reaffirmed rule in Oklahoma

1937Cr. 582 , 139 Pac. 1156, 1158 , the court reaffirmed the doctrine that, if the property alleged to have been stolen by the defendant was taken, honestly, believing it- to- be his, there was no' felonious intent.

1929Cr. 582 , 139 Pac. 1156, 1158 , the court reaffirmed the doctrine that, if the property alleged to have been stolen was taken by the defendant, honestly believing it to be his, there was no felonious intent.

2007In California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991), the Court reaffirmed its rule announced in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-22 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2171-72 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), that probable cause justifying a search of a vehicle extends to all containers in the vehicle.

2007In California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991), the Court reaffirmed its rule announced in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-22 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2171-72 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), that probable cause justifying a search of a vehicle extends to all containers in the vehicle.

2007In California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991), the Court reaffirmed its rule announced in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-22 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2171-72 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), that probable cause justifying a search of a vehicle extends to all containers in the vehicle.

2007In California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 , 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1991 , 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991), the Court reaffirmed its rule announced in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-22 , 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2171-72 , 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), that probable cause justifying a search of a vehicle extends to all containers in the vehicle.

1999Thus, the revocation of the defendant’s suspended sentence was affirmed. ¶ 18 This Court reaffirmed the principle of Brooks in Anderson v. State, 1971 OK CR 386 , 489 P.2d 797 .

1999Thus, the revocation of the defendant’s suspended sentence was affirmed. ¶ 18 This Court reaffirmed the principle of Brooks in Anderson v. State, 1971 OK CR 386 , 489 P.2d 797 .

1978In United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 , 97 S.Ct. 20 , 50 L.Ed.2d 17 (1976), the Court reaffirmed the test set forth in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 578 , 22 U.S. 578 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824) to be *335 applied when the trial judge declares a mistrial.

1978In United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 , 97 S.Ct. 20 , 50 L.Ed.2d 17 (1976), the Court reaffirmed the test set forth in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 578 , 22 U.S. 578 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824) to be *335 applied when the trial judge declares a mistrial.

1978In United States v. Sanford, 429 U.S. 14 , 97 S.Ct. 20 , 50 L.Ed.2d 17 (1976), the Court reaffirmed the test set forth in United States v. Perez, 9 Wheat. 578 , 22 U.S. 578 , 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824) to be *335 applied when the trial judge declares a mistrial.

1957What constitutes such reasonable time is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” In Ross v. Choctaw Lumber Co., supra [ 176 Okla. 399 , 55 P.2d 1042 ], this court reaffirmed the rule announced in Mitchell-Crittenden Tie Co. v. Crawford, supra, and in the opinion therein said: “The reason for such a rule is obvious.

1945The distinction is between enforcing an illegal contract, and asserting title to money and property which has arisen from it.” In the later case of White v. Little, 131 Okla. 132 , 268 P. 221 , this court considered a fact situation almost identical with the instant case.

1945The distinction is between enforcing an illegal contract, and asserting title to money and property which has arisen from it.” In the later case of White v. Little, 131 Okla. 132 , 268 P. 221 , this court considered a fact situation almost identical with the instant case.

1945While the contract with Stiles was -illegal, it was carried ■out and effectuated, and the title to the property taken by Barnes and Dalton was, beyond dispute, taken by them for the company upon consideration paid by it and its members, and it is not necessary for the company to invoke the aid of the illegal contract referred to, for the purpose of recovering ■or asserting their rights here.” In the case of Thurlwell v. Rabbit, 110 Okla. 285 , 235 P. 923 , this court reaffirmed the rule announced by the Territorial Supreme Court in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus in the following language

1945While the contract with Stiles was -illegal, it was carried ■out and effectuated, and the title to the property taken by Barnes and Dalton was, beyond dispute, taken by them for the company upon consideration paid by it and its members, and it is not necessary for the company to invoke the aid of the illegal contract referred to, for the purpose of recovering ■or asserting their rights here.” In the case of Thurlwell v. Rabbit, 110 Okla. 285 , 235 P. 923 , this court reaffirmed the rule announced by the Territorial Supreme Court in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus in the following language

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1940Therein the court reaffirmed the rule announced in the case of Brink v. Canfield, supra, and after quoting at length from that opinion, it was held: “The district or superior courts of this state are without jurisdiction to enter a valid judgment divesting a full-blood Indian of title to inherited, allotted, restricted Indian lands by entering a decree quieting title in a party asserting title to such lands under void conveyance executed in violation of a federal statute prescribing the manner by which title may be acquired in such lands.” Other cases in harmony with the rule so announced are

1940Therein the court reaffirmed the rule announced in the case of Brink v. Canfield, supra, and after quoting at length from that opinion, it was held: “The district or superior courts of this state are without jurisdiction to enter a valid judgment divesting a full-blood Indian of title to inherited, allotted, restricted Indian lands by entering a decree quieting title in a party asserting title to such lands under void conveyance executed in violation of a federal statute prescribing the manner by which title may be acquired in such lands.” Other cases in harmony with the rule so announced are

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1940Bank v. Ford, 93 Okla. 289 , 220 P. 833 ; Bilby v. Harrison, 100 Okla. 67 , 227 P. 407 ; Balthrop v. Clark, Adm’r, 94 Okla. 294 , 222 P. 520 ; Eysenbach v. Naharkey, 110 Okla. 207 , 236 P. 619 ; Cotton v. McClendon, 128 Okla. 48 , 261 P. 150 .

1939Cr. 133 , 135 P. 428 , 47 L.R.A., N.S., 1036, the court reaffirmed the doctrine set forth herein, that the acts of the officer rightly in possession of the office and under color of title are valid as against *211 third persons and cannot be questioned in a collateral attack.

1937Cr. 278 , 207 Pac. 454 , the court reaffirmed the doctrine that a party cannot be convicted on uncorroborated testimony of accomplices.

1937Citing Thompson v. State, 9 Okla.

1936Cr. 454 , 42 Pac. (2d) 286 , this court reaffirmed the doctrine laid down in Horton v. State, supra. The court carefully considered the motion and amended motion of the defendant for a new trial and overruled the same.

1936In Allen v. State, 49 Okla.

1933Cr. 219 , 18 Pac. (2d) 281 , this court reaffirmed the doctrine in the Stacy Case, but went a step further, and said: “The experiments were not made with the finger prints of defendant, but with those of other persons for the purpose of testing the ability of the witness to identify finger prints made by different or particular persons.

1929Cr. 45 , 279 Pac. 968 , this court reaffirmed the rule laid down in Hogan v. State, supra. Where the statute enumerates several acts disjunctively, which separately or together shall constitute the offense, the indictment, if it charges more than one of them, which it may do, and that, too, in the same count, should do. so in the conjunctive.

1929Cr. 86 , 274 Pac. 696 , this court reaffirmed the rule heretofore laid down, that evidence of other stolen property recently stolen and found in the possession of the defendant was competent as tending to establish a theft of other articles by the defendant at or about the plan or scheme to steal and rob.

1913The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that it was within the discretion of the court to permit the jury to take a *117 forged time cheek to their jury room for further inspection during their deliberations. ’ Harshaw v. State, 94 Ark. 343 , 127 S. W. 745 .

1913The Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that it was within the discretion of the court to permit the jury to take a *117 forged time cheek to their jury room for further inspection during their deliberations. ’ Harshaw v. State, 94 Ark. 343 , 127 S. W. 745 .

1913R. 152 , 136 S. W. 465 , the same court reaffirmed this doctrine.

1905R. v. Dawson et al . 62 Tex. Rep. 260 , in these words: "The present weight of authority is to the effect that a railroad corporation can bind itself to maintain perpetually a permanent depot at a particular place." *Page 351 Another case is Louisville N. A. C.