proof claim in Ohio

2016(Other citations omitted.) An abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s “attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶ 12} The Staff Notes to Evid.R. 807 indicate that its independent proof requirement “is comparable to the independent proof requirement of the co-conspirator exception, Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e),” and that “[t]he rule thus goes beyond the minimum Confrontation Clause requirements prescribed in * * * [Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)], as is

2016(Other citations omitted.) An abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s “attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶ 12} The Staff Notes to Evid.R. 807 indicate that its independent proof requirement “is comparable to the independent proof requirement of the co-conspirator exception, Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e),” and that “[t]he rule thus goes beyond the minimum Confrontation Clause requirements prescribed in * * * [Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)], as is

2002In [State d.] Henderson [(1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 , 601 N.E.2d 596 ], the court concluded that a victim’s uncorroborated allegations of sexual abuse did not fulfill the substantial proof requirement that the defendant committed other similar crimes.

2002In [State d.] Henderson [(1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 290 , 601 N.E.2d 596 ], the court concluded that a victim’s uncorroborated allegations of sexual abuse did not fulfill the substantial proof requirement that the defendant committed other similar crimes.

1996L.P. (1993), 507 U.S. 380 , 113 S.Ct. 1489 , 123 L.Ed.2d 74 , the United States Supreme Court, while finding a Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(1) movant’s failure to timely file a proof of claim excusable on other grounds, stated that it gave “little weight to the fact that counsel was experiencing upheaval in his law practice at the time of the bar date.” 2 Id. at 398 , 113 S.Ct. at 1499 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 91 .

1996L.P. (1993), 507 U.S. 380 , 113 S.Ct. 1489 , 123 L.Ed.2d 74 , the United States Supreme Court, while finding a Fed.R.Bankr.P. 9006(b)(1) movant’s failure to timely file a proof of claim excusable on other grounds, stated that it gave “little weight to the fact that counsel was experiencing upheaval in his law practice at the time of the bar date.” 2 Id. at 398 , 113 S.Ct. at 1499 , 123 L.Ed.2d at 91 .

2023Cert. denied subnom, as cited in Lombard v. Cooper, 446 U.S. 984 (1988) and the central tenet and maxim of our republic law of one being held 'innocent until proven guilty' by a jury of ones peers pursuant to 'due process of law' (4th, 5th, 6th Amendments) and those not subjected to slavery, * * *, and/or punishment until such time as one is found guilty of a crime (13th and 14th Amendments). [4.] The application of Ohio Constitution Article I Section 9 under ORC 2937.222, with its added legislative language concerning the proof or presumption that 'the accused committed' the offense charged a

2020No. CT2013-0004, 2013-Ohio-3608, ¶ 53 , citing Walker v. State, 5th Dist.

2016(Other citations omitted.) An abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s “attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶ 12} The Staff Notes to Evid.R. 807 indicate that its independent proof requirement “is comparable to the independent proof requirement of the co-conspirator exception, Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e),” and that “[t]he rule thus goes beyond the minimum Confrontation Clause requirements prescribed in * * * [Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)], as is

2016(Other citations omitted.) An abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s “attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶ 12} The Staff Notes to Evid.R. 807 indicate that its independent proof requirement “is comparable to the independent proof requirement of the co-conspirator exception, Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e),” and that “[t]he rule thus goes beyond the minimum Confrontation Clause requirements prescribed in * * * [Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)], as is

2016(Other citations omitted.) An abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s “attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶ 12} The Staff Notes to Evid.R. 807 indicate that its independent proof requirement “is comparable to the independent proof requirement of the co-conspirator exception, Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e),” and that “[t]he rule thus goes beyond the minimum Confrontation Clause requirements prescribed in * * * [Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)], as is

2016(Other citations omitted.) An abuse of discretion means that the trial court’s “attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157 , 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). {¶ 12} The Staff Notes to Evid.R. 807 indicate that its independent proof requirement “is comparable to the independent proof requirement of the co-conspirator exception, Evid.R. 801(D)(2)(e),” and that “[t]he rule thus goes beyond the minimum Confrontation Clause requirements prescribed in * * * [Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990)], as is

2008It is well-established that, "every contract contain[s] an implied duty for the parties to act in good faith and to deal fairly with each other." Littlejohn v. Parrish (2005), 163 Ohio App.3d 456 , 2005-Ohio-4850 , 839 N.E.2d 49 , ¶ 27.

2008It is well-established that, "every contract contain[s] an implied duty for the parties to act in good faith and to deal fairly with each other." Littlejohn v. Parrish (2005), 163 Ohio App.3d 456 , 2005-Ohio-4850 , 839 N.E.2d 49 , ¶ 27.

2008The aforementioned "stipulation is valid and binding upon the parties to the contract, and no recovery can be had for such work without a written directive in compliance with the terms of the contract, unless the requirement is waived and is treated as being for the benefit of the owner." 18 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d. (2008), Contracts, Section 172, citations omitted. {¶ 36} The Ohio Supreme Court has previously stated that the proof of a waiver "`must either be in writing, or by such clear and convincing evidence as to *Page 17 leave no reasonable doubt about it.'" Foster Wheeler Enviresponse, In

2008Section 523(a)(3)(A) excepts from discharge debts ‘neither listed nor scheduled * * * in time to permit * * * timely filing of a proof of claim, unless such creditor had notice or actual knowledge of the case in time for such timely filing.’ Id. [149 F.3d] at 469.

2008The court stated that in a chapter 7 no-asset ease, there is typically no deadline for filing a proof of claim, and that therefore, ‘there is no date by which a proof of claim must be filed in order to be “timely” and whenever the creditor receives notice or acquires actual knowledge of the bankruptcy, he may file a proof of claim, [and that claim will be timely.]’ Id.

2007In re Tarnow (C.A.7, 1984), 749 F.2d 464 , 467 ; In re Hydorn (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1988), 94 B.R. 608 , 613 . {¶ 27} Without some evidence and some type of cogent legal argument, there was no reason for the trial court to decide that any property taxes were discharged in bankruptcy, and there is no reason for us to reverse the trial court's decision regarding Appellant's motion for summary judgment.

2007In re Tarnow (C.A.7, 1984), 749 F.2d 464 , 467 ; In re Hydorn (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1988), 94 B.R. 608 , 613 . {¶ 27} Without some evidence and some type of cogent legal argument, there was no reason for the trial court to decide that any property taxes were discharged in bankruptcy, and there is no reason for us to reverse the trial court's decision regarding Appellant's motion for summary judgment.

2003Reams v. Stuart (1933), 127 Ohio St. 314 , 188 N.E. 393 , syllabus. {¶ 34} Hughbanks argues that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proof or presumption warranted a denial of bail.

2003Reams v. Stuart (1933), 127 Ohio St. 314 , 188 N.E. 393 , syllabus. {¶ 34} Hughbanks argues that the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proof or presumption warranted a denial of bail.

2002On appeal, the court determined that Dr. Dave did not prove excusable neglect. {¶ 18} The court stated: {¶ 19} “Finding whether neglect is excusable is an equitable determination ‘taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s omission.’ * * * The relevant circumstances envelop the big picture of both causes and effects, including (1) the danger of prejudice to the party opposing the late filing, (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on proceedings, (3) the reason why the filing was late and whether that reason or reasons were within the filer’s reasonable

2001Officer Robles further testified that “once their shoulders started moving, I kind of guessed it was a furtive movement.” The sole reason the van was approached was based on the behavior of Harris and on the officers’ prior police experience. *478 The court, after closing arguments, made the following statement on the record: “Well, while I believe that the officers, arguably, had reasonable and articulable suspicion to effect a Terry-type stop regarding Mr. Harris, I believe what we have here is a ‘hunch’ that does not give rise to the level of the proof of requirement of reasonable and artic

2001Officer Robles further testified that “once their shoulders started moving, I kind of guessed it was a furtive movement.” The sole reason the van was approached was based on the behavior of Harris and on the officers’ prior police experience. *478 The court, after closing arguments, made the following statement on the record: “Well, while I believe that the officers, arguably, had reasonable and articulable suspicion to effect a Terry-type stop regarding Mr. Harris, I believe what we have here is a ‘hunch’ that does not give rise to the level of the proof of requirement of reasonable and artic

2001Officer Robles further testified that “once their shoulders started moving, I kind of guessed it was a furtive movement.” The sole reason the van was approached was based on the behavior of Harris and on the officers’ prior police experience. *478 The court, after closing arguments, made the following statement on the record: “Well, while I believe that the officers, arguably, had reasonable and articulable suspicion to effect a Terry-type stop regarding Mr. Harris, I believe what we have here is a ‘hunch’ that does not give rise to the level of the proof of requirement of reasonable and artic

2001Officer Robles further testified that “once their shoulders started moving, I kind of guessed it was a furtive movement.” The sole reason the van was approached was based on the behavior of Harris and on the officers’ prior police experience. *478 The court, after closing arguments, made the following statement on the record: “Well, while I believe that the officers, arguably, had reasonable and articulable suspicion to effect a Terry-type stop regarding Mr. Harris, I believe what we have here is a ‘hunch’ that does not give rise to the level of the proof of requirement of reasonable and artic

2000See also, In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. (C.A. 3 1996), 96 F.3d 687 , 690 ; Broomall, supra, 786 F.2d at 403 ; In re Unioil v. Unsecured Creditors Committee (C.A. 10 1991), 948 F.2d 678 ; Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co. (C.A. 10 1984), 726 F.2d 620 ; But see, In re Green (C.A. 10 1989), 876 F.2d 854 , holding that formal notice is not required to bind a creditor to the effects of a discharge under Chapter 7 if the creditor had actual knowledge of the proceedings in time to be able to file a proof of claim.

2000See also, In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. (C.A. 3 1996), 96 F.3d 687 , 690 ; Broomall, supra, 786 F.2d at 403 ; In re Unioil v. Unsecured Creditors Committee (C.A. 10 1991), 948 F.2d 678 ; Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co. (C.A. 10 1984), 726 F.2d 620 ; But see, In re Green (C.A. 10 1989), 876 F.2d 854 , holding that formal notice is not required to bind a creditor to the effects of a discharge under Chapter 7 if the creditor had actual knowledge of the proceedings in time to be able to file a proof of claim.

2000See also, In re Trans World Airlines, Inc. (C.A. 3 1996), 96 F.3d 687 , 690 ; Broomall, supra, 786 F.2d at 403 ; In re Unioil v. Unsecured Creditors Committee (C.A. 10 1991), 948 F.2d 678 ; Reliable Electric Co. v. Olson Construction Co. (C.A. 10 1984), 726 F.2d 620 ; But see, In re Green (C.A. 10 1989), 876 F.2d 854 , holding that formal notice is not required to bind a creditor to the effects of a discharge under Chapter 7 if the creditor had actual knowledge of the proceedings in time to be able to file a proof of claim.

1995Wiedemann, 1 Ohio App.3d at 27-28 ,1 OBR at 17-19, 437 N.E.2d at 1213-1215 .

1995Wiedemann, 1 Ohio App.3d at 27-28 ,1 OBR at 17-19, 437 N.E.2d at 1213-1215 .

1994See, generally, Section 522(h), Title 11, U.S.Code; In re Fragapane (N.D.Ohio 1989), 108 B.R. 585 .

1984In a tangential footnote reference, id. at 707 , the majority noted that Leland v. Oregon (1952), 343 U.S. 790 , had approved a state’s imposition of the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity on the defendant and permitted a proof requirement beyond a reasonable doubt.

1984In a tangential footnote reference, id. at 707 , the majority noted that Leland v. Oregon (1952), 343 U.S. 790 , had approved a state’s imposition of the burden of proving the affirmative defense of insanity on the defendant and permitted a proof requirement beyond a reasonable doubt.