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8 Rhode Island opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Rhode Island courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In the Matter of Elcona Homes Corporation, Debtor-Appellant. Green Tree Acceptance, Inc.green2 sentences2001And even though PCU’s contractual setoff right “is not quite the same thing as a mortgage or a security interest. * * * [T]here is little to distinguish between a creditor’s status [in a bankruptcy proceeding] arising from a right of setoff and its status arising from some other type of security entitlement.” 4 Lawrence P. King, Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 506.03[1][b] at 506-17 (15th rev. ed.2000) (quoting In re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483, 485 (7th Cir.1988) (“The only sense we can make of the rule is that it recognizes that the creditor who owes his debtor money is like a secured creditor 2001And even though PCU's contractual setoff right "is not quite the same thing as a mortgage or a security interest. * * * [T]here is little to distinguish between a creditor's status [in a bankruptcy proceeding] arising from a right of setoff and its status arising from some other type of security entitlement." 4 Lawrence P. King, Collier on Bankruptcy, ķ 506.03[1][b] at 506-17 (15th rev. ed. 2000) (quoting In re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483, 485 (7th Cir.1988) ("The only sense we can make of the rule is that it recognizes that the creditor who owes his debtor money is like a secured credito | 1 | 1 |
Bankr. L. Rep. P 73,372 in Re Nathan Davidovich and Amy Jill Davidovich, Debtors. Nathan Davidovich and Christine Jobin, Trustee v. Charles Weltongreen2 sentences2001In re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 1533, 1539 (10th Cir.1990). 2001In re Davidovich, 901 F.2d 1533, 1539 (10th Cir. 1990). | 1 | 1 |
Medeiros v. Hilton Homes, Inc.green2 sentences1990See, e.g., Medeiros v. Hilton Homes, Inc., 122 R.I. 406 , 408 A.2d 598 (1979); Clewley v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R.I. 485 , 59 A. 391 (1904); Dyson v. Rhode Island Co., 25 R.I. 600 , 57 A. 771 (1904). 1990See, e.g., Medeiros v. Hilton Homes, Inc., 122 R.I. 406 , 408 A.2d 598 (1979); Clewley v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R.I. 485 , 59 A. 391 (1904); Dyson v. Rhode Island Co., 25 R.I. 600 , 57 A. 771 (1904). | 1 | 1 |
Donahue v. Hartford Fire Insurance Companygreen2 sentences1980We then held that an insurer could not rely on any of the so-called “notice” provisions of its policy unless it could demonstrate that it had been prejudiced by the lack of notice. 3 Id. at 160 , 282 A.2d at 593 ; Donahue v. *541 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 110 R.I. 603, 604 , 295 A.2d 693, 693 (1972). 1980We then held that an insurer could not rely on any of the so-called “notice” provisions of its policy unless it could demonstrate that it had been prejudiced by the lack of notice. 3 Id. at 160 , 282 A.2d at 593 ; Donahue v. *541 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 110 R.I. 603, 604 , 295 A.2d 693, 693 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Rhode Island. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Daniel v. Cross
green
1 sentence2011Fortunately our High Court provides significant guidance: "Excusable neglect" is a more rigorous standard than "good cause," and it requires a party to show "that the neglect * * * was occasioned by some extenuating circumstances of sufficient significance to render it excusable." Daniel v. Cross , 749 A.2d 6 , 9 (R.I. 2000) (per curiam) (quoting Fields v. S. M. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Carney v. Superior Court
neutral
2 sentences2006Laws § 33-11-16 in Carney v. Superior Court, 30 R.I. 276 , 74 A. 1018 (1910), demonstrates that her failure to file for a proof of claim hearing in the Probate Court within the ten day time period prescribed by that statute does not prevent her from having her claim heard by the Probate Court. 2006Laws § 33-11-16 in Carney v. Superior Court, 30 R.I. 276 , 74 A. 1018 (1910), demonstrates that her failure to file for a proof of claim hearing in the Probate Court within the ten day time period prescribed by that statute does not prevent her from having her claim heard by the Probate Court. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Morris v. Jones
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Clewley v. Rhode Island Company
neutral
2 sentences1990See, e.g., Medeiros v. Hilton Homes, Inc., 122 R.I. 406 , 408 A.2d 598 (1979); Clewley v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R.I. 485 , 59 A. 391 (1904); Dyson v. Rhode Island Co., 25 R.I. 600 , 57 A. 771 (1904). 1990See, e.g., Medeiros v. Hilton Homes, Inc., 122 R.I. 406 , 408 A.2d 598 (1979); Clewley v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R.I. 485 , 59 A. 391 (1904); Dyson v. Rhode Island Co., 25 R.I. 600 , 57 A. 771 (1904). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Dyson v. Rhode Island Company
green
2 sentences1990See, e.g., Medeiros v. Hilton Homes, Inc., 122 R.I. 406 , 408 A.2d 598 (1979); Clewley v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R.I. 485 , 59 A. 391 (1904); Dyson v. Rhode Island Co., 25 R.I. 600 , 57 A. 771 (1904). 1990See, e.g., Medeiros v. Hilton Homes, Inc., 122 R.I. 406 , 408 A.2d 598 (1979); Clewley v. Rhode Island Co., 26 R.I. 485 , 59 A. 391 (1904); Dyson v. Rhode Island Co., 25 R.I. 600 , 57 A. 771 (1904). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Conti v. Geffroy
green
1 sentence1988This court ruled that the affidavit in support of the proof of claim was insufficient to justify a judgment by default because the attorney was not competent to testify about the facts underlying the action. 486 A.2d at 581 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Pickering v. American Employers Insurance
green
2 sentences1980We then held that an insurer could not rely on any of the so-called “notice” provisions of its policy unless it could demonstrate that it had been prejudiced by the lack of notice. 3 Id. at 160 , 282 A.2d at 593 ; Donahue v. *541 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 110 R.I. 603, 604 , 295 A.2d 693, 693 (1972). 1980We then held that an insurer could not rely on any of the so-called “notice” provisions of its policy unless it could demonstrate that it had been prejudiced by the lack of notice. 3 Id. at 160 , 282 A.2d at 593 ; Donahue v. *541 Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 110 R.I. 603, 604 , 295 A.2d 693, 693 (1972). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Fournier v. German American Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1980They assert that the proof-of-loss requirement signifies the Legislature’s concern with fraudulent claims resulting from “arson for profit.” While we grant that a proof of claim is required, in part, to protect an insurer against fraud, Fournier v. German-American Insurance Co., 23 R.I. 36 , 49 A. 98 (1901), we do not believe that application of the Pickering rule will substantially impair the provision’s utility for determining the nature of a fire’s origin. 1980They assert that the proof-of-loss requirement signifies the Legislature’s concern with fraudulent claims resulting from “arson for profit.” While we grant that a proof of claim is required, in part, to protect an insurer against fraud, Fournier v. German-American Insurance Co., 23 R.I. 36 , 49 A. 98 (1901), we do not believe that application of the Pickering rule will substantially impair the provision’s utility for determining the nature of a fire’s origin. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Bell's Adm'r v. Andrews
neutral
1 sentence1902The language of the revised statutes is confined to actions : £ No action against an administrator shall be sustained, etc., unless the demand shall have been exhibited to the administrator and payment demanded.’ In the case of an insolvent estate neither the proof of the claim before the commissioners nor the offer of it in set-off has been regarded as within the meaning of the term ‘action.’” Bell's Admr. v. Andrews, 34 Ala. 538 . | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.