.

1971In Cheney v. State (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 454 , 171 N. W. 2d 339 , 174 N. W. 2d 1 , decided at the time sec. 971.23, Stats., was a proposed bill, this court reaffirmed the rule of prior cases that the right to pretrial discovery would not be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. *621 In Abraham v. State (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 44 , 176 N. W. 2d 349 , this court refused to apply sec. 971.23 (4), Stats., dealing with pretrial notice of physical evidence, retroactively to cover a conviction occurring prior to July 1,1970.

1971In Cheney v. State (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 454 , 171 N. W. 2d 339 , 174 N. W. 2d 1 , decided at the time sec. 971.23, Stats., was a proposed bill, this court reaffirmed the rule of prior cases that the right to pretrial discovery would not be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. *621 In Abraham v. State (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 44 , 176 N. W. 2d 349 , this court refused to apply sec. 971.23 (4), Stats., dealing with pretrial notice of physical evidence, retroactively to cover a conviction occurring prior to July 1,1970.

1971In Cheney v. State (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 454 , 171 N. W. 2d 339 , 174 N. W. 2d 1 , decided at the time sec. 971.23, Stats., was a proposed bill, this court reaffirmed the rule of prior cases that the right to pretrial discovery would not be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. *621 In Abraham v. State (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 44 , 176 N. W. 2d 349 , this court refused to apply sec. 971.23 (4), Stats., dealing with pretrial notice of physical evidence, retroactively to cover a conviction occurring prior to July 1,1970.

1971In Cheney v. State (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 454 , 171 N. W. 2d 339 , 174 N. W. 2d 1 , decided at the time sec. 971.23, Stats., was a proposed bill, this court reaffirmed the rule of prior cases that the right to pretrial discovery would not be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. *621 In Abraham v. State (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 44 , 176 N. W. 2d 349 , this court refused to apply sec. 971.23 (4), Stats., dealing with pretrial notice of physical evidence, retroactively to cover a conviction occurring prior to July 1,1970.

1964The court reasoned that since it was without power to grant affirmative relief, it could not declare an existing statute unconstitutional leaving the state without election machinery. *561 Again, the court grounded its result in the rationale of Colegrove v. Green, supra: “Furthermore, as the United States supreme court recently declared in its decision in Colegrove v. Green (1946), 328 U. S. 549 , 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 90 L.

1964The court reasoned that since it was without power to grant affirmative relief, it could not declare an existing statute unconstitutional leaving the state without election machinery. *561 Again, the court grounded its result in the rationale of Colegrove v. Green, supra: “Furthermore, as the United States supreme court recently declared in its decision in Colegrove v. Green (1946), 328 U. S. 549 , 66 Sup. Ct. 1198, 90 L.

1948The law devolves such title as the ancestor may have had in and to the real estate upon his heirs, and, as said in Walling v. Thomas, 133 Ala. 426, 430 , 31 South. 982 , ‘the jurisdiction of a court of equity rests upon the equitable right [of the heirs] to be invested with [their] succession.’ ” The court thereupon made the statement criticized by plaintiffs that although the deed was voidable by the grantor it would vest title in the grantee until it was voided by her and that her death without rescission had the same effect as though she.had affirmed it in her lifetime.