analogous defense in Kansas

1983“Although Kansas interjects comparative negligence principles into areas which ‘previously were considered beyond the ordinary tort negligence situation’ (Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 452 , 618 P.2d 788 [1980]), the court in Arredondo v. Duckwall Stores, Inc., 227 Kan. 842 , 610 P.2d 1107 (1980), had qualified the application of the statute by stating: “ ‘If contributory negligence or an analogous defense would not have been a defense to a claim, the comparative negligence statute does not apply; if contributory negligence would have been a defense, the statute is applicable.’ 227

1983“Although Kansas interjects comparative negligence principles into areas which ‘previously were considered beyond the ordinary tort negligence situation’ (Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 452 , 618 P.2d 788 [1980]), the court in Arredondo v. Duckwall Stores, Inc., 227 Kan. 842 , 610 P.2d 1107 (1980), had qualified the application of the statute by stating: “ ‘If contributory negligence or an analogous defense would not have been a defense to a claim, the comparative negligence statute does not apply; if contributory negligence would have been a defense, the statute is applicable.’ 227

1983“Although Kansas interjects comparative negligence principles into areas which ‘previously were considered beyond the ordinary tort negligence situation’ (Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 452 , 618 P.2d 788 [1980]), the court in Arredondo v. Duckwall Stores, Inc., 227 Kan. 842 , 610 P.2d 1107 (1980), had qualified the application of the statute by stating: “ ‘If contributory negligence or an analogous defense would not have been a defense to a claim, the comparative negligence statute does not apply; if contributory negligence would have been a defense, the statute is applicable.’ 227

1983“Although Kansas interjects comparative negligence principles into areas which ‘previously were considered beyond the ordinary tort negligence situation’ (Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 452 , 618 P.2d 788 [1980]), the court in Arredondo v. Duckwall Stores, Inc., 227 Kan. 842 , 610 P.2d 1107 (1980), had qualified the application of the statute by stating: “ ‘If contributory negligence or an analogous defense would not have been a defense to a claim, the comparative negligence statute does not apply; if contributory negligence would have been a defense, the statute is applicable.’ 227

2009The court noted that in interpreting the good cause requirement of Rule 4(j), federal courts “have consistently held that, to be entitled to a ‘good cause’ extension, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he has made reasonable and diligent efforts to serve process prior to seeking an extension of time. [Citations omitted.]” (Emphasis added.) 141 F.R.D. at 325-26 . *287 In looking at the facts of its case, the Fidelity court found that there was nothing to indicate that the plaintiff even attempted to serve the defendants before seeking the 30-day extension under K.S.A. 60-203(a)(1).

2007Barnett counters that the most analogous claim is a statutory claim for employment discrimination and cites this court’s decisions in Wagher v. Guy’s Foods, Inc., 256 Kan. 300 , 885 P.2d 1197 (1994), and Wright v. Kansas Water Office, 255 Kan. 990 , for her contention that the 3-year limitations period for “liability created by statute” should apply.

2007Barnett counters that the most analogous claim is a statutory claim for employment discrimination and cites this court’s decisions in Wagher v. Guy’s Foods, Inc., 256 Kan. 300 , 885 P.2d 1197 (1994), and Wright v. Kansas Water Office, 255 Kan. 990 , for her contention that the 3-year limitations period for “liability created by statute” should apply.

2007Barnett counters that the most analogous claim is a statutory claim for employment discrimination and cites this court’s decisions in Wagher v. Guy’s Foods, Inc., 256 Kan. 300 , 885 P.2d 1197 (1994), and Wright v. Kansas Water Office, 255 Kan. 990 , for her contention that the 3-year limitations period for “liability created by statute” should apply.

2003“If contributory negligence or an analogous defense would have been a defense to a claim before comparative fault was adopted, then the comparative negligence statute is applicable to the same facts. [Citations omitted.]” 247 Kan. at 256 .

1980Tennessee had occasion to consider an analogous clause in Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn. 506 , 241 S.W.2d 548 (1951).

1980Tennessee had occasion to consider an analogous clause in Hall v. Crocker, 192 Tenn. 506 , 241 S.W.2d 548 (1951).

1973In Hospital Co. v. Philippi, 82 Kan. 64 , 107 Pac. 530 , this court considered the question of premature filing and said: “Where the devisee of the will brought the action before the will was probated, and later, when it was probated, filed an amended and supplemental petition, on which the cause of action was tried, the objection that the action was prematurely brought became immaterial.” (Syl. f 3.) An analogous principle is stated in 1 C.

1973In Hospital Co. v. Philippi, 82 Kan. 64 , 107 Pac. 530 , this court considered the question of premature filing and said: “Where the devisee of the will brought the action before the will was probated, and later, when it was probated, filed an amended and supplemental petition, on which the cause of action was tried, the objection that the action was prematurely brought became immaterial.” (Syl. f 3.) An analogous principle is stated in 1 C.

1957Co., 157 Kan. 535 , 142 P. 2d 838 ; and Smith v. Kansas Transport Co., 172 Kan. 26 , 238 P. 2d 553 .) An analogous rule is indicated where appeal is taken from the ruling of the trial court overruling the motion for new trial, but the ruling is not specified as error.

1957Co., 157 Kan. 535 , 142 P. 2d 838 ; and Smith v. Kansas Transport Co., 172 Kan. 26 , 238 P. 2d 553 .) An analogous rule is indicated where appeal is taken from the ruling of the trial court overruling the motion for new trial, but the ruling is not specified as error.

1957(McIntyre v. Dickinson, 180 Kan. 710 , 307 P. 2d 1068 , and cases cited therein.) The result is that defendants’ specification of error — challenging the judgment as against the weight of evidence, and considering all of it to be true, that the judgment is erroneous as a matter of law — presents nothing for appellate review.

1957(McIntyre v. Dickinson, 180 Kan. 710 , 307 P. 2d 1068 , and cases cited therein.) The result is that defendants’ specification of error — challenging the judgment as against the weight of evidence, and considering all of it to be true, that the judgment is erroneous as a matter of law — presents nothing for appellate review.

1957Co., 157 Kan. 535 , 142 P. 2d 838 ; and Smith v. Kansas Transport Co., 172 Kan. 26 , 238 P. 2d 553 .) An analogous rule is indicated where appeal is taken from the ruling of the trial court overruling the motion for new trial, but the ruling is not specified as error.

1957Co., 157 Kan. 535 , 142 P. 2d 838 ; and Smith v. Kansas Transport Co., 172 Kan. 26 , 238 P. 2d 553 .) An analogous rule is indicated where appeal is taken from the ruling of the trial court overruling the motion for new trial, but the ruling is not specified as error.

1926(Case v. Bartholow, 21 Kan. 300, 308 , syl. ¶ 3.) When the interstate commerce commission gave its approval to an advance of the interstate rate specified on page 144 of the Missouri Pacific Tariff No. 4746-C, and that rate was published by Supplement No. 14 thereto, the higher Missouri river rate included therein was thereby advanced from 22.5 cents per hundredweight to 27.5 cents per hundredweight, thereby increasing it above the Kansas rates governing the transportation of these 31 carloads of wheat, and the balance due plaintiff from defendant according to the Kansas local distance tariffs

1887Perhaps the most liberal expression of the analogous doctrine of cruelty that has judicial sanction is the view of this court expressed in the case of Carpenter v. Carpenter, 30 Kas. 712 .