analogous principle in California

2024That is because those caps tell the local legislative body, “You cannot do X [where X is approving a project 6 This type of preemption also exists in the inverse situation where the local law says, “You must do X,” and the state law says, “You cannot do X.” (City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 743 .) 15 that exceeds the locally enacted housing density cap],” while Senate Bill 10 tells the local legislative body, “You have the option of doing X [opting to exceed the cap] or doing Y [opting not to exceed the cap].” In this situation, the local housing caps “prohibit” what Senate Bill 10 “

2024That is because those caps tell the local legislative body, “You cannot do X [where X is approving a project 6 This type of preemption also exists in the inverse situation where the local law says, “You must do X,” and the state law says, “You cannot do X.” (City of Riverside, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 743 .) 15 that exceeds the locally enacted housing density cap],” while Senate Bill 10 tells the local legislative body, “You have the option of doing X [opting to exceed the cap] or doing Y [opting not to exceed the cap].” In this situation, the local housing caps “prohibit” what Senate Bill 10 “

2024First, they assert that Citizens for Planning Responsibly v. County of San Luis Obispo (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 357 supplies the sole test for assessing preemption of local initiatives, and that none of its three tests for preemption—namely, (1) the Legislature has occupied the field, (2) the Legislature is exclusively delegating the power to enact laws to the local legislative body and shutting down the power to enact local voter initiatives entirely, or (3) the exercise of the initiative power “would impermissibly interfere with an essential governmental function”—applies.

2024First, they assert that Citizens for Planning Responsibly v. County of San Luis Obispo (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 357 supplies the sole test for assessing preemption of local initiatives, and that none of its three tests for preemption—namely, (1) the Legislature has occupied the field, (2) the Legislature is exclusively delegating the power to enact laws to the local legislative body and shutting down the power to enact local voter initiatives entirely, or (3) the exercise of the initiative power “would impermissibly interfere with an essential governmental function”—applies.

2017(See Hernández Ríos, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 1158 .) As Hernández Ríos *456 explained, the California Supreme Court has in essence rejected that argument, albeit in the context of the parallel CALJIC instruction: “On whether a flight instruction permitting a jury to infer ‘awareness of guilt’ is constitutional, the California Supreme Court’s rejection of an analogous challenge to CALJIC No. 2.52 is instructive.

2017In People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 , 6 P.3d 150 ] (Mendoza), the defense argued that ‘the instruction creates an unconstitutional permissive inference because it cannot be said with “ ‘substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Noting that a permissive inference violates due process ‘only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury,’ Mendoza held that permitting ‘a jury to infer, if it so

2017(See generally In re Trombley (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801 , 807, 193 P.2d 734 ["The word 'willfully' ... implies that the person knows what he is doing"].) The requisite scienter for these probation conditions is thus easily ascertainable by reference to " 'other definable sources' " that make sufficiently clear the conditions' scope. ( Acuna , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 1117 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 , 929 P.2d 596 .) When a criminal statute similarly fails to expressly articulate the requisite scienter, we routinely rely on an analogous presumption.

2017(See generally In re Trombley (1948) 31 Cal.2d 801 , 807, 193 P.2d 734 ["The word 'willfully' ... implies that the person knows what he is doing"].) The requisite scienter for these probation conditions is thus easily ascertainable by reference to " 'other definable sources' " that make sufficiently clear the conditions' scope. ( Acuna , supra , 14 Cal.4th at p. 1117 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 , 929 P.2d 596 .) When a criminal statute similarly fails to expressly articulate the requisite scienter, we routinely rely on an analogous presumption.

2017In People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 , 6 P.3d 150 ] (Mendoza), the defense argued that ‘the instruction creates an unconstitutional permissive inference because it cannot be said with “ ‘substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Noting that a permissive inference violates due process ‘only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury,’ Mendoza held that permitting ‘a jury to infer, if it so

2017In People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130 [ 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485 , 6 P.3d 150 ] (Mendoza), the defense argued that ‘the instruction creates an unconstitutional permissive inference because it cannot be said with “ ‘substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Noting that a permissive inference violates due process ‘only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury,’ Mendoza held that permitting ‘a jury to infer, if it so

2015Our independent research has revealed cases addressing an analogous claim, i.e., a claim of prejudicial instructional error regarding the People’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (hereafter, People’s burden) in relation to perfect self-defense. 8 In People v. Sanchez (1947) 30 Cal.2d 560 (Sanchez), the trial court refused the following defense-requested instruction relating reasonable doubt to perfect self-defense: “ ‘In a trial for murder it is not necessary for the defendant to establish self defense by evidence sufficient to satisfy the jury that the self defense was true, but if

2015Our independent research has revealed cases addressing an analogous claim, i.e., a claim of prejudicial instructional error regarding the People’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (hereafter, People’s burden) in relation to perfect self-defense. 8 In People v. Sanchez (1947) 30 Cal.2d 560 (Sanchez), the trial court refused the following defense-requested instruction relating reasonable doubt to perfect self-defense: “ ‘In a trial for murder it is not necessary for the defendant to establish self defense by evidence sufficient to satisfy the jury that the self defense was true, but if

2014A. The Applicable MLS Rules The parties agreed at trial, in accord with their respective experts' testimony, that the MLS rules applied to the parties' relationship and were by definition incorporated by reference into their contract.10 Thus, with respect to the MLS rules, we apply the analogous principle that " '[a]pplicable law becomes part of the contract as fully as if incorporated by reference . . . .' " (City of El Cajon v. El Cajon Police Officers' Assn. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 64, 71 .) Prudential's concession about the contractual nature of its listing is consistent with MLS rule 7.12,

2014A. The Applicable MLS Rules The parties agreed at trial, in accord with their respective experts' testimony, that the MLS rules applied to the parties' relationship and were by definition incorporated by reference into their contract.10 Thus, with respect to the MLS rules, we apply the analogous principle that " '[a]pplicable law becomes part of the contract as fully as if incorporated by reference . . . .' " (City of El Cajon v. El Cajon Police Officers' Assn. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 64, 71 .) Prudential's concession about the contractual nature of its listing is consistent with MLS rule 7.12,

2014Her claim was tried individually after the trial court’s denial of class certification (Heyen, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 799 ) and illustrates the enormous cost of resolving these claims on an individual, rather than a classwide, basis. 17 “[T]ask classification is a mixed question of law and fact appropriate for a court to address separately from calculating the amount of time specific employees actually spend on specific tasks.” (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 330 .) Relying on IWC wage order No. 7-2001 (mercantile workers) and related FLSA regulations, our colleagues in Division Four of

2014Her claim was tried individually after the trial court’s denial of class certification (Heyen, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 799 ) and illustrates the enormous cost of resolving these claims on an individual, rather than a classwide, basis. 17 “[T]ask classification is a mixed question of law and fact appropriate for a court to address separately from calculating the amount of time specific employees actually spend on specific tasks.” (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 330 .) Relying on IWC Wage Order No. 4 (mercantile workers) and related FLSA regulations, our colleagues in Division Four of this

2014Her claim was tried individually after the trial court’s denial of class certification (Heyen, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 799 ) and illustrates the enormous cost of resolving these claims on an individual, rather than a classwide, basis. 17 “[T]ask classification is a mixed question of law and fact appropriate for a court to address separately from calculating the amount of time specific employees actually spend on specific tasks.” (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 330 .) Relying on IWC wage order No. 7-2001 (mercantile workers) and related FLSA regulations, our colleagues in Division Four of

2014Her claim was tried individually after the trial court’s denial of class certification (Heyen, supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 799 ) and illustrates the enormous cost of resolving these claims on an individual, rather than a classwide, basis. 17 “[T]ask classification is a mixed question of law and fact appropriate for a court to address separately from calculating the amount of time specific employees actually spend on specific tasks.” (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 330 .) Relying on IWC Wage Order No. 4 (mercantile workers) and related FLSA regulations, our colleagues in Division Four of this

2013Reliford, which involved an analogous instruction on the use of prior sex crimes evidence, “emphasized that nothing in the instruction at issue authorized the jury to use preponderance of the evidence as the burden of proof on any issue other than the preliminary determination whether the accused 25 committed a previous sexual assault. [Citation.] On that basis, the court rejected the notion that a jury could reasonably interpret the instruction to authorize a guilty verdict of a charged offense on the basis of a lowered standard of proof. [Citation.]” (Reyes, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 253

2013In this, CALCRIM No. 852 . . . [includes] a clarification which inures to the defendant’s benefit.” (People v. Reyes (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 246, 252 .) With respect to an analogous instruction concerning prior sexual offense evidence, our Supreme Court has held: “This instruction [(CALJIC No. 2.50.01)] will help assure that the defendant will not be convicted of the charged offense merely because the evidence of his other offenses indicates he is a ‘bad person’ with a criminal disposition. [Citation.]” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 920 .) Given the state of the evidence and jury instructi

1968The Attorney General argues that the Be Leon interpretation of the effect of Griffin upon this instruction is the correct one because at least three different federal Courts of Appeals have upheld, since Griffin, an analogous instruction in federal narcotics cases. 3 These federal eases have chosen to rely upon United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 658 , 85 S.Ct. 754 ] decided some two months prior to Griffin.

1968The Attorney General argues that the Be Leon interpretation of the effect of Griffin upon this instruction is the correct one because at least three different federal Courts of Appeals have upheld, since Griffin, an analogous instruction in federal narcotics cases. 3 These federal eases have chosen to rely upon United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 [ 13 L.Ed.2d 658 , 85 S.Ct. 754 ] decided some two months prior to Griffin.

1967There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract.' (Italics ours.) "An analogous rule is found in the case of Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App.2d 564 [ 92 P.2d 416 ].

1967There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract.' (Italics ours.) "An analogous rule is found in the case of Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App.2d 564 [ 92 P.2d 416 ].

2024(Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 963 .) But as Anderson makes clear, Houston’s forfeiture analysis is also relevant to whether such a pleading error is harmless.

2024(Gitmed, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 827 .) Gitmed found that Brown’s “analogous reasoning squares section 581, subdivision (f)(2) with other pleading situations where ‘. . . it is generally recognized that an untimely pleading is not a nullity, and it will serve to preclude the taking of default proceedings unless it is stricken. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Accordingly, once the amended pleading is filed, the court must first grant a motion to strike the pleading before the action can be dismissed.” (Gitmed, at pp. 827–828.) Defendants attempt to further distinguish Gitmed as involving an ex pa

2024But we did analyze an analogous claim in People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991 (Lang).

2024As the court notes, we announced an analogous rule nearly 50 years ago in Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592 .

2024As the court notes, we announced an analogous rule nearly 50 years ago in Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592 .

2024Indeed, Gitmed relied on Brown v. Brown (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 54 , in which an amended complaint was filed nine months after the demurrer was sustained, but the court nevertheless held, drawing from an analogous rule in default judgment proceedings, that the filing of the amended complaint precluded dismissal.

2023For instance, in Nader, supra, 426 U.S. 290 , the United States Supreme Court held the analogous doctrine of primary jurisdiction10 did not preclude a plaintiff’s fraud claims targeting an 9 Gallivan recognized that nondiscrimination concerns are “ ‘alleviated’ ” in a putative class action, but the court noted there were still remaining policy concerns regarding agency authority, justiciability, and institutional competence.

2023For instance, in Nader, supra, 426 U.S. 290 , the United States Supreme Court held the analogous doctrine of primary jurisdiction10 did not preclude a plaintiff’s fraud claims targeting an 9 Gallivan recognized that nondiscrimination concerns are “ ‘alleviated’ ” in a putative class action, but the court noted there were still remaining policy concerns regarding agency authority, justiciability, and institutional competence.