analogous rule in Texas

2021Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 791–92.

2015The procedure itself does not necessarily extend to the place where the procedure is to be performed; in the circumstances of this case, the alleged fact that the facility was not a tertiary facility was not, as a matter of law, a material risk.36 35 The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed an analogous claim in Adler v. Kokemoor, 199 Wis. 2d 615 , 545 N.W.2d 495 (1996) (where [***62] plaintiff pro- duced evidence showing defendant misrepresented mortality rates and his experience performing surgery, with respect to lack of informed consent claim, court properly allowed plaintiff to introduce evi

2015The procedure itself does not necessarily extend to the place where the procedure is to be performed; in the circumstances of this case, the alleged fact that the facility was not a tertiary facility was not, as a matter of law, a material risk.36 35 The Wisconsin Supreme Court addressed an analogous claim in Adler v. Kokemoor, 199 Wis. 2d 615 , 545 N.W.2d 495 (1996) (where [***62] plaintiff pro- duced evidence showing defendant misrepresented mortality rates and his experience performing surgery, with respect to lack of informed consent claim, court properly allowed plaintiff to introduce evi

2015The record in this case establishes the privity relationship between Zbranek and Bella Cima, and Bella Cima and the Allbaughs. 18 Mid-Continent also cited MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows, 434 S.W.3d 132 (Tex. 2014), which involves an analogous principle.

2015There the court observed, in the context of an implied warranty claim arising out of a sale of used yacht engines, that as a matter of Texas common law “[w]hen a manufacturer disclaims implied warranties, such express language necessarily applies downstream to subsequent purchasers, as Buyer # 2 cannot tenably boast a greater warranty than that given to Buyer # 1.” Id. at 133-34 .

2008Compare Tex. R App. P. 60.2 with Tex. R App. P. 43.2; see also In re Doe I, 19 S.W.3d at 327; In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d at 283-84 .

2002Id. at 465-66 (citing Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex.1978)).

1995In Ward v. Scarborough, 236 S.W. 441 (Tex.Comm’n App.1922, judgm’t adopted), the court applied an analogous rule to uphold the court of appeals’ dismissal of a writ of error appeal that had been filed after the opposing party had perfected an ordinary appeal from the same judgment.

1988The parallel between "an employer" and "the insurer" is too obvious to require any elaboration, but I think it valid. *505 In Little v. Bryce, 733 S.W.2d 937 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ), I expressed my views in a concurring opinion on the harshness of the "employment-at-will" doctrine, consisting of its inherent indifference to the hardship and trauma of unemployment imposed thereby on the worker, whether professional or unskilled, who depends solely upon his labor to earn his livelihood.

1987In resolving this challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are guided by the analogous standard set out in Van Guilder v. State, 709 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.Crim.App.1985).

1986Two Texas courts have interpreted the analogous state-rule requirement to mean that there are “questions which when answered as to one class member are answered as to all class members.” Amoco Production Co. v. Hardy, 628 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex.App.1981, writ dism’d); RSR Corp. v. Hayes, supra. This rule appears to be a sensible approach to the problem, and following the analysis in Amoco, we first inquire concerning what questions will predominate in a trial on the merits under the allegations made by Austin Supply.

1985They would have us adopt an analogous rule to that announced in Welch v. Mathews, 642 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1982, no writ).

1933Chief Justice Gaines, in Bomar v. West, 87 Tex. 299 , 28 S. W. 519, 520 , construed an analogous clause contained in a deed of trust securing a series of several notes, and concluded that there is no such right in one of several payees of a note providing for acceleration at the option of the “holder.” In Aat case, one Skinner made five promissory notes to one Bomar, payable one, two, three, four, and five years after date, re- speetively, to secure payment of which Skinner executed a deed of trust, which contained this clause: “In default of the payment of said notes, or of either of them, th

1933Chief Justice Gaines, in Bomar v. West, 87 Tex. 299 , 28 S. W. 519, 520 , construed an analogous clause contained in a deed of trust securing a series of several notes, and concluded that there is no such right in one of several payees of a note providing for acceleration at the option of the “holder.” In Aat case, one Skinner made five promissory notes to one Bomar, payable one, two, three, four, and five years after date, re- speetively, to secure payment of which Skinner executed a deed of trust, which contained this clause: “In default of the payment of said notes, or of either of them, th

1926App.) 277 S. W. 1039 , where in determining the conclusiveness of a judgment, it was declared that the bar of a former judgment might be removed by stipulation or thereafter by agreement proceeding to trial and a new judgment.

1877In the case of Weet v. Brockport, the court, after an elaborate and careful review of the previous decisions, and thorough discussion of the question, held, upon the authority of Lord Mansfield, in the case of Whitfield v. Lord Le Despencer, Cowp., 754, that “a public officer who received no compensation from, and owes no duty to any private individual, is accountable to the public alone for his neglect.” An analogous doctrine, it is also said, may be found asserted in Brooke’s Abr., title, “Action in the Case,” upon the authority of the Year Books, that if a highway be out of repair, so that