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13 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1891–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
EOP-Colonnade of Dallas Ltd. Partnership v. Faulknergreen2 sentences2009See id. at 274 . 2009See id. at 274 . | 2 | 2 |
Martinson v. American Family Mutual Insurancegreen2 sentences2018It further determined that the proof of claim condition "does not mean the claim should be filed as soon as practicable after the liability of the insurer has been established." Id. *527 ¶ 32 Martinson 's holding makes sense in the context of a "first dollar" UM claim. 2017Similar to the proof of claim provision in Shugarts' policy, see supra ¶ 14, the proof of claim provision in Martinson required the insured, or any other person making a claim, to "give to the company written proof of claim" "[a]s soon as practicable[.]" Martinson, 63 Wis. 2d at 19 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bakergreen2 sentences1996This court has previously determined that § 343.44(2) "is essentially in the nature of a repeater statute." Steeno v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 663, 672 , 271 N.W.2d 396 (1978); see also State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 64 , 485 N.W.2d 237 (1992) (concluding that "the OAR statute uses prior OAR convictions primarily to enhance punishment"). 1996This court has previously determined that § 343.44(2) "is essentially in the nature of a repeater statute." Steeno v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 663, 672 , 271 N.W.2d 396 (1978); see also State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 64 , 485 N.W.2d 237 (1992) (concluding that "the OAR statute uses prior OAR convictions primarily to enhance punishment"). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Engebretson v. Hekla Fire Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1892Co. 58 Wis. 301 , and Knudson v. Hekla F. Ins. 1891Co. 58 Wis. 301 ; Knudson v. Hekla F. Ins. | 2 | 1891–1892 |
State v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2016Should this court adopt the strong proof requirement set forth in Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 27 , and Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 857 -58? ¶77 I am mindful of the legal landscape allowing sentencing courts to consider all relevant information, including dismissed, uncharged, and unproven offenses. 2016Should this court adopt the strong proof requirement set forth in Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 27 , and Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 857 -58? f 77. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Frey
green
1 sentence2016Frey, 343 Wis. 2d 358, ¶¶45-47 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2016Should this court adopt the strong proof requirement set forth in Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 27 , and Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 857 -58? ¶77 I am mindful of the legal landscape allowing sentencing courts to consider all relevant information, including dismissed, uncharged, and unproven offenses. 2016Should this court adopt the strong proof requirement set forth in Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 27 , and Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 857 -58? f 77. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Waalen
green
2 sentences2008However, the court was forced to repudiate the notion that "material impairment" meant "substantial impairment," as suggested by the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee, Waalen, 130 Wis.2d at 27 , 386 N.W.2d 47 , because that notion appeared to undermine the purpose of the statute by raising the proof requirement for "under the influence" and because the language had no basis in statutory text or legislative history. ¶ 45 The Waalen court made the point that the Motor Vehicle Code did not contain a definition of "under the influence" "at the time th[e] case was initially tried." Id. at 25 , 3 2008However, the court was forced to repudiate the notion that "material impairment" meant "substantial impairment," as suggested by the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee, Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d at 27 , because that notion appeared to undermine the purpose of the statute by raising the proof requirement for "under the influence" and because the language had no basis in statutory text or legislative history. ¶ 45. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Farr
green
2 sentences2002State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 693-94 , 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 658 ). ¶ 24. 2002State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 693-94 , 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 658 ). ¶ 24. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Caldwell
green
2 sentences2002State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 693-94 , 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 658 ). ¶ 24. 2002State v. Caldwell, 154 Wis. 2d 683, 693-94 , 454 N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing Farr, 119 Wis. 2d at 658 ). ¶ 24. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Steeno v. State
green
2 sentences1996This court has previously determined that § 343.44(2) "is essentially in the nature of a repeater statute." Steeno v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 663, 672 , 271 N.W.2d 396 (1978); see also State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 64 , 485 N.W.2d 237 (1992) (concluding that "the OAR statute uses prior OAR convictions primarily to enhance punishment"). 1996This court has previously determined that § 343.44(2) "is essentially in the nature of a repeater statute." Steeno v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 663, 672 , 271 N.W.2d 396 (1978); see also State v. Baker, 169 Wis. 2d 49, 64 , 485 N.W.2d 237 (1992) (concluding that "the OAR statute uses prior OAR convictions primarily to enhance punishment"). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Heimlich v. Kees Appliance Co.
yellow
1 sentence1974Heimlich v. Kees Appliance Co. (1950), 256 Wis. 356 , 41 N. W. 2d 359 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Heimlich v. Kees Appliance Co.
green
1 sentence1974Heimlich v. Kees Appliance Co. (1950), 256 Wis. 356 , 41 N. W. 2d 359 . | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Truesdill v. Roach
green
1 sentence1967As this court stated in Truesdill v. Roach (1960), 11 Wis. (2d) 492, 499, 105 N. W. (2d) 871 , under the summary judgment statute, sec. 270.635, the defendants are entitled to judgment if the proof of their defense is sufficient to defeat the plaintiff. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Jewell v. Sherman
green
1 sentence1898As said in In re Meyer, 78 Wis. 615 -627: “ At the time the proof of claim is made, if the whole debt be due and unpaid, it is the right of the party to present and prove his claim.” Just such a situation as this -was involved in the case of Plankinton v. Gorman, 93 Wis. 560 . | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Plankinton v. Gorman
neutral
1 sentence1898As said in In re Meyer, 78 Wis. 615 -627: “ At the time the proof of claim is made, if the whole debt be due and unpaid, it is the right of the party to present and prove his claim.” Just such a situation as this -was involved in the case of Plankinton v. Gorman, 93 Wis. 560 . | 1 | 1898–1898 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.