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17 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1930–2022 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rhew v. Feltongreen2 sentences2022This Court reaffirmed this requirement and later held: “A supporting spouse’s ability to pay an alimony award is generally determined by the supporting spouse’s income at the time of the award.” Rhew v. Felton, 178 N.C. 2022This Court reaffirmed this requirement and later held: “A supporting spouse’s ability to pay an alimony award is generally determined by the supporting spouse’s income at the time of the award.” Rhew v. Felton, 178 N.C. | 2 | 2 |
Adams v. Williamsgreen2 sentences1981In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 612, 617 (1972), the Court reaffirmed the principle of Terry that “[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” The standard set forth in Terry and reaffirmed in Adams clearly falls short of the traditional notion of probable cause, which is required for an arrest. 1981In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923 , 32 L.Ed. 2d 612, 617 (1972), the Court reaffirmed the principle of Terry that “[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time.” The standard set forth in Terry and reaffirmed in Adams clearly falls short of the traditional notion of probable cause, which is required for an arrest. | 2 | 2 |
Brown v. . Comrs. of Richmond Countygreen2 sentences1996Justice Orr, writing for the majority, quoted with approval Brown v. Board of Comm'rs of Richmond Co., 223 N.C. 744, 746 , 28 S.E.2d 104, 105-06 (1943): "[T]he Legislature has no power to compel or even to authorize a municipal corporation to pay a gratuity to an individual to adjust a claim which the municipality is under no legal obligation to pay. 1996Justice Orr, writing for the majority, quoted with approval Brown v. Board of Comm'rs of Richmond Co., 223 N.C. 744, 746 , 28 S.E.2d 104, 105-06 (1943): "[T]he Legislature has no power to compel or even to authorize a municipal corporation to pay a gratuity to an individual to adjust a claim which the municipality is under no legal obligation to pay. | 1 | 1 |
Guthrie v. North Carolina State Ports Authoritygreen2 sentences1993Guthrie v. State Ports Authority, 307 N.C. 522, 534 , 299 S.E.2d 618, 625 (1983) (stating that no action can be maintained against the State of North Carolina or an agency thereof unless it consents to be sued or upon its waiver of immunity, and such immunity is absolute and unqualified). 1993Guthrie v. State Ports Authority, 307 N.C. 522, 534 , 299 S.E.2d 618, 625 (1983) (stating that no action can be maintained against the State of North Carolina or an agency thereof unless it consents to be sued or upon its waiver of immunity, and such immunity is absolute and unqualified). | 1 | 1 |
FIRST UNION NAT. BANK OF CAROLINA v. Hackneygreen1 sentence1984Bank v. Hackney, supra, at 20, 145 S.E. 2d at 355. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Stephenson v. Bartlett
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 371–72. ¶ 140 More recently, this Court reaffirmed this principle in Harper, 2022-NCSC-17. 2022Id. at 371–72. ¶ 140 More recently, this Court reaffirmed this principle in Harper, 2022-NCSC-17. | 3 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2018This Court reaffirmed that principle in a similar case decided three years later, State v. Williams , 305 N.C. 656 , 292 S.E.2d 243 , cert. denied , 459 U.S. 1056 , 103 S.Ct. 474 , 74 L.Ed.2d 622 (1982). 2018This Court reaffirmed that principle in a similar case decided three years later, State v. Williams , 305 N.C. 656 , 292 S.E.2d 243 , cert. denied , 459 U.S. 1056 , 103 S.Ct. 474 , 74 L.Ed.2d 622 (1982). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Smith v. North Carolina; Williams v. North Carolina; And Pinch v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2018RODRIGUEZ Martin, C.J., dissenting later, State v. Williams, 305 N.C. 656 , 292 S.E.2d 243 , cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 , 103 S. Ct. 474 (1982). 2018This Court reaffirmed that principle in a similar case decided three years later, State v. Williams , 305 N.C. 656 , 292 S.E.2d 243 , cert. denied , 459 U.S. 1056 , 103 S.Ct. 474 , 74 L.Ed.2d 622 (1982). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Kirkman v. State Highway Commission
green
2 sentences2006The Court reaffirmed this rule in Kirkman , explaining that "[l]oss of profits or injury to a growing business conducted on property or connected therewith are not elements of recoverable damages in an award for the taking under the power of eminent domain." 257 N.C. at 432 , 126 S.E.2d at 110 . 2006The Court reaffirmed this rule in Kirkman , explaining that "[l]oss of profits or injury to a growing business conducted on property or connected therewith are not elements of recoverable damages in an award for the taking under the power of eminent domain." 257 N.C. at 432 , 126 S.E.2d at 110 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Leete v. County of Warren
green
2 sentences1996However, in Leete v. County of Warren, 341 N.C. 116 , 462 S.E.2d 476 (1995), this Court reaffirmed the principle that a municipality must have a legal obligation to make a payment in order to distribute governmental funds. 1996However, in Leete v. County of Warren, 341 N.C. 116 , 462 S.E.2d 476 (1995), this Court reaffirmed the principle that a municipality must have a legal obligation to make a payment in order to distribute governmental funds. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Lynch
green
2 sentences1994Recently in State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402 , 432 S.E.2d 349 (1993), this Court reaffirmed the rule “prohibiting the State from eliciting *353 details of prior convictions other than the name of the crime and the time, place, and punishment for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a) in the guilt-innocence phase of a criminal trial.” 334 N.C. at 410, 432 S.E.2d at 353 . 1994Recently in State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402 , 432 S.E.2d 349 (1993), this Court reaffirmed the rule “prohibiting the State from eliciting *353 details of prior convictions other than the name of the crime and the time, place, and punishment for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a) in the guilt-innocence phase of a criminal trial.” 334 N.C. at 410, 432 S.E.2d at 353 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
State v. Keller
green
2 sentences1983When this Court reaffirmed the rule again three years later in State v. Keller, 297 N.C. 674 , 256 S.E.2d 710 (1979), we explained the reason for the rule: the jury must be allowed to decide whether to infer that the defendant did premeditate and deliberate the killing. 1983When this Court reaffirmed the rule again three years later in State v. Keller, 297 N.C. 674 , 256 S.E.2d 710 (1979), we explained the reason for the rule: the jury must be allowed to decide whether to infer that the defendant did premeditate and deliberate the killing. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. . Newsome
green
2 sentences1976When, however, the State relies upon evidence tending to show . . . deliberation and premeditation, the Jury should be instructed that if they fail to find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder . . . was committed after deliberation and premeditation, they should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, provided, of course, they shall find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the murder.” 195 N.C. at 563-64 , 143 S.E. at 193 . 1976When, however, the State relies upon evidence tending to show . . . deliberation and premeditation, the Jury should be instructed that if they fail to find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the murder . . . was committed after deliberation and premeditation, they should return a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree, provided, of course, they shall find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the murder.” 195 N.C. at 563-64 , 143 S.E. at 193 . | 1 | 1976–1976 |
State v. . Tankersley
neutral
1 sentence1930To make a case of culpable negligence at common law it is necessary, under our decisions, to show a higher degree of negligence than is required to establish negligent default in a civil action (S. v. Tankersley, 172 N. C., 955 ) ; but if a person does an act which is in breach of a positive law designed to prevent injury to the person, which is likely to produce death or great bodily harm, and which proximately causes death, . . . such person is guilty of manslaughter. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
State v. . Rountree
neutral
1 sentence1930While the conviction of the defendant in S. v. Rountree, 181 N. C., 535 , was maintainable upon the ground of his culpable negligence at common law, the Court reaffirmed the principle stated in M-cIver’s case and remarked that if the defendant was operating his machine in disregard of the statute he was engaged in an unlawful act. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.