14 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1942–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hoyt Street Properties LLC v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2011Furthermore, Father Frank Knusel spoke with the Defendant's office on behalf of Plaintiff regarding the exemption application and was "instructed by the assessor's office to file in 2 separate requests for exemption for `late filing.'" (Aff of Father Frank Knusel at 3.) "In the context of summary judgment, the `proof positive' requirement is understood by the court to create `a more stringent proof requirement.' Although taxpayers are still permitted `all reasonable inferences' under [TCR] 47 C, those inferences `must provide strong support' for the conclusion that the department misled taxpay 2007See TCR 47 C. 4 In the context of summary judgment, the "proof positive" requirement is understood by the court to create "a more stringent proof requirement." Hoyt Street Properties , 18 OTR at 319 . | 1 | 2 |
In re Mohammedgreen1 sentence2019See In re Mohammed , 536 B.R. 351 , 357-58 (Bankr. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Connall v. Rothgreen2 sentences1980Rather, the state’s burden is to persuade the magistrate by other competent evidence that the proof or presumption of guilt is evident or strong. 258 Or at 433, 435 . 1980Rather, the state's burden is to persuade the magistrate by other competent evidence that the proof or presumption of guilt is evident or strong. 258 Or. at 433, 435 , 482 P.2d 740 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Menillogreen2 sentences1971State v. Menillo, 159 Conn 264, 268 A2d 667, 674 (1970); In re Steigler, 250 A2d 379 (Del 1969); Ford v. Dilley, supra; Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky 388, 35 SW2d 563 (1931); State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ 367, 164 A2d 740 , 89 ALR2d 345 (1960); Application of Wheeler, 81 Nev 495, 406 P2d 713 (1965); Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 RI 596, 253 A2d 609 (1969). 1971State v. Menillo, 159 Conn 264, 268 A2d 667, 674 (1970); In re Steigler, 250 A2d 379 (Del 1969); Ford v. Dilley, supra; Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky 388, 35 SW2d 563 (1931); State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ 367, 164 A2d 740 , 89 ALR2d 345 (1960); Application of Wheeler, 81 Nev 495, 406 P2d 713 (1965); Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 RI 596, 253 A2d 609 (1969). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
SAIF Corp. v. Walker
green
2 sentences2004The court held only that a symptomatic worsening may meet the proof standard for an aggravation if a medical expert concludes that the “symptoms demonstrate the existence of a worsened condition.” Walker, 330 Or at 118 . 2001We explained that “a symptomatic worsening may meet the proof standard for an actual worsening if a medical expert concludes that the ‘symptoms demonstrate the existence of a worsened condition.’ [Walker, 330 Or at 118 .] To be sure, evidence of a symptomatic worsening, in and of itself, does not permit a factfinder to infer an actual worsening. | 4 | 2000–2004 |
Modoc Lumber Co. v. EBI Companies
neutral
1 sentence2020Id. at 602-03 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
In Re Randall Todd Nielsen in Re Jerri Lea Nielsen, Debtors, Sharon White v. Randall Todd Nielsen Jerri Lea Nielsen
green
1 sentence2019Nielsen , 383 F.3d at 926-27 ; see also Fed. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
M&S Market, Inc. v. Department of Revenue
neutral
2 sentences2011Furthermore, Father Frank Knusel spoke with the Defendant's office on behalf of Plaintiff regarding the exemption application and was "instructed by the assessor's office to file in 2 separate requests for exemption for `late filing.'" (Aff of Father Frank Knusel at 3.) "In the context of summary judgment, the `proof positive' requirement is understood by the court to create `a more stringent proof requirement.' Although taxpayers are still permitted `all reasonable inferences' under [TCR] 47 C, those inferences `must provide strong support' for the conclusion that the department misled taxpay 2011Furthermore, Father Frank Knusel spoke with the Defendant's office on behalf of Plaintiff regarding the exemption application and was "instructed by the assessor's office to file in 2 separate requests for exemption for `late filing.'" (Aff of Father Frank Knusel at 3.) "In the context of summary judgment, the `proof positive' requirement is understood by the court to create `a more stringent proof requirement.' Although taxpayers are still permitted `all reasonable inferences' under [TCR] 47 C, those inferences `must provide strong support' for the conclusion that the department misled taxpay | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sidhu v. Department of Revenue
green
1 sentence2011Furthermore, Father Frank Knusel spoke with the Defendant's office on behalf of Plaintiff regarding the exemption application and was "instructed by the assessor's office to file in 2 separate requests for exemption for `late filing.'" (Aff of Father Frank Knusel at 3.) "In the context of summary judgment, the `proof positive' requirement is understood by the court to create `a more stringent proof requirement.' Although taxpayers are still permitted `all reasonable inferences' under [TCR] 47 C, those inferences `must provide strong support' for the conclusion that the department misled taxpay | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Virgel E. Flemister v. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner, Social Security Administration
green
1 sentence2006In re Consolidated Pioneer Mortgage, 178 BR 222 (BAP 9th Cir 1995), aff'd mem, 91 F3d 151 (1996). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Ashford v. Consolidated Pioneer Mortgage (In Re Consolidated Pioneer Mortgage)
green
1 sentence2006In re Consolidated Pioneer Mortgage, 178 BR 222 (BAP 9th Cir 1995), aff'd mem, 91 F3d 151 (1996). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Zockert v. Fanning
green
2 sentences2001Defendant, on the other hand, argues that in the absence of legislation to the contrary, ORS 10.095(5) requires a preponderance standard. 1 We agree with plaintiffs. *691 Zockert v. Fanning, 310 Or 514 , 800 P2d 773 (1990), describes two categories of civil cases in which the clear and convincing standard of proof might be proper. 2001Defendant, on the other hand, argues that in the absence of legislation to the contrary, ORS 10.095(5) requires a preponderance standard. 1 We agree with plaintiffs. *691 Zockert v. Fanning, 310 Or 514 , 800 P2d 773 (1990), describes two categories of civil cases in which the clear and convincing standard of proof might be proper. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Ex Parte Wheeler
green
1 sentence1971State v. Menillo, 159 Conn 264, 268 A2d 667, 674 (1970); In re Steigler, 250 A2d 379 (Del 1969); Ford v. Dilley, supra; Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky 388, 35 SW2d 563 (1931); State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ 367, 164 A2d 740 , 89 ALR2d 345 (1960); Application of Wheeler, 81 Nev 495, 406 P2d 713 (1965); Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 RI 596, 253 A2d 609 (1969). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Commonwealth v. Stahl
green
1 sentence1971State v. Menillo, 159 Conn 264, 268 A2d 667, 674 (1970); In re Steigler, 250 A2d 379 (Del 1969); Ford v. Dilley, supra; Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky 388, 35 SW2d 563 (1931); State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ 367, 164 A2d 740 , 89 ALR2d 345 (1960); Application of Wheeler, 81 Nev 495, 406 P2d 713 (1965); Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 RI 596, 253 A2d 609 (1969). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
State v. Konigsberg
green
1 sentence1971State v. Menillo, 159 Conn 264, 268 A2d 667, 674 (1970); In re Steigler, 250 A2d 379 (Del 1969); Ford v. Dilley, supra; Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky 388, 35 SW2d 563 (1931); State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ 367, 164 A2d 740 , 89 ALR2d 345 (1960); Application of Wheeler, 81 Nev 495, 406 P2d 713 (1965); Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 RI 596, 253 A2d 609 (1969). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Taglianetti v. Fontaine
green
1 sentence1971State v. Menillo, 159 Conn 264, 268 A2d 667, 674 (1970); In re Steigler, 250 A2d 379 (Del 1969); Ford v. Dilley, supra; Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky 388, 35 SW2d 563 (1931); State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ 367, 164 A2d 740 , 89 ALR2d 345 (1960); Application of Wheeler, 81 Nev 495, 406 P2d 713 (1965); Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 RI 596, 253 A2d 609 (1969). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
In Re Steigler
green
1 sentence1971State v. Menillo, 159 Conn 264, 268 A2d 667, 674 (1970); In re Steigler, 250 A2d 379 (Del 1969); Ford v. Dilley, supra; Commonwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky 388, 35 SW2d 563 (1931); State v. Konigsberg, 33 NJ 367, 164 A2d 740 , 89 ALR2d 345 (1960); Application of Wheeler, 81 Nev 495, 406 P2d 713 (1965); Taglianetti v. Fontaine, 105 RI 596, 253 A2d 609 (1969). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Thomas v. Gladden
neutral
2 sentences1967In Thomas v. Gladden, 239 Or 293, 295 , 397 P2d 836 (1964), this court said: “* * * He is entitled to bail as a matter of right unless the crime for which he has been convicted is one of those made not bailable by OES 140.020 * * OES 140.020 specifically prohibits the granting of bail to a defendant charged with murder in any degree if the proof or presumption of the guilt of the defendant is evident or strong. 1967In Thomas v. Gladden, 239 Or 293, 295 , 397 P2d 836 (1964), this court said: “* * * He is entitled to bail as a matter of right unless the crime for which he has been convicted is one of those made not bailable by OES 140.020 * * OES 140.020 specifically prohibits the granting of bail to a defendant charged with murder in any degree if the proof or presumption of the guilt of the defendant is evident or strong. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Schmurr v. State Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1942Schmurr v. State Insurance Co., 30 Or. 29 , 46 P. 363 (1896); Misskelley v. Home Life Ins. 1942Schmurr v. State Insurance Co., 30 Or. 29 , 46 P. 363 (1896); Misskelley v. Home Life Ins. | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Squires v. Modern Brotherhood
green
2 sentences1942Squires v. Modern Brotherhood, 68 Or. 336 at 350 , 135 P. 774 (1913); Ringo v. Automobile Insurance Co., 143 Or. 420 , 22 P. (2d) 887 (1933). 1942Squires v. Modern Brotherhood, 68 Or. 336 at 350 , 135 P. 774 (1913); Ringo v. Automobile Insurance Co., 143 Or. 420 , 22 P. (2d) 887 (1933). | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Ringo v. Automobile Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1942Squires v. Modern Brotherhood, 68 Or. 336 at 350 , 135 P. 774 (1913); Ringo v. Automobile Insurance Co., 143 Or. 420 , 22 P. (2d) 887 (1933). 1942Squires v. Modern Brotherhood, 68 Or. 336 at 350 , 135 P. 774 (1913); Ringo v. Automobile Insurance Co., 143 Or. 420 , 22 P. (2d) 887 (1933). | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.