12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rochefort v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Rochefort, 279 Ga. at 741 (2); Sims, 258 Ga. App. at 537 (1). 2013See Rochefort, 279 Ga. at 741 (2); Sims, 258 Ga. App. at 537 (1). | 2 | 2 |
Sims v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See Rochefort, 279 Ga. at 741 (2); Sims, 258 Ga. App. at 537 (1). 2013See Rochefort, 279 Ga. at 741 (2); Sims, 258 Ga. App. at 537 (1). | 2 | 2 |
Keystone Automotive v. Hallgreen2 sentences2012See Keystone Automotive v. Hall, 292 Ga. App. 645, 654 (2) ( 665 SE2d 392 ) (2008) (“[Ojnce the unexplained death presumption arises, no further proof is required to satisfy OCGA § 34-9-1 (4).”). 2012See Keystone Automotive v. Hall, 292 Ga. App. 645, 654 (2) ( 665 SE2d 392 ) (2008) (“[Ojnce the unexplained death presumption arises, no further proof is required to satisfy OCGA § 34-9-1 (4).”). | 2 | 2 |
Poole v. U.B. Vehicle Leasing, Inc. (In Re Poole)green1 sentence2012See 11 USC § 362 (automatic stay provision); In re Poole, 242 B.R. 104, 111 (Bankr. | 1 | 1 |
In Re JWKgreen2 sentences2012K., 276 Ga. 314, 316 (2) ( 578 SE2d 396 ) (2003). 7 part of a statute, a court should consider the entire scheme of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative intent from the statute as a whole.9 With these principles in mind, we note that OCGA § 15-11-58, titled “[r]eunification services,” is the statute governing what services are appropriate to help reunify a child with his or her parents after the child has been placed in DFCS custody by court order.10 As noted above, the “reasonable efforts” analysis set forth in Subsection (h) of that statute establishes the standard of proof and 2012K., 276 Ga. 314, 316 (2) ( 578 SE2d 396 ) (2003). 7 part of a statute, a court should consider the entire scheme of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative intent from the statute as a whole.9 With these principles in mind, we note that OCGA § 15-11-58, titled “[r]eunification services,” is the statute governing what services are appropriate to help reunify a child with his or her parents after the child has been placed in DFCS custody by court order.10 As noted above, the “reasonable efforts” analysis set forth in Subsection (h) of that statute establishes the standard of proof and | 1 | 1 |
Newton Lumber & Supply, Inc. v. Crumbleygreen2 sentences2007Trust, 241 Ga. 589, 593 ( 247 SE2d 76 ) (1978) (holding that the filing of a proof of claim in bankruptcy court “within 12 months from the time the amount became due satisfies the requirement of [OCGA § 44-14-361.1 (a) (3)] of commencement of an action for the recovery of the amount of the claim of lien”); Newton Lumber & Supply v. Crumbley, 161 Ga. App. 741, 742 (1) ( 290 SE2d 114 ) (1982) (holding that the filing of a proof of claim constitutes the commencement of an action, and that the failure to timely file notice of that action with the superior court clerk extinguishes the claim of lien 2007Trust, 241 Ga. 589, 593 ( 247 SE2d 76 ) (1978) (holding that the filing of a proof of claim in bankruptcy court “within 12 months from the time the amount became due satisfies the requirement of [OCGA § 44-14-361.1 (a) (3)] of commencement of an action for the recovery of the amount of the claim of lien”); Newton Lumber & Supply v. Crumbley, 161 Ga. App. 741, 742 (1) ( 290 SE2d 114 ) (1982) (holding that the filing of a proof of claim constitutes the commencement of an action, and that the failure to timely file notice of that action with the superior court clerk extinguishes the claim of lien | 1 | 1 |
Weber Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Triple-R Pooler, Inc.green2 sentences2007See Gwinnett-Club Assoc., 242 Ga. App. at 509-510 . 3 See also Weber Air Conditioning v. Triple-R Pooler, 245 Ga. App. 590, 592 ( 538 SE2d 499 ) (2000); Palmer v. Duncan Wholesale, 262 Ga. 28, 31 (2) ( 413 SE2d 437 ) (1992). 2007See Gwinnett-Club Assoc., 242 Ga. App. at 509-510 . 3 See also Weber Air Conditioning v. Triple-R Pooler, 245 Ga. App. 590, 592 ( 538 SE2d 499 ) (2000); Palmer v. Duncan Wholesale, 262 Ga. 28, 31 (2) ( 413 SE2d 437 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Gwinnett-Club Associates, L.P. v. Southern Electric Supply Co.green1 sentence2007See Gwinnett-Club Assoc., 242 Ga. App. at 509-510 . 3 See also Weber Air Conditioning v. Triple-R Pooler, 245 Ga. App. 590, 592 ( 538 SE2d 499 ) (2000); Palmer v. Duncan Wholesale, 262 Ga. 28, 31 (2) ( 413 SE2d 437 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Palmer v. Duncan Wholesale, Inc.green2 sentences2007See Gwinnett-Club Assoc., 242 Ga. App. at 509-510 . 3 See also Weber Air Conditioning v. Triple-R Pooler, 245 Ga. App. 590, 592 ( 538 SE2d 499 ) (2000); Palmer v. Duncan Wholesale, 262 Ga. 28, 31 (2) ( 413 SE2d 437 ) (1992). 2007See Gwinnett-Club Assoc., 242 Ga. App. at 509-510 . 3 See also Weber Air Conditioning v. Triple-R Pooler, 245 Ga. App. 590, 592 ( 538 SE2d 499 ) (2000); Palmer v. Duncan Wholesale, 262 Ga. 28, 31 (2) ( 413 SE2d 437 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Melton v. Pacific Southern Mortgage Trustgreen2 sentences2007Trust, 241 Ga. 589, 593 ( 247 SE2d 76 ) (1978) (holding that the filing of a proof of claim in bankruptcy court “within 12 months from the time the amount became due satisfies the requirement of [OCGA § 44-14-361.1 (a) (3)] of commencement of an action for the recovery of the amount of the claim of lien”); Newton Lumber & Supply v. Crumbley, 161 Ga. App. 741, 742 (1) ( 290 SE2d 114 ) (1982) (holding that the filing of a proof of claim constitutes the commencement of an action, and that the failure to timely file notice of that action with the superior court clerk extinguishes the claim of lien 2007Trust, 241 Ga. 589, 593 ( 247 SE2d 76 ) (1978) (holding that the filing of a proof of claim in bankruptcy court “within 12 months from the time the amount became due satisfies the requirement of [OCGA § 44-14-361.1 (a) (3)] of commencement of an action for the recovery of the amount of the claim of lien”); Newton Lumber & Supply v. Crumbley, 161 Ga. App. 741, 742 (1) ( 290 SE2d 114 ) (1982) (holding that the filing of a proof of claim constitutes the commencement of an action, and that the failure to timely file notice of that action with the superior court clerk extinguishes the claim of lien | 1 | 1 |
Lattimore v. Stategreen2 sentences1995Compare Lattimore v. State, 265 Ga. 102, 104 (3), 106 ( 454 SE2d 474 ), where the Georgia Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction and held “the trial court improperly instructed the jury to return a verdict of guilty on a type of murder not charged in the indictment or included as an offense. ...” This enumeration is without merit. 1995Compare Lattimore v. State, 265 Ga. 102, 104 (3), 106 ( 454 SE2d 474 ), where the Georgia Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction and held “the trial court improperly instructed the jury to return a verdict of guilty on a type of murder not charged in the indictment or included as an offense. ...” This enumeration is without merit. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chambers v. State
green
1 sentence2026In Chambers, 320 Ga. at 770 , the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed the proof requirement for OCGA § 40-6-395, explaining that in order for the State to establish a violation of OCGA § 40-6-395(a) when a driver flees or attempts to elude an officer who is in a police vehicle, the State must prove that the officer was “in uniform prominently displaying his or her badge of office” and that his or her vehicle was “appropriately marked showing it to be an official police vehicle.” Id. at 774(1) (emphasis added). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Action Concrete v. Portrait Homes — Little Suwanee Point, LLC
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 651 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Fulton County v. Colon
green
2 sentences2012K., 276 Ga. 314, 316 (2) ( 578 SE2d 396 ) (2003). 7 part of a statute, a court should consider the entire scheme of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative intent from the statute as a whole.9 With these principles in mind, we note that OCGA § 15-11-58, titled “[r]eunification services,” is the statute governing what services are appropriate to help reunify a child with his or her parents after the child has been placed in DFCS custody by court order.10 As noted above, the “reasonable efforts” analysis set forth in Subsection (h) of that statute establishes the standard of proof and 2012K., 276 Ga. 314, 316 (2) ( 578 SE2d 396 ) (2003). 7 part of a statute, a court should consider the entire scheme of the statute and attempt to gather the legislative intent from the statute as a whole.9 With these principles in mind, we note that OCGA § 15-11-58, titled “[r]eunification services,” is the statute governing what services are appropriate to help reunify a child with his or her parents after the child has been placed in DFCS custody by court order.10 As noted above, the “reasonable efforts” analysis set forth in Subsection (h) of that statute establishes the standard of proof and | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Dull
green
2 sentences1986This issue was decided against him in State v. Dull, 176 Ga. App. 152 ( 335 SE2d 605 ) (1985), in which the proof requirement proposed in Steed was disapproved by Steed's author. 1986This issue was decided against him in State v. Dull, 176 Ga. App. 152 ( 335 SE2d 605 ) (1985), in which the proof requirement proposed in Steed was disapproved by Steed's author. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Armour & Co. v. Ross & Barfield
green
2 sentences1978Further, as stated in Division 2 above, where a claimant has two entirely distinct demands against the insurer — one for the house and the second for living expenses, " '[t]here being at the time no mention of the other or any attempt whatever to settle or adjust [the second claim in the proof of claim], a mere recital in the [proof of claim] that it is "in full payment of all claims to date of whatsoever nature” is without consideration so far as relates to the unsettled demand, and does not estop the person signing the receipt from afterwards asserting the demand, nor does it render it incum 1978Further, as stated in Division 2 above, where a claimant has two entirely distinct demands against the insurer — one for the house and the second for living expenses, " '[t]here being at the time no mention of the other or any attempt whatever to settle or adjust [the second claim in the proof of claim], a mere recital in the [proof of claim] that it is "in full payment of all claims to date of whatsoever nature” is without consideration so far as relates to the unsettled demand, and does not estop the person signing the receipt from afterwards asserting the demand, nor does it render it incum | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Gilpin v. Swainsboro Ice Fuel Co. Inc.
green
1 sentence1978Co., 74 Ga. App. 813, 815 , supra. Thus, the claimant — Mrs. Fordham was not prevented from asserting her claim for "additional living expenses” as it was not included in the first settlement, and she was not required to tender back the amount received for settlement in the disputed claim on the damages to the house. 4. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.