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41 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1955–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Momon v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 168 (Tenn.1999); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 . 2015See Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 168 (Tenn.1999); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 . | 5 | 5 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen2 sentences2015See Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 168 (Tenn.1999); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 . 2015See Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 168 (Tenn.1999); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 . | 4 | 4 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2025In State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 578 (Tenn. 1993), our supreme court upheld the admission of evidence in the defendant’s trial on three counts of first degree premeditated murder that the defendant had pending charges aggravated assault of two of the victims at the time of the murders pursuant to Rule 404(b) as evidence of motive and intent while concluding that the State was not required to prove that the defendant actually committed the charged aggravated assaults by clear and convincing evidence. 2015In State v. Smith, 868 S.W.2d 561, 578 (Tenn. 1993), our supreme court upheld the trial court’s admission of “evidence that the Defendant had been charged with the aggravated assaults of two of the victims” under Rule 404(b). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Ricegreen2 sentences2015See Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 168 (Tenn. 1999); see also Van Ardsall, 475 U.S. at 684 . -5- In State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 670-71 (Tenn. 2006), we applied similar factors in determining whether an erroneous curtailment of cross-examination and exclusion of testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 2015See Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 168 (Tenn. 1999); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684 . -5- In State v. Rice, 184 S.W.3d 646, 670-71 (Tenn. 2006), we applied similar factors in determining whether an erroneous curtailment of cross-examination and exclusion of testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Miltongreen2 sentences1998Id.; State v. Milton, 673 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tenn. Crim. 1998Id.; State v. Milton, 673 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Harkinsgreen2 sentences2002Id. 2000Id. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Rogersgreen2 sentences2011However, when “the proof or defense of one charge necessarily involves the proof or defense of another charge, sequential prosecutions of the two charges burden both the defendant and the state with repetitive presentation of evidence.” People v. Rogers, 742 P.2d at 919 . 2011Specifically, the court noted that “when ‘the proof or defense of one charge necessarily involves the proof or defense of another charge, sequential prosecutions of the two charges burden both the defendant and the state with repetitive presentation of evidence.’” Id. (quoting People v. Rogers, 742 P.2d 912, 919 (Colo. 1987)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cleavorgreen2 sentences2000For example, this Court in State v. Cleavor, 691 S.W.2d 541 (Tenn.1985), affirmed the denial of probation for a D.U.I. offender by finding that “[t]he need for deterrence is obvious,” even though the need for deterrence was not evident from the proof in the record. 691 S.W.2d at 543 . 2000For example, this Court in State v. Cleavor, 691 S.W.2d 541 (Tenn.1985), affirmed the denial of probation for a D.U.I. offender by finding that “[t]he need for deterrence is obvious,” even though the need for deterrence was not evident from the proof in the record. 691 S.W.2d at 543 . | 1 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Sizemore v. United Physicians Insurance Risk Retention Groupgreen2 sentences2025Id. at 561 . 2025Id. (noting that because the office administrator was the doctor’s employee, “her oversights regarding the filing of the proof of claim form are attributable to him” (citations omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Dellinger v. Stategreen1 sentence2024As such, “the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit of hindsight, may not second-guess a reasonably based trial strategy, and cannot criticize a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision made during the course of the proceedings.” Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Tenn. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mixongreen1 sentence2019See Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 673 n.17. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burlisongreen1 sentence2015The Defendant argues the court incorrectly denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal based upon the contradiction of the State’s proof by the defense proof. “[T]he accuracy of a trial court’s thirteenth juror determination,” however, “is not a subject of appellate review.” Id. (citing State v. Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Summers v. Stategreen1 sentence2015See Summers I, 212 S.W.3d at 258 . | 1 | 1 |
Griffin v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 60 , 112 S.Ct. 466 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (recognizing that, “if the evidence is insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury’s consideration”); State v. Smith, 656 S.W.2d 882, 888-89 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983) (holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to give an instruction not supported by the proof because such an instruction “would have done nothing more than confuse the jury”). 2010See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 60 , 112 S.Ct. 466 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (recognizing that, “if the evidence is insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury’s consideration”); State v. Smith, 656 S.W.2d 882, 888-89 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983) (holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to give an instruction not supported by the proof because such an instruction “would have done nothing more than confuse the jury”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence2010See Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 60 , 112 S.Ct. 466 , 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (recognizing that, “if the evidence is insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury’s consideration”); State v. Smith, 656 S.W.2d 882, 888-89 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983) (holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to give an instruction not supported by the proof because such an instruction “would have done nothing more than confuse the jury”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burnsgreen1 sentence2006As explained in State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 462 (Tenn. 1999), “[c]onduct that is unreasonable under the facts of one case may be perfectly reasonable under the facts of another.” In denying the post-conviction petition, the post-conviction court made the following findings of facts: An analysis of the proof at the hearing must start with this Court’s finding on the record at the conclusion of the hearing that petitioner’s testimony at the hearing on this petition lacked any indicia of credibility. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ashbygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Perrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Leggsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Provenzano v. Singletarygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Eurus Kelly Waters v. Albert G. Thomas, Warden Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Centergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Millsapsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roberts v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
STATE of Tennessee v. DeWayne COLLIER AKA Patrick Collier
green
2 sentences2017However, if the defendant renews his motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of all the evidence, he does not “waive his right to appeal the denial of the motion made at the close of all of the proof or to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.” Id. 2017However, if the defendant renews his motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of all the evidence, he does not “waive his right to appeal the denial of the motion made at the close of all of the proof or to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.” Id. | 3 | 2015–2017 |
Dusky v. United States
green
2 sentences2006His argument in this regard is twofold: the proof at the hearing established, under the standard set out in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 , 80 S.Ct. 788 , 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), he was not competent to stand trial; or, alternatively, the Dusky standard is unconstitutional, given the holding in Momon that a defendant has a constitutional right to testify. 2006His argument in this regard is twofold: the proof at the hearing established, under the standard set out in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 , 80 S.Ct. 788 , 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960), he was not competent to stand trial; or, alternatively, the Dusky standard is unconstitutional, given the holding in Momon that a defendant has a constitutional right to testify. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Overturf v. State
green
1 sentence2025However, if the defendant renews his motion for judgment of acquittal at the conclusion of all the evidence, he does not “waive his right to appeal the denial of the motion made at the close of all of the proof or to challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence.” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
1 sentence2024In his second amended post- conviction petition, the Petitioner asserted that “trial strategy development was consistent with ineffective assistance of counsel and contributed to [P]etitioner’s conviction.” The post-conviction court found that this allegation was “really a vague allegation with no factual support” and that the proof at the hearing did not “show a reasonable probability of a different outcome.” As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Estate of Amos v. Vanderbilt University
green
2 sentences2017Id. 2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Hall
green
1 sentence2016Shifting Burden of Proof The defendant also premises relief on her contention that allowing the State to present rebuttal evidence pursuant to State v. Hall, 958 S.W.2d 679 (Tenn. 1997), shifted the burden of proof to the defense in violation of her constitutional rights. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Carter
green
1 sentence2015The Defendant argues the court incorrectly denied the motion for a judgment of acquittal based upon the contradiction of the State’s proof by the defense proof. “[T]he accuracy of a trial court’s thirteenth juror determination,” however, “is not a subject of appellate review.” Id. (citing State v. Burlison, 868 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Stern v. Marshall
green
2 sentences2013In Waldman , the Sixth Circuit summarized the holding of Stem as follows: When a debtor pleads an action under federal bankruptcy law and seeks dis-allowance of a creditor’s proof of claim against the estate — as in Katchen [v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 , 86 S.Ct. 467 , 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) ] — the bankruptcy court’s authority is at its constitutional maximum. 131 S.Ct. at 2617-18 . 2013But when a debtor pleads an action arising only under state-law, as in Northern Pipeline [v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 458 U.S. 50 , 102 S.Ct. 2858 , 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) ]; or when the debtor pleads an action that would augment the bankrupt estate, but not “necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process[,]” 131 S.Ct. at 2618 ; then the bankruptcy court is constitutionally prohibited from entering final judgment. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Katchen v. Landy
green
2 sentences2013In Waldman , the Sixth Circuit summarized the holding of Stem as follows: When a debtor pleads an action under federal bankruptcy law and seeks dis-allowance of a creditor’s proof of claim against the estate — as in Katchen [v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 , 86 S.Ct. 467 , 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) ] — the bankruptcy court’s authority is at its constitutional maximum. 131 S.Ct. at 2617-18 . 2013In Waldman , the Sixth Circuit summarized the holding of Stem as follows: When a debtor pleads an action under federal bankruptcy law and seeks dis-allowance of a creditor’s proof of claim against the estate — as in Katchen [v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 , 86 S.Ct. 467 , 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) ] — the bankruptcy court’s authority is at its constitutional maximum. 131 S.Ct. at 2617-18 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Onkyo Europe Electronics GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In Re Global Technovations Inc.)
green
1 sentence2013Id. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.
red
2 sentences2013But when a debtor pleads an action arising only under state-law, as in Northern Pipeline [v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 458 U.S. 50 , 102 S.Ct. 2858 , 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) ]; or when the debtor pleads an action that would augment the bankrupt estate, but not “necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process[,]” 131 S.Ct. at 2618 ; then the bankruptcy court is constitutionally prohibited from entering final judgment. 2013But when a debtor pleads an action arising only under state-law, as in Northern Pipeline [v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 458 U.S. 50 , 102 S.Ct. 2858 , 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) ]; or when the debtor pleads an action that would augment the bankrupt estate, but not “necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process[,]” 131 S.Ct. at 2618 ; then the bankruptcy court is constitutionally prohibited from entering final judgment. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Moore
green
1 sentence2011Essentially, “any question as to whether offenses should be tried separately pursuant to Rule 14(b)(1) is ‘really a question of evidentiary relevance.’” Spicer, 12 S.W.3d at 445 (quoting Moore, 6 S.W.3d at 239 ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2011Specifically, the court noted that “when ‘the proof or defense of one charge necessarily involves the proof or defense of another charge, sequential prosecutions of the two charges burden both the defendant and the state with repetitive presentation of evidence.’” Id. (quoting People v. Rogers, 742 P.2d 912, 919 (Colo. 1987)). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Spicer v. State
green
1 sentence2011Essentially, “any question as to whether offenses should be tried separately pursuant to Rule 14(b)(1) is ‘really a question of evidentiary relevance.’” Spicer, 12 S.W.3d at 445 (quoting Moore, 6 S.W.3d at 239 ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Owens v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Kennamore green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Hayslip v. Wellford neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Norton v. Hines green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Priest v. Union Agency green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| City of Kingsport v. Quillen green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Daugherty v. State green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| McMahan v. Tucker green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.