proof hearing in Arkansas

1993Given the fact that a revocation can be had in circumstances where the proof requirement is less stringent, see Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), we find no error in revoking probation if a conviction has occurred, even though it may be on appeal.

1988Given the fact that a revocation can be had in circumstances where the proof requirement is less stringent, see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), we find no error in revoking probation if a conviction has occurred even though it may be on appeal.

1933Another affidavit or other proof of the publication than the one presented here could have been filed in the other case, and it is conclusively presumed, as against this collateral attack, that the notice was published and that all persons interested were, as the decree recites, “duly and constructively summoned as required by law.” In the case of Fiddyment v. Bateman, 97 Ark. 77 , 133 S. W. 192 , this court held: “Where an overdue tax decree recited that due notice was given by publication of warning order as required by law, it will be presumed on collateral attack that due notice was 'given

1932Among the numerous cases to this effect is that of Fiddyment v. Bateman, 97 Ark. 76 , 133 S. W. 192 , where it was held (to quote a headnote): “Where an overdue tax decree recited that due notice was given by publication of warning order as required by law, it will be presumed on collateral attack that due notice was given, though the proof of the warning order was defective in failing to show that the newspaper in which the publication was made had a bona fide circulation in the county and had been regularly published therein for one month before the date of the first publication of the warni

2024These four tests together read as follows: (1) Are the circuit court’s written findings accurate and consistent with the evidence; and (2) If any factual findings are not consistent with the evidence, are such inconsistencies material enough to warrant a reversal of the transfer order? (3) Does the written order provide enough detail and facts to support the court’s conclusions; and (4) Are there specific findings on the statutory factors tailored to the juvenile and the evidence? 2 In Spears, the denial of a juvenile-transfer motion was reversed and remanded by this court because we were unab

2024Spears v. State, 2019 Ark.

2024App. 576 , 591 S.W.3d 803 ; Lopez, 2021 Ark.

2014In Stern v. Marshall, ___U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to enter a final judgment when the counterclaim does not “stem[ ] from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process,” ___U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2618 , and a bankruptcy court does not have “constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim,” ___U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2620 .

2014In Stern v. Marshall, ___U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to enter a final judgment when the counterclaim does not “stem[ ] from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process,” ___U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2618 , and a bankruptcy court does not have “constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of claim,” ___U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2620 .

1987In Caraway Bank v. United States of America, 258 Ark. 858 , 529 S.W.2d 351 (1975), where the wrong township was used in the mortgage, we held that a third party lien claimant could have located the correct property by extrinsic evidence and by the mortgage itself.

1987In Caraway Bank v. United States of America, 258 Ark. 858 , 529 S.W.2d 351 (1975), where the wrong township was used in the mortgage, we held that a third party lien claimant could have located the correct property by extrinsic evidence and by the mortgage itself.

1892But does not the fact that the oil has been inspected, if such be the fact, lie peculiarly within the knowledge of the seller, and is nqtthe burden on him to prove it, and, upon his failure to do so, will it not be presumed that it was not inspected ? 1 Greenieaf on Evidence (14th ed.), sec. 79; Hopper v. State, 19 Ark., 146; Williams v. State, 35 Ark., 430; Farrall v. State, 32 Ala., 557, 559 .