7 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1933–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sheppard v. Geneva Rockgreen1 sentence2023There, the court reaffirmed the standard it had set forth in Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9 , 179 P.3d 754 , namely that expert testimony is not necessarily required to prove that a particular injury caused certain damages when the link between injury and treatment “would be clear to a lay juror who has no medical training—i.e., when the causal connection is readily apparent using only common knowledge.” Sheppard, 2021 UT 31, ¶ 31 (quotation simplified); see Bowman, 2008 UT 9, ¶ 9 . | 1 | 1 |
Bowman v. Kalmgreen2 sentences2023There, the court reaffirmed the standard it had set forth in Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9 , 179 P.3d 754 , namely that expert testimony is not necessarily required to prove that a particular injury caused certain damages when the link between injury and treatment “would be clear to a lay juror who has no medical training—i.e., when the causal connection is readily apparent using only common knowledge.” Sheppard, 2021 UT 31, ¶ 31 (quotation simplified); see Bowman, 2008 UT 9, ¶ 9 . 2023There, the court reaffirmed the standard it had set forth in Bowman v. Kalm, 2008 UT 9 , 179 P.3d 754 , namely that expert testimony is not necessarily required to prove that a particular injury caused certain damages when the link between injury and treatment “would be clear to a lay juror who has no medical training—i.e., when the causal connection is readily apparent using only common knowledge.” Sheppard, 2021 UT 31, ¶ 31 (quotation simplified); see Bowman, 2008 UT 9, ¶ 9 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. McGeegreen2 sentences2015Seq, e.g., State v. Martinez, 23 Utah 2d 62 , 457 P.2d 613, 614 (1969) (first instance of this court applying Chapman, concluding that alleged Miranda and Fourth Amendment violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. McGee, 24 Utah 2d 396 , 473 P.2d 388, 391 (1970) (applying the standard without citing to authority). 2015Seq, e.g., State v. Martinez, 23 Utah 2d 62 , 457 P.2d 613, 614 (1969) (first instance of this court applying Chapman, concluding that alleged Miranda and Fourth Amendment violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. McGee, 24 Utah 2d 396 , 473 P.2d 388, 391 (1970) (applying the standard without citing to authority). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2015Seq, e.g., State v. Martinez, 23 Utah 2d 62 , 457 P.2d 613, 614 (1969) (first instance of this court applying Chapman, concluding that alleged Miranda and Fourth Amendment violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. McGee, 24 Utah 2d 396 , 473 P.2d 388, 391 (1970) (applying the standard without citing to authority). 2015Seq, e.g., State v. Martinez, 23 Utah 2d 62 , 457 P.2d 613, 614 (1969) (first instance of this court applying Chapman, concluding that alleged Miranda and Fourth Amendment violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. McGee, 24 Utah 2d 396 , 473 P.2d 388, 391 (1970) (applying the standard without citing to authority). | 1 | 1 |
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1995The Court held in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11, 15-16 , 69 S.Ct. 1434, 1442-43 , 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1948), that a governmental taking of a laundry’s intangible “trade routes,” meaning customer lists and continued patronage, required just compensation. 1995The Court held in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11, 15-16 , 69 S.Ct. 1434, 1442-43 , 93 L.Ed. 1765 (1948), that a governmental taking of a laundry’s intangible “trade routes,” meaning customer lists and continued patronage, required just compensation. | 1 | 1 |
Berry by and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraftgreen1 sentence1987Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 676 (Utah 1985); see also 16A C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Delaware v. Van Arsdall
green
2 sentences2015And the Court reaffirmed this principle in Delo-ware v. Van Arsdall with language this court has often employed: "[AJn otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 475 U.S. 673, 681 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). 138 Neither Chapman nor Van Arsdall specified whether this federal standard applies with equal force to preserved and un-preserved trial errors, and we acknowledge that our precedent on this issue has not been consistent. 10 In the ye 2015And the Court reaffirmed this principle in Delo-ware v. Van Arsdall with language this court has often employed: "[AJn otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 475 U.S. 673, 681 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). 138 Neither Chapman nor Van Arsdall specified whether this federal standard applies with equal force to preserved and un-preserved trial errors, and we acknowledge that our precedent on this issue has not been consistent. 10 In the ye | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Payton v. New York
green
2 sentences1986The Court therefore reaffirmed the rule that all that is required is that there be “ ‘probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 741-42 , 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). 1986The Court therefore reaffirmed the rule that all that is required is that there be “ ‘probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 741-42 , 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Brinegar v. United States
green
2 sentences1986Under that standard, an officer must only have a reasonable belief “that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct....” A ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.” Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 , 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). 1986Under that standard, an officer must only have a reasonable belief “that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct....” A ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.” Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 , 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 , 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1311 , 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
In re Flint
green
2 sentences1986After statehood, this Court reaffirmed that principle in In re Flint, 25 Utah 338 , 71 P. 531 (1903), and Mutart v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246 , 170 P. 67 (1917). 1986After statehood, this Court reaffirmed that principle in In re Flint, 25 Utah 338 , 71 P. 531 (1903), and Mutart v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246 , 170 P. 67 (1917). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Mutart v. Pratt
green
2 sentences1986After statehood, this Court reaffirmed that principle in In re Flint, 25 Utah 338 , 71 P. 531 (1903), and Mutart v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246 , 170 P. 67 (1917). 1986After statehood, this Court reaffirmed that principle in In re Flint, 25 Utah 338 , 71 P. 531 (1903), and Mutart v. Pratt, 51 Utah 246 , 170 P. 67 (1917). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Texas v. Brown
green
2 sentences1986The Court therefore reaffirmed the rule that all that is required is that there be “ ‘probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 741-42 , 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). 1986The Court therefore reaffirmed the rule that all that is required is that there be “ ‘probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity.’ ” Id. at 741-42 , 103 S.Ct. at 1543 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 , 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Cullen v. Harris
neutral
2 sentences1933In the case of Cullen v. Harris et al., 27 Utah 4 , 73 P. 1048 , this court reaffirmed the doctrine that an order denying the motion to correct a judgment may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment if properly preserved in the record: “The respondents contend that this appeal should be dismissed for the reason that the order appealed from is not a final judgment. 1933In the case of Cullen v. Harris et al., 27 Utah 4 , 73 P. 1048 , this court reaffirmed the doctrine that an order denying the motion to correct a judgment may be reviewed on appeal from the judgment if properly preserved in the record: “The respondents contend that this appeal should be dismissed for the reason that the order appealed from is not a final judgment. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.