reaffirmed rule in Nebraska

1997In reviewing the plaintiff's Article VIII, § 4 challenge, the court reaffirmed the principle that an impermissible commutation of taxes occurs "when tax funds raised in one [school] district are diverted entirely to the benefit of another [school] district." Id. at 471, 544 N.W.2d at 337 (citing State ex rel.

1997School Dist. v. Ellis , 160 Neb. 400 , 70 N.W.2d 320 (1955); State ex rel.

1997School Dist. v. Ellis , 160 Neb. 400 , 70 N.W.2d 320 (1955); State ex rel.

1994In Eno v. Watkins, 229 Neb. 855 , 429 N.W.2d 371 (1988), this court reaffirmed the principle of law that unless the character of the injury is objective, there must be expert medical testimony to establish the causation and the extent and nature of the injuries.

1994In Eno v. Watkins, 229 Neb. 855 , 429 N.W.2d 371 (1988), this court reaffirmed the principle of law that unless the character of the injury is objective, there must be expert medical testimony to establish the causation and the extent and nature of the injuries.

1994This court reaffirmed that rule in Seymour v. Street, 5 Neb. 85 (1876), citing Blodgett for the proposition that absence from the state, as contemplated by the tolling statute, meant that period in which the right to proceed in court and reduce the claim to judgment was suspended.

1994Similarly, Talcott v. Bennett, 49 Neb. 569 , 68 N.W. 931 (1896), held that concealment or absconding as used within the tolling statute meant such absence from the state as affects the commencement of judicial proceedings in Nebraska.

1994Similarly, Talcott v. Bennett, 49 Neb. 569 , 68 N.W. 931 (1896), held that concealment or absconding as used within the tolling statute meant such absence from the state as affects the commencement of judicial proceedings in Nebraska.

1989Recently, in State v. Trevino, 230 Neb. 494 , 432 N.W.2d 503 (1988), this court reaffirmed the rule of State v. Ammons, 208 Neb. 812 , 305 N.W.2d 812 (1981), that it is not for an expert to suggest to a jury how a witness’ testimony shall be weighed or evaluated.

1989Recently, in State v. Trevino, 230 Neb. 494 , 432 N.W.2d 503 (1988), this court reaffirmed the rule of State v. Ammons, 208 Neb. 812 , 305 N.W.2d 812 (1981), that it is not for an expert to suggest to a jury how a witness’ testimony shall be weighed or evaluated.

1989Recently, in State v. Trevino, 230 Neb. 494 , 432 N.W.2d 503 (1988), this court reaffirmed the rule of State v. Ammons, 208 Neb. 812 , 305 N.W.2d 812 (1981), that it is not for an expert to suggest to a jury how a witness’ testimony shall be weighed or evaluated.

1989Recently, in State v. Trevino, 230 Neb. 494 , 432 N.W.2d 503 (1988), this court reaffirmed the rule of State v. Ammons, 208 Neb. 812 , 305 N.W.2d 812 (1981), that it is not for an expert to suggest to a jury how a witness’ testimony shall be weighed or evaluated.

1989(See, also, State v. Beermann, ante p. 380, 436 N.W.2d 499 (1989), concerning the general impropriety of one witness’ testifying about the weight to be given another’s testimony.) The district court’s determination not to admit Sardeson’s proffered evidence therefore having been, far from an abuse of discretion, the only correct ruling possible, Sardeson’s fourth assignment of error is clearly without merit. 5.

1976Nebraska Railroads of Omaha v. Nebco, Inc., 194 Neb. 322 , 231 N. W. 2d 505 .

1976Nebraska Railroads of Omaha v. Nebco, Inc., 194 Neb. 322 , 231 N. W. 2d 505 .

1967This rule was established by the Supreme, Court of the United States as early as Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371 , 11 S. Ct., 808 , 35 L.

1967This rule was established by the Supreme, Court of the United States as early as Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371 , 11 S. Ct., 808 , 35 L.

1967As recently as Hartwig v. Berggren, 179 Neb. 718 , 140 N. W. 2d 22 , this court reaffirmed the rule that the meander lines of a river as established by the original government survey are not boundary lines unless made so by the instrument of conveyance.

1967As recently as Hartwig v. Berggren, 179 Neb. 718 , 140 N. W. 2d 22 , this court reaffirmed the rule that the meander lines of a river as established by the original government survey are not boundary lines unless made so by the instrument of conveyance.

1951The Iowa guest cases are exhaustively reviewed in Russell v. Turner, 56 F. Supp. 455 , and on appeal in 148 F. 2d 562 , wherein the court points out the difficulty involved in attempting to reconcile all the decisions of the Supreme Court of that state.

1951Also, the rule is that: “It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to the degree of corroboration required in a divorce action, as each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.” Johnsen v. Johnsen, 144 Neb. 208 , 12 N. W. 2d 837 .

1951Also, the rule is that: “It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to the degree of corroboration required in a divorce action, as each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances.” Johnsen v. Johnsen, 144 Neb. 208 , 12 N. W. 2d 837 .

1951As late as Stefan v. Stefan, 152 Neb. 23 , 39 N. W. 2d 918 , this court reaffirmed the rule that: “In an action for divorce if the evidence is principally oral and is in irreconcilable conflict, and the determination of the issues depends upon the reliability of the respective witnesses, the conclusion of the trial court as to such reliability will be carefully regarded by this court on a review.” See, also, Trevett v. Trevett, 151 Neb. 517 , 38 N. W. 2d 332 .

1951As late as Stefan v. Stefan, 152 Neb. 23 , 39 N. W. 2d 918 , this court reaffirmed the rule that: “In an action for divorce if the evidence is principally oral and is in irreconcilable conflict, and the determination of the issues depends upon the reliability of the respective witnesses, the conclusion of the trial court as to such reliability will be carefully regarded by this court on a review.” See, also, Trevett v. Trevett, 151 Neb. 517 , 38 N. W. 2d 332 .

1951“The court will give the words used in the information their ordinary and commonly accepted meaning, and when viewed in this light, if the words employed mean the same thing as those found in the language of the statute denouncing the offense, the information will be upheld.” In Pauli v. State, 151 Neb. 385 , 37 N. W. 2d 717 , it was held: “An information which apprises the defendant, 'with reasonable certainty, of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense and plead the judgment as a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same *73 offense, meets fundamental purposes of informa

1951“The court will give the words used in the information their ordinary and commonly accepted meaning, and when viewed in this light, if the words employed mean the same thing as those found in the language of the statute denouncing the offense, the information will be upheld.” In Pauli v. State, 151 Neb. 385 , 37 N. W. 2d 717 , it was held: “An information which apprises the defendant, 'with reasonable certainty, of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense and plead the judgment as a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same *73 offense, meets fundamental purposes of informa

1951“The court will give the words used in the information their ordinary and commonly accepted meaning, and when viewed in this light, if the words employed mean the same thing as those found in the language of the statute denouncing the offense, the information will be upheld.” In Pauli v. State, 151 Neb. 385 , 37 N. W. 2d 717 , it was held: “An information which apprises the defendant, 'with reasonable certainty, of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense and plead the judgment as a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same *73 offense, meets fundamental purposes of informa

1951“The court will give the words used in the information their ordinary and commonly accepted meaning, and when viewed in this light, if the words employed mean the same thing as those found in the language of the statute denouncing the offense, the information will be upheld.” In Pauli v. State, 151 Neb. 385 , 37 N. W. 2d 717 , it was held: “An information which apprises the defendant, 'with reasonable certainty, of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense and plead the judgment as a bar to subsequent prosecution for the same *73 offense, meets fundamental purposes of informa

1951As late as Stefan v. Stefan, 152 Neb. 23 , 39 N. W. 2d 918 , this court reaffirmed the rule that: “In an action for divorce if the evidence is principally oral and is in irreconcilable conflict, and the determination of the issues depends upon the reliability of the respective witnesses, the conclusion of the trial court as to such reliability will be carefully regarded by this court on a review.” See, also, Trevett v. Trevett, 151 Neb. 517 , 38 N. W. 2d 332 .

1951As late as Stefan v. Stefan, 152 Neb. 23 , 39 N. W. 2d 918 , this court reaffirmed the rule that: “In an action for divorce if the evidence is principally oral and is in irreconcilable conflict, and the determination of the issues depends upon the reliability of the respective witnesses, the conclusion of the trial court as to such reliability will be carefully regarded by this court on a review.” See, also, Trevett v. Trevett, 151 Neb. 517 , 38 N. W. 2d 332 .

1951The Iowa guest cases are exhaustively reviewed in Russell v. Turner, 56 F. Supp. 455 , and on appeal in 148 F. 2d 562 , wherein the court points out the difficulty involved in attempting to reconcile all the decisions of the Supreme Court of that state.

1951Recklessness implies ‘no care, coupled with disregard for consequences.’ ” In Hebert v. Allen (Iowa), 41 N. W. 2d 240 , the court reaffirmed the rule in the Puth case, and stated that there had been no essential departure from it, and that it had the merit of being abstract, a necessary quality since it must be applied to widely differing facts.

1947As recently as Jackson v. Olson, supra, this court reaffirmed the rule that: “Where an information charges the crime of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and manslaughter áre included in the charge, the degree ordinarily being for the jury; and where the evidence and circumstances of the killing are such that different inferences may properly be drawn therefrom as to the degree, the court should submit the different degrees to the jury for them to draw the inference.” See, also, Denison v. State, 117 Neb. 601 , 221 N. W. 683 ; and Jackson v. State, 133 Neb. 786 , 277 N. W

1947As recently as Jackson v. Olson, supra, this court reaffirmed the rule that: “Where an information charges the crime of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and manslaughter áre included in the charge, the degree ordinarily being for the jury; and where the evidence and circumstances of the killing are such that different inferences may properly be drawn therefrom as to the degree, the court should submit the different degrees to the jury for them to draw the inference.” See, also, Denison v. State, 117 Neb. 601 , 221 N. W. 683 ; and Jackson v. State, 133 Neb. 786 , 277 N. W

1947As recently as Jackson v. Olson, supra, this court reaffirmed the rule that: “Where an information charges the crime of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and manslaughter áre included in the charge, the degree ordinarily being for the jury; and where the evidence and circumstances of the killing are such that different inferences may properly be drawn therefrom as to the degree, the court should submit the different degrees to the jury for them to draw the inference.” See, also, Denison v. State, 117 Neb. 601 , 221 N. W. 683 ; and Jackson v. State, 133 Neb. 786 , 277 N. W

1947As recently as Jackson v. Olson, supra, this court reaffirmed the rule that: “Where an information charges the crime of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree and manslaughter áre included in the charge, the degree ordinarily being for the jury; and where the evidence and circumstances of the killing are such that different inferences may properly be drawn therefrom as to the degree, the court should submit the different degrees to the jury for them to draw the inference.” See, also, Denison v. State, 117 Neb. 601 , 221 N. W. 683 ; and Jackson v. State, 133 Neb. 786 , 277 N. W

1946In Rexroat v. State, 143 Neb. 333 , 9 N. W. 2d 305 , this court reaffirmed the rule that “The right to tax attorney’s fees in compensation cases is purely statutory.” In that case we construed section 48-125, R.

1946In Rexroat v. State, 143 Neb. 333 , 9 N. W. 2d 305 , this court reaffirmed the rule that “The right to tax attorney’s fees in compensation cases is purely statutory.” In that case we construed section 48-125, R.