proof standard in South Carolina

2009The question becomes one of fact for the jury, under the general principle that he who affirms must prove, and that every man is presumed innocent until the contrary appears.” Id. at 156-57 (citing State v. Coleman, 6 S.C. 185 (1875)).

2009The question becomes one of fact for the jury, under the general principle that he who affirms must prove, and that every man is presumed innocent until the contrary appears.” Id. at 156-57 (citing State v. Coleman, 6 S.C. 185 (1875)).

1998In In re Alton, 837 F.2d 457 (11th Cir.1988), the Eleventh Circuit discussed the efficacy of § 523(a)(3)(B): Section 523(a)(3)(B) specifically provides that when a debtor fails to list those debts incurred fraudulently or incurred because of malicious injury to another or lists them too late to allow a creditor to file a proof of claim and a dischargeability complaint in [a] timely manner, then those debts will be undischarged “unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request.” ...

1998In In re Alton, 837 F.2d 457 (11th Cir.1988), the Eleventh Circuit discussed the efficacy of § 523(a)(3)(B): Section 523(a)(3)(B) specifically provides that when a debtor fails to list those debts incurred fraudulently or incurred because of malicious injury to another or lists them too late to allow a creditor to file a proof of claim and a dischargeability complaint in [a] timely manner, then those debts will be undischarged "unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing and request." ...

1996Long, 246 S.C. at 238 , 143 S.E.2d at 466 . (2) Standard of Proof The standard of proof applicable in a case involving gift by parol of land is articulated in Smith v. Hanna, 215 S.C. 520 , 56 S.E.2d 339 (1949): Appellants, Anna Hanna and Mose Hanna, further contend that they are the beneficiaries of a gift by parol of the ten-acre tract.

1996Long, 246 S.C. at 238 , 143 S.E.2d at 466 . (2) Standard of Proof The standard of proof applicable in a case involving gift by parol of land is articulated in Smith v. Hanna, 215 S.C. 520 , 56 S.E.2d 339 (1949): Appellants, Anna Hanna and Mose Hanna, further contend that they are the beneficiaries of a gift by parol of the ten-acre tract.

1996Long, 246 S.C. at 238 , 143 S.E.2d at 466 . (2) Standard of Proof The standard of proof applicable in a case involving gift by parol of land is articulated in Smith v. Hanna, 215 S.C. 520 , 56 S.E.2d 339 (1949): Appellants, Anna Hanna and Mose Hanna, further contend that they are the beneficiaries of a gift by parol of the ten-acre tract.

1996Long, 246 S.C. at 238 , 143 S.E.2d at 466 . (2) Standard of Proof The standard of proof applicable in a case involving gift by parol of land is articulated in Smith v. Hanna, 215 S.C. 520 , 56 S.E.2d 339 (1949): Appellants, Anna Hanna and Mose Hanna, further contend that they are the beneficiaries of a gift by parol of the ten-acre tract.

1991Thus, for the first time, this Court must face the difficult task of interpreting the Baldasar decision. [2] Baldasar was decided after the decision in Scott v. Illinois , 440 U.S. 367 , 99 S.Ct. 1158 , 59 L.Ed. (2d) 383 (1979).

1991Thus, for the first time, this Court must face the difficult task of interpreting the Baldasar decision. [2] Baldasar was decided after the decision in Scott v. Illinois , 440 U.S. 367 , 99 S.Ct. 1158 , 59 L.Ed. (2d) 383 (1979).

1991Appellant was not incarcerated for the 1980 offense. [1] Appellant relies on Baldasar v. Illinois , 446 U.S. 222 , 100 S. Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed. (2d) 169 (1980), to argue that his prior uncounselled guilty plea cannot be used to enhance his punishment as a repeat offender absent the State's proof of a waiver of counsel.

1991Appellant was not incarcerated for the 1980 offense. [1] Appellant relies on Baldasar v. Illinois , 446 U.S. 222 , 100 S. Ct. 1585 , 64 L.Ed. (2d) 169 (1980), to argue that his prior uncounselled guilty plea cannot be used to enhance his punishment as a repeat offender absent the State's proof of a waiver of counsel.

1977Appellant relies upon Hatchett v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 244 S. C. 425, 137 S. E. (2d) 608 (1964) to support its position that Section 56-9-880 of the 1976 Code of Laws does not restrict the proof of claim procedure to be followed but only prohibits provisions which would defeat coverage.

1936In the case of Craig v. Insurance Co., 80 S. C., 151, 61 S. E., 423, 425 , 18 L.