reaffirmed rule in Arkansas

2004Cf. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100 , 102 , 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990) (regarding territorial jurisdiction for peace officers, wherein the court reaffirmed the rule, previously stated in City of Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334 , 340 , 197 S.W. 686 (1917), that "[t]he authority of municipal corporations to exercise powers beyond their territorial limits must be derived from some state statute, either expressly conferring such powers or granting them by necessary implication.") The other Code sections cited in Ordinance 2004-4 represent general sources of municipal regulatory power (A.C.A. § 14-56-201 )

2004Cf. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100 , 102 , 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990) (regarding territorial jurisdiction for peace officers, wherein the court reaffirmed the rule, previously stated in City of Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334 , 340 , 197 S.W. 686 (1917), that "[t]he authority of municipal corporations to exercise powers beyond their territorial limits must be derived from some state statute, either expressly conferring such powers or granting them by necessary implication.") The other Code sections cited in Ordinance 2004-4 represent general sources of municipal regulatory power (A.C.A. § 14-56-201 )

2004Cf. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100 , 102 , 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990) (regarding territorial jurisdiction for peace officers, wherein the court reaffirmed the rule, previously stated in City of Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334 , 340 , 197 S.W. 686 (1917), that "[t]he authority of municipal corporations to exercise powers beyond their territorial limits must be derived from some state statute, either expressly conferring such powers or granting them by necessary implication.") The other Code sections cited in Ordinance 2004-4 represent general sources of municipal regulatory power (A.C.A. § 14-56-201 )

2004Cf. Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100 , 102 , 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990) (regarding territorial jurisdiction for peace officers, wherein the court reaffirmed the rule, previously stated in City of Argenta v. Keath, 130 Ark. 334 , 340 , 197 S.W. 686 (1917), that "[t]he authority of municipal corporations to exercise powers beyond their territorial limits must be derived from some state statute, either expressly conferring such powers or granting them by necessary implication.") The other Code sections cited in Ordinance 2004-4 represent general sources of municipal regulatory power (A.C.A. § 14-56-201 )

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1960A. (N. S.) 772 the court said: “Color of title is not necessary to give title by adverse possession, but it is necessary to extend the title acquired beyond the limits of the actual possession.” (Emphasis supplied.) In the case of Dickson v. Sentell, 83 Ark. 385 , 104 S. W. 148 , the court was dealing with adverse possession based on an indefinite description, and the court said: ‘ ‘ This description is so vague that it does not constitute color of title, so that possession of part will be considered possession of the whole.” Likewise in the case of Bailey, Trustee v. Martin, 218 Ark. 513 , 23

1946In Norden v. Martin, 202 Ark. 180 , 149 S. W. 2d 550 , this court reaffirmed the rule laid down in the ease of Russell v. Webb, 96 Ark. 190 , 131 S. W. 456 , as follows: “It is well settled that declarations and admissions of one in possession of land, relating’ to the title thereof and adverse to his interest, are admissible against him; and declarations and admissions of a person made while in possession, adverse to his title are admissible against his successors in interest and all who claim under him.” See, also, England v. Scott, 205 Ark. 47 , 166 S. W. 2d 1014 .

1946In Norden v. Martin, 202 Ark. 180 , 149 S. W. 2d 550 , this court reaffirmed the rule laid down in the ease of Russell v. Webb, 96 Ark. 190 , 131 S. W. 456 , as follows: “It is well settled that declarations and admissions of one in possession of land, relating’ to the title thereof and adverse to his interest, are admissible against him; and declarations and admissions of a person made while in possession, adverse to his title are admissible against his successors in interest and all who claim under him.” See, also, England v. Scott, 205 Ark. 47 , 166 S. W. 2d 1014 .

1946In Norden v. Martin, 202 Ark. 180 , 149 S. W. 2d 550 , this court reaffirmed the rule laid down in the ease of Russell v. Webb, 96 Ark. 190 , 131 S. W. 456 , as follows: “It is well settled that declarations and admissions of one in possession of land, relating’ to the title thereof and adverse to his interest, are admissible against him; and declarations and admissions of a person made while in possession, adverse to his title are admissible against his successors in interest and all who claim under him.” See, also, England v. Scott, 205 Ark. 47 , 166 S. W. 2d 1014 .

1946In Norden v. Martin, 202 Ark. 180 , 149 S. W. 2d 550 , this court reaffirmed the rule laid down in the ease of Russell v. Webb, 96 Ark. 190 , 131 S. W. 456 , as follows: “It is well settled that declarations and admissions of one in possession of land, relating’ to the title thereof and adverse to his interest, are admissible against him; and declarations and admissions of a person made while in possession, adverse to his title are admissible against his successors in interest and all who claim under him.” See, also, England v. Scott, 205 Ark. 47 , 166 S. W. 2d 1014 .

1946In Norden v. Martin, 202 Ark. 180 , 149 S. W. 2d 550 , this court reaffirmed the rule laid down in the ease of Russell v. Webb, 96 Ark. 190 , 131 S. W. 456 , as follows: “It is well settled that declarations and admissions of one in possession of land, relating’ to the title thereof and adverse to his interest, are admissible against him; and declarations and admissions of a person made while in possession, adverse to his title are admissible against his successors in interest and all who claim under him.” See, also, England v. Scott, 205 Ark. 47 , 166 S. W. 2d 1014 .

1946In Norden v. Martin, 202 Ark. 180 , 149 S. W. 2d 550 , this court reaffirmed the rule laid down in the ease of Russell v. Webb, 96 Ark. 190 , 131 S. W. 456 , as follows: “It is well settled that declarations and admissions of one in possession of land, relating’ to the title thereof and adverse to his interest, are admissible against him; and declarations and admissions of a person made while in possession, adverse to his title are admissible against his successors in interest and all who claim under him.” See, also, England v. Scott, 205 Ark. 47 , 166 S. W. 2d 1014 .

1944Digest, *unimproved and uninclosed land shall be deemed and held to be in the possession of the person who pays the taxes thereon, if he have color of title thereto,’ etc.” In Smith v. Southern Kraft Corp. supra, the court reaffirmed the rule here contended for and said: “We reaffirm this rule; but it must be said that it is not one which may or should be applied in all cases and under all circumstances.

1932The court reaffirmed the doctrine of Harvey v. Dewoody, 18 Ark. 252 .

1932None of these cases in any way modify or change the rule announced in the case of Thorton v. Findley, 97 Ark. 432 , 134 S. W. 627 .

1932None of these cases in any way modify or change the rule announced in the case of Thorton v. Findley, 97 Ark. 432 , 134 S. W. 627 .

1930R. 1194, this court reaffirmed the rule of law regarding the force an officer may use in making arrests, and preventing escapes after arrest in misdemeanor cases, as stated by the court in the earlier case of Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502 , 18 S. W. 854 , 15 L.

1930R. 1194, this court reaffirmed the rule of law regarding the force an officer may use in making arrests, and preventing escapes after arrest in misdemeanor cases, as stated by the court in the earlier case of Thomas v. Kinkead, 55 Ark. 502 , 18 S. W. 854 , 15 L.

1930It is settled by the principles of law announced in Grable v. Blackwood, 180 Ark. 311 , that the diversion of the funds from the purposes declared in the Severance Tax Law and the Income Tax Act of 1929, and the appropriation of them to a different purpose is not viola-tive of the provisions of article 5, § 23 of the Constitution, as an appropriation by reference, which, is prohibited by the section of the Constitution just referred to.

1930In Stanley v. Gates, 179 Ark. 886 , 19 S. W. (2d) 1000 , the court reaffirmed the principle announced in earlier cases that, unless inhibited by some constitutional provision, the Legislature has full power over all matters of taxation and the collection and disbursement of taxes.

1930In Stanley v. Gates, 179 Ark. 886 , 19 S. W. (2d) 1000 , the court reaffirmed the principle announced in earlier cases that, unless inhibited by some constitutional provision, the Legislature has full power over all matters of taxation and the collection and disbursement of taxes.

1924This was first decided in the case of Athletic M. & S. Co. v. Sharp, 135 Ark. 330 , and, after full reconsideration of the subject, the court reaffirmed the rule in the case of Rice v. Lonoke-Cabot Road Imp.

1924Dist., 142 Ark. 454 .

1921In Beasley v. Equitable Securities Co., 72 Ark. 601 , the court reaffirmed this doctrine and declined to overrule White v. Stokes, supra. The principal item about which there is a dispute in the master’s account is the rent for the four years from 1916 to 1919, inclusive.

1914In the case of Ward v. Sturdivant, 81 Ark. 73 , the court reaffirmed the rule announced in the Doster case, and said that while such a deed is good between the parties, a creditor may elect to treat it as a nullity, and that when he recovers judgment against the fraudulent grantor he may levy his execution on the property and subject it to sale for the satisfaction of his debt.

1845The State, 1 Ark.