analogous rule in Colorado

2026Id. at 932 . ¶35 Federal courts construing Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 appear to have addressed the objectively reasonable inquiry requirement of that rule more frequently than we 19 have addressed the analogous requirement in C.R.C.P. 11, and because C.R.C.P. 11 closely parallels Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3) (requiring reasonable inquiry), with C.R.C.P. 11(a) (same), we deem it appropriate to look to federal case law for guidance, see Trupp I , 51 P.3d at 990 ("We consider federal precedent when our rule is similar to the federal rule."). ¶36 Federal courts addressing whether counsel wh

2026But because we do not have an analogous rule in the dependency and neglect context, we rely upon counsel’s allegations in the appellate briefs to assess the claim. 26 A. Applicable Law ¶ 48 A parent has a statutory right to effective counsel in dependency and neglect proceedings. §§ 19-1-105(2), 19-3-202(1), C.R.S. 2025; A.R. v. D.R., 2020 CO 10 , ¶ 47.

2020Garcia v. Schneider Energy Servs., Inc., 2012 CO 62, ¶ 7 ; see also Garrigan v. Bowen, 243 P.3d 231, 235 (Colo. 2010)(“Because the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned on the federal rules, we may also look to the federal rules and decisions for guidance.”). ¶ 31 Colorado has an analogous rule to Fed.

2012Id. at 1 46. 37 This reasoning is similar to that which applies under the analogous framework governing mental condition evidence in federal court.

2008Claimant argues that Williams v. Kunau, 147 P.3d 33 (Colo.2006), necessitates our reading a prehearing DIME requirement into the reopening statute.

1996Although these certiorari issues speak to "sovereign immunity,” an analogous immunity was specifically extended to public employees, named in their individual capacities, by the General Assembly in 1985 when it added section 24-10-105, 10A C.R.S. (1988), to the statutory scheme. 20 .As the United States Supreme Court has expressed, "the terms of [the sovereign's] consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 , 110 S.Ct. 1361, 1368 , 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1996Although these certiorari issues speak to "sovereign immunity,” an analogous immunity was specifically extended to public employees, named in their individual capacities, by the General Assembly in 1985 when it added section 24-10-105, 10A C.R.S. (1988), to the statutory scheme. 20 .As the United States Supreme Court has expressed, "the terms of [the sovereign's] consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 608 , 110 S.Ct. 1361, 1368 , 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

1996Therefore, ”[w]hether a claim falls within an exception to the GIA's waiver of sovereign immunity is a question of subject matter jurisdiction and, if raised before trial, it is appropriately addressed under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1).” Fogg, 892 P.2d at 277 .

1983See Padilla v. People, 156 Colo. 186 , 397 P.2d 741 (1964); Coplin v. People, 67 Colo. 17 , 185 P. 254 (1919); II J.

1983See Padilla v. People, 156 Colo. 186 , 397 P.2d 741 (1964); Coplin v. People, 67 Colo. 17 , 185 P. 254 (1919); II J.

1982Having interred the mechanical rule that a creditor’s amenability to a quasi in rem action travels with his debtor, we are unwilling to endorse an analogous principle in the present case.” 444 U.S. at 296 , 100 S.Ct. at 566-67 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 500-01 .

1982Having interred the mechanical rule that a creditor’s amenability to a quasi in rem action travels with his debtor, we are unwilling to endorse an analogous principle in the present case.” 444 U.S. at 296 , 100 S.Ct. at 566-67 , 62 L.Ed.2d at 500-01 .